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Abstract 
Although government guarantee scheme has become a well-known policy strategy for 
encouraging public-private infrastructure delivery. However, a huge concern with 
government guarantee in PFI/PPP is the issue of weak public accountability scrutiny. This 
study therefore investigates accountability mechanisms necessary for evaluating PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme within UK context. Using exploratory sequential mixed 
methodology approach, constructs from accountability theory (Process-Based Accountability 
Mechanisms, Ethics-Based Accountability Mechanisms, Democratic Accountability 
Mechanisms, and Outcome-Based Accountability Mechanisms) were examined. Sixteen (16) 
accountability mechanisms (value for money, parliamentary scrutiny, rule of law etc.) useful 
for evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme were identified and used to formulate 
theoretical hypotheses. Through literature review, documentation and case study interviews 
with experts in public and private sectors, 78 indicators contributing towards each 
accountability mechanism were uncovered. Confirming the relevance of each indicators from 
experts in the qualitative study, a final questionnaire survey was developed and distributed to 
wider audiences. Series of statistical tests were performed on the collected questionnaire data 
including Descriptive Mean Rating, Reliability Analysis, Mann Whitney U Test of 
Significant Differences in Perceptions and Structural Equation Modelling. The results 
revealed fourteen out of the sixteen tested hypotheses were valid, with two rejected 
(Benchmarking and Budgetary Reporting). Findings also identified the top-five 
accountability mechanisms critical for evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme 
comprising: Value for Money, Competition, Social and Political Impact, Risk Management, 
and Parliamentary Scrutiny. The study culminated in a multidimensional framework for 
public accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. Contributing towards 
existing accountability theory, the study confirmed a combination of multiple 
accountabilities, as against a single-dimensional accountability, is necessary for strengthening 
public accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. For UK policy formulators, 
the result suggested need for future re-dimensioning of accountability frameworks for 
infrastructure government guarantee schemes, especially as the nation faces new geo-political 
and economic complexities in years to come. 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1.0 Background 
Since the last two decades, government guarantee schemes such as the UK Guarantee 
Scheme for Infrastructure (UKGSI), have become a popular tool for encouraging Private 
Finance Initiatives (PFI) and Public Private Partnership (PPP) Projects (Burke and Demirag, 
2015). Guarantees are a fiscal policy instrument for supporting infrastructure investments 
(Viana, 2016), particularly when government is better placed to control and minimise 
associated risks (Caselli, et al. 2015). With guarantees, many economies have been able to 
attract long-term finances for critical infrastructures in different sectors such as road, 
education, water, power, etc. (Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Caselli, et al. 2015), while 
reducing investors’ risk exposures (Blyth, 2013). However, despite its strategic role, 
accountability remains a major issue in public sector guarantee (Alonso-Conde et al., 2007; 
Xu et al., 2014). Beyond the challenge of ambiguity regarding its accounting treatments 
(Bova, 2016); the contingent costs of guarantees and the huge fiscal implications have lately 
generated much concerns, particularly regarding UK’s PFI/PPP projects (Campbell et al., 
2009; Willems and Van Dooren, 2016, National Audit Office, 2016).  
 
As highlighted by Sarraf and Mohammadnazari, (2016), concerns about government 
guarantees for PFI/PPPs have intensified due to series of debates surrounding the empirical 
validity of most assumptions upon which PFI/PPP was advocated. During its formative stage 
in the early 1990s (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; Robinson and Scott, 2009; Bae and Joo, 
2016), many policy makers and practitioners had argued that PFI relieves pressure on fiscal 
budget and de-escalate rising national debt (Caselli, et al. 2015).  Enthusiasts contended that 
through “Off Balance Sheet” financing, PFI allows government to transfer most projects’ 
risks to the private sector, whilst freeing available resources for other crucial national needs 
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(Li et al., 2005; Villalba-Romero and Liyanage, 2016; Delmon, 2017). However, several 
years on, scholarly evidences and published reports have shown that, not only did many 
PFI/PPP projects ended up on governments’ balance sheets (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; 
Hood et al., 2006; OBR, 2015), the assumptions of value for money (VFM) and risk transfer 
for which PFI was advocated remain strongly contestable (Sparkman, 2002; Asenova and 
Beck, 2010; Villalba-Romero and Liyanage, 2016). With recent government statistics 
revealing 98% of PFI/PPP projects in the UK, an estimated £39.4 billion (representing about 
2.1% of GDP) worth of PFI deals were recorded as on-balance sheet transactions (OBR, 
2015, pp. 41-42). Therefore, the biggest issue for PPPs, despite its flaws (i.e. weak 
transparency in transactions, rising public debt, ambiguous claims of VFM, eroded 
democratic control, politicisation etc.) is how to address the serious accountability questions 
raised with the use of additional (contingency) debt via government guarantee scheme to 
promote PFI/PPPs (NAO, 2015). 
1.1 Research Problem 
According to Burke and Demirag, (2015), the use of government guarantee especially 
financial guarantees for promoting PFI/PPP infrastructure investments raises very salient 
questions of public accountability. Oliveira et al. (2016) argued that guarantees transfer huge 
risk to the public sector because government becomes responsible for liabilities arising from 
any project failure. This apparently aggravates accountability concerns, especially as the 
horizontal nature of relationship between government and private sector in PPPs requires 
both parties to mutually share risks and ensure project success (Hodge and Greve, 2007; 
Willems, 2014). In another related study, Love. et al (2010) argued that government 
guarantee erodes the important notion of “risk-reward” relationship in PFI/PPP transactions. 
In others words, by allowing government to assume additional risks on projects via issuance 
of guarantees, the private sector ends up taking limited or no risks at all (Oliveira et al., 2016; 
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Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Such situation, without any doubt breeds serious moral hazards, 
rent seeking and corruption, with dire consequences for both public and the private sector 
stakeholders (Farhi and Tirole, 2012).  
 
 In addition, the popular accounting treatment of accrual method and budgetary reporting of 
guarantees (Marcel, 2014; Kopits, 2014) have been criticised as ineffective and needs to be 
used in combination with other governance reforms and mechanisms (Laughlin, 2012; Guess 
and Ma, 2015). Also, Breton et al., (2012) and Wibowo and Alfen, (2015) recently critiqued 
the use of guarantees for PFI/PPPs, arguing that such contingent liabilities when combined 
with the huge future unitary payments on PFI projects, poses danger to public finances. This 
perspective confirms report on fiscal sustainability from the UK’s Office of the Budget 
Responsibility, which revealed a cumulative spending of £51.7 billion on signed off PFI deals 
between 2015-16 and 2019-20 (OBR, 2015, pp. 27). Coming from the above background, the 
impact of using government guarantees for promoting PFI/PPPs has become a major issue for 
public sector finance and thus called for urgent and holistic accountability scrutiny (Wibowo 
and Alfen, 2015; Grande and Visco, 2011; Willems, 2014). 
 
 
Existing literature have made efforts to examine accountability issues in public sector 
guarantees (Takashima et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2014; Newberry, 2015; Chowdhury et al., 
2015). For instance, in recent studies by Kluvers and Tippett (2010) and Weil et al., (2013), 
accountability in public sector guarantees have been linked to the problem of its age-long 
traditional cash accounting treatment, which many governments have, until recently preferred 
for managing state aids. According to Emek and Acar (2015), “Cash-Based Accounting” and 
reporting treatment provides policy makers and the legislature with very insufficient 
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information needed to hold public managers accountable on the management of fiscal 
guarantees (Robinson, 1998; Connolly and Hyndman, 2006). Its’ greatest weakness, which 
lies in delayed recognition of government expenditures have allowed guarantees to escape 
more public scrutiny (Emek and Acar, 2015), while many governments have accumulated 
fiscal burdens to massive proportions through this means (Weil et al., 2013). 
  
Although Weil et al. (2013) highlighted the importance of “Accrual-based Accounting” 
techniques for handling guarantees, as used by many major economies, while also suggesting 
its relative reporting clarity of contingent liabilities (due to its immediate capture of future 
liabilities in current balance sheet). However, Newberry (2015) challenged that accrual-based 
appropriations by government weakens legislative control on the executive arm of 
government especially in relation to managing sovereign debt. Hausman (2012) argued that 
accountability in guarantees remain at the mercy of politicians and policy manoeuvres (Irwin 
and Mokdad, 2009).  According to Romero and Liyanage (2016), in many instances, the 
introduction of government guarantees has had more political undertones than even economic 
motivations.  Bachmair (2016) suggested that many policy makers embrace government 
guarantees majorly to avoid making painful structural reforms.  This ensures guarantees 
enjoy more political preference, even when other forms of fiscal support such as direct 
funding, credit reinsurance or bond support would have yielded better results (Arata et al., 
2016).  According to Moser et al. (2008) and Bringselius (2014), a number of guarantee 
schemes have also been enmeshed in serious allegations of corruption (i.e. including the UK 
export guarantee), with policy objectives being greatly undermined as many beneficiaries 
undercut guarantee policy rules.  
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While studies have continued to examine fiscal risks, including accounting and budgeting 
issues in government guarantees (Irwin and Mokdad, 2009; Takashima et al., 2010; 
Bringselius, 2014; Grande and Visco, 2011; Willems, 2014; Emek and Acar, 2015). Bae and 
Joo, (2016) explored the policy suitability and implications of government guarantees on a 
host of topics including financial institutions’ risk appetite. However, despite their immense 
contributions, an apparent gap in knowledge has become noticeable as most studies have 
focused on fiscal issues relating to guarantees and its financial reporting on public sector 
balance sheet (Cangiano et al., 2006; Takashima et al., 2010; De Bruyckere, et al., 2013; 
Bringselius, 2014). These has obviously led to a neglect of the numerous public 
accountability issues raised with the adoption of government guarantee for promoting 
infrastructure PPPs. Government guarantee scheme for PFI/PPP therefore remains a serious 
public finance issue, which gets even more complicated amid recent relentless public-private 
collaborations and investments by government, coming on the back of insufficient rigorous 
public scrutiny. Based on this knowledge gap, there is an urgent need for robust 
accountability mechanisms and processes for protecting public interest in PFI/PPP 
government guarantees (Wibowo and Kochendoerfer, 2010; Takashima et al., 2010; Forrer et 
al., 2010; Laughlin, 2012; 3. Bae and Joo, 2016). To fill this identified gap in knowledge, 
this study therefore sets out to ask the big question:  
 
“How can public accountability be strengthened in the evaluation of government guarantee 
scheme for PFI/PPP infrastructures?  
 
In order to approach the above big question in a more comprehensive manner that provides 
in-depth insights into UK’s public and private sector stakeholders’ perspectives, further 
questions can be added to elaborate on the big question: 
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1.2 Research Questions 
(1) What accountability mechanisms are necessary for strengthening public 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme?  
(2) Are there similarities or differences in public and private sector stakeholders’ 
perceptions concerning the accountability mechanisms and their associated indicators? 
(3) What are the underlying crucial accountability mechanisms essential for ensuring 
public accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantees scheme in the UK? 
 
1.3 Justification for study 
The World Bank in her 2007 report on “allocating and valuing risk in privately financed 
infrastructure” already identified poor handling of contingent liabilities (i.e. guarantees, 
pensions) and associated fiscal risks as a major contributor to the 2000-03 economic crises. 
However, despite this acknowledgement, current political posture of many advanced 
economies including the UK has suggested unrelenting entrenchment of public-private 
collaborations that is facilitated by huge state guarantees (Hodge and Greve, 2007). As a 
result, guarantees to PPPs, regardless of concerns for accountability or fiscal implications, 
looks to remain pivotal to most European governments’ infrastructure policies. In the case of 
the UK, the recent £40billion unconditional government guarantee scheme for infrastructure 
seems to have intensified concerns as to whether government was better served by using 
traditional procurements or private sector driven procurement routes (NAO, 2015; Wynne, 
2015). Or rather, whether government is indeed justified to incentivise private sector, whose 
original role in PPP is to take risk in return for commensurate reward (Hodge and Greve, 
2007; Forrer et al., 2010). This has become a major issue especially as the UK government 
looks caught between balancing divergent policy objectives. From austerity-propelled deficit 
reduction agenda (Bracci et al., 2015), to private debt financing of critical infrastructures and 
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the challenge of growing Public Sector Net Debt that currently stands at £1,790.4 billion 
(OBR, 2017, pp.68). It is therefore fair to say that the UK government seems to have a 
herculean task at hand. 
 
Albeit, the government targeted £483 billion infrastructure investment between years 2015-
2020 (NIP, 2014); the risks from investment will become higher should guarantees be 
required to make such deals bankable to the private sector. This will confirm arguments 
raised by McKinnon and Pill (1999) and Nier and Baumann (2006), that guarantees have 
become government’s tool for pampering the private sector, at tax payers’ expense. Coming 
from this point of view and considering UK government’s determination to intensify private 
sector led infrastructural investments (NIP, 2014; NAO, 2015), the urgent need for robust 
accountability mechanisms for effectively managing government guarantees is clearly 
evident (Willems, 2014). 
  
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of this study is to evolve a public accountability framework suitable for 
evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme in the UK. In this regard, the following 
objectives were identified for the study. 
1. To identify important accountability mechanisms and associated indicators for 
evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
2. To explore differences in perceptions among UK public and private sector 
stakeholders on each identified accountability factors regarding their suitability in the 
context of PFI/PPP government guarantee. 
3. To identify the top-ranked underlying mechanisms suitable for strengthening public 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
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4. To develop a structural model for evaluating accountability in PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme. 
 
1.5 Unit of Study  
Babbie (2013. pp.98) defined a unit of analysis as “those things we examine in order to create 
summary descriptions of all such units and to explain the differences among them”. 
According to Jaffe (1989), unit of study or analysis describes the object of the research (i.e. 
an individual, a group, organisation or phenomena). The features of such objects are carefully 
examined and consequently summarised to make general assumption about a larger group or 
phenomena.  
 
Within the context of this study, the major aim is to develop an accountability model for 
evaluating and managing government guarantee for PFI/PPP Projects in the UK. Hence, the 
unit of analysis is a “Project”. Albeit, “Project as a unit of Analysis” in project management 
may have raised issues, especially as it relates to whether projects should be examined as “an 
object” or as “an actor” (Engwall, 1998, pp.26), this study takes a holistic view of projects. It 
considers a project as embodying objects, actors, processes and structures and as such, we 
focus specifically on government guaranteed PFI/PPP projects from a public accountability 
perspective.  To that end, three case studies of specific PFI/PPP projects in the U.K that were 
financially guaranteed by the UK government were investigated. In the same vein, since the 
study employed an exploratory sequential mixed method approach, huge amount of the 
qualitative data used in the study were therefore obtained from the said guaranteed PPP 
projects. 
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1.6  Research Methodology 
This study stems from a “Subjectivist” cum “Objectivist” epistemological background. It 
combines in a single study, two contrasting world views about the nature of reality and the 
paths to knowledge acquisition. The notion of “knowledge of reality that is based on 
participants’ own interpretations” is given equal consideration with “a pre-existing notion of 
knowledge that is obtained via scientific methods” (Blaikie, 2011; Bally, 2012). As a result, 
the study adopted exploratory sequential mixed methodological approach and emerged from 
a critical realism philosophical paradigm. Interpretivists’ (qualitative) approaches that include 
theoretical review of literature, case study interviews and documentary analysis were 
combined with positivists’ instrument such as questionnaire survey (quantitative).  
 
In addition, the research strategy adopted is “Multiple Case Study Strategy” by exploring the 
perspective of public and private sector employees on accountability mechanisms in 
government guaranteed PPP/PFI projects in the UK. The study examined three (3) existing 
PPP projects in the UK that were backed by government guarantee cover. These case studies 
were used at the exploratory stage of the study to confirm various accountability mechanisms 
suitable for evaluating PPP projects at government guarantee level. Combined with evidences 
from literature review, 23 semi-structured interviews and document analysis were used to 
inform questionnaire survey to 118 wider audiences among UK public and private sector 
stakeholders. Below is the highlight of research instruments used in the study: 
 
 Theoretical review of literature 
 Multiple Case studies of government guarantee-backed PFI/PPP projects in the UK. 
 Semi-Structure Interviews 
 Documentation Analysis. 
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 Questionnaire Survey. 
 Data Analysis (Descriptive Mean Rating, Reliability Analysis, Mann Whitney U Test 
& Structural Equation Model). 
1.6.1 Sampling Strategy 
While maximum variation sampling was used in this study to identify suitable government 
guarantee–backed PFI/PPP projects as case studies. Purposive sampling approach was used to 
identify information-rich participants (UK public servants and private sector participants) for 
semi-structured interviews in order to implement the qualitative phase of the research. On the 
other hand, the quantitative stage of the study adopted snowball sampling to gradually build a 
pool of questionnaire respondents and distribution to wider audiences of UK public and 
private service experts with experiences in infrastructure government guarantee and PFI/PPP 
infrastructures respectively.  
1.6.2 Case Studies  
Case study research involves an in-depth study of events, persons, phenomena or projects 
(Cohen et al., 2007; Johansson, 2003). As suggested by Fellow and Liu (2008), case studies 
may be employed in a study to gain insight into a scenario under scrutiny, using a wide range 
of research instruments such as interview, observation, archival analysis, reports and 
questionnaire. In this study, multiple-case studies of three (3) government guarantee-backed 
PPP projects in the UK were identified for indepth investigation. These include Six-lane Toll 
bridge in Northwest England, Power Station Project in South West England, and Rail Line 
Extension, South East England. These case studies were explored in terms of accountability 
issues encountered and most importantly, the accountability mechanisms used for ensuring 
policy objectives are achieved and projects evaluated. 
 
28 
 
1.6.3 Interviews and Documentation 
Interview is a qualitative research tool used for exploring the perceptions of research 
participants concerning a phenomenon (Basch, 1987). Types of interviews include 
unstructured (in-depth), semi-structured and structured interview (questionnaire) (Neuman, 
2007). In this study, the experiential views of UK public sector employees about government 
guarantees and PFI/PPP projects are being captured through semi-structured interviews. As 
such, twenty-three (23) UK public and private sector experts of various categories with prior 
experiences in infrastructure government guarantee and or PFI/PPP projects in the UK were 
interviewed. Triangulation was also ensured for the qualitative data through the analysis of 
project documents relating to government and accountability procedures for evaluating and 
approving guarantees were examined.  
1.6.4 Questionnaire 
To confirm wider relevance and generalizability of findings elicited through the literature 
review and identified case studies, questionnaire survey to 118 wider audiences among the 
UK public and private sector employees was administered.  
1.6.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
A mix of qualitative and quantitative data analysis was employed in this study. Nvivo 10 
qualitative analysis software was used for thematic analysis of existing literature, 
documentary reports and semi-structured interviews with UK public and private sector 
subject matter experts. This helped unravel various themes and sub-themes from the 
qualitative data. On the other hand, IBM Amos SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) 
was used for quantitative analysis of the data. Asides confirming the reliability of the data, 
the IBM AMOS SPSS ensured the development of a structural equation model for evaluating 
public accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
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1.6.6 Research Approach (Explorative to Exploitative Approach) 
 
 
Figure 1.1:The Research Approach (Qualitative approach feeds into in the quantitative 
approach)  
1.7 Contribution to Study 
A study is considered useful if it facilitates interaction between practitioners and 
academicians to explore each other’s perspectives in a broader manner and work together to 
analyse results. Due to global proliferation of project finance technique and Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP) from both public and private sectors, indepth understanding of issues of 
public accountability raised in such arrangements and associated issues is therefore essential. 
This is even more important as government resources are often involved in large amounts 
with recent PPP mega projects. As such, understanding of the relevant processes, structures 
and mechanisms to protect public interest and ensure accountability must be in place. This 
research therefore contributes to existing body of literature in two ways:  
Quantitative Approach
(Questionnaire Survey)
Qualitative Approach
Literature 
Review
Documentation
Unstructured 
Interviews
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1.7.1 Contribution to Theoretical Knowledge.  
This research contributes to existing accountability theories in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
study confirms Boven’s (2010) assertion that both “accountability as a virtue” and 
“accountability as a mechanism” are collectively needed to strengthen public accountability. 
Although this study examined accountability mechanisms for evaluating PFI/PPP guarantee 
scheme, themes such as reporting, transparent bidding and tendering, responsibility - all of 
which are normative concepts that mirrors accountability from a virtuous perspective, were 
reflected in the research findings, and also statistically contributed towards study. The 
implication of this is that, for public accountability, especially in transactions with blurry 
lines of accountability between public and private parties, such as PFI/PPPs, the combination 
of high moral standards and strong institutional mechanisms of accountability will be 
important.  
 
Similar to the above perspective, whilst exploring process accountability, Tetlock and 
Mellers (2011b), opined that most accountability mechanisms are a constantly evolving 
process-outcome hybrids that lean towards either side, depending on the context or task. 
According to Tetlock and Mellers, the desirability of one type of accountability is often based 
on context within which the accountee operates at a given time. As such, in this study, 
process, ethics, democratic and outcome-based accountabilities were used as theoretical 
constructs to classify a number of accountability mechanisms investigated. Based on the 
results from the study, only two accountability mechanisms (benchmarking and budgetary 
visibility/reporting), each from process and outcome-based accountability constructs were 
rejected by the respondents. Also, there was no clear cut evidence of any statistically 
significant differences of opinion on accountability mechanisms among respondents on the 
basis of their dimension. The implication of this result confirms Tetlock and Mellers (2011), 
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including Sinclair (1995) suggested that accountability forums favour different types of 
accountability tools at certain times based on whether their needs are well served by its 
adoption.  
 
Additionally, this study supports existing assertions in earlier studies such as Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2005) and Sainati et al (2017) that the theoretical notion of off-budget financing of 
PPPs is untenable since most of the PPPs implemented so far in the UK ended up on 
government’s balance sheet. The conclusion in this study, is therefore based on the study’ 
findings which highlighted how, most contingent liabilities incurred in the name of 
facilitating PFI/PPPs end up on public sector balance sheet and drive up public sector net 
debt, which indirectly affects a nation’s sovereign credit rating.  
 
1.7.2 Contribution of Study to Public Policy 
 
This study contributes to public policy on infrastructure procurement by suggesting a holistic 
blend of accountabilities that delivers public value through ethical, democratic and outcome 
driven processes. Evidences from this study already suggest that, successful management of 
guarantees depends on how much accountabilities are built into the processes of its 
evaluation, the assessment of its outcome, the strategies for preventing unethical practices, as 
well as the extent of democratic control. Apparently, results from the study have huge 
implications especially for the UK public sector managers. The findings represent an urgent 
call to policy makers and public administrators to understand that there is no “one size fits 
all” approach towards addressing public accountability issues in government guarantees for 
PFI/PPPs. As suggested by Atmo and Duffield (2014), and De Castro et al. (2016), the 
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situation in government guarantees for PFI/PPP is quite complex considering that, guarantee 
changes the balance and nature of risk allocation in most PPP contracts. This very dicey 
situation presents huge challenge to public finance in the UK, especially at a time when the 
global economy faces its longest period of turbulences. 
 
In addition, going by the results of this study which unravelled top-five accountability 
mechanisms for evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme which includes, Value for 
Money (VFM), Competition (C), Socio-Political Impact (SPI), Risk Management (RM) and 
Parliamentary Scrutiny (PS). The policy implication of these results for government is that, 
future government guarantee evaluation for PFI/PPPs can integrate these key accountability 
mechanisms into their due diligence appraisals. This will help ensure that a more 
comprehensive approach that strengthens public accountability is taken whilst making 
decisions on deserving projects under the infrastructure guarantee scheme. 
 
1.8 Scope of Study 
The scope of this study is the UK public service including central, regional and local levels 
that has played active roles in successful development and implementation of government 
policies, including the implementation of Private Finance Initiatives (PFI). Hence, the study 
would be carried out within the institutional, legal and policy frameworks of PFI procurement 
in the United Kingdom. The study also focused on exploring the opinions of UK’s public and 
private sector experts on issues relating to public accountability mechanisms, PFI/PPPs and 
government guarantees. Their responses helped in the development of a structural model for 
safeguarding public accountability in government guarantees to PFI/PPPs. While three case 
studies of PPP projects previously backed with government guarantees were explored, only 
experts with experiences in guarantees and, or PPPs were interviewed. The study also 
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considered only experts with UK public and private sector experience between 2-25 years, 
considering that PFI in the UK only became one of government’s procurement policy in early 
1990s. This therefore helped ensure that selected interview and questionnaire respondents had 
rich experience and knowledge of government guarantees and or PFI/PPP projects. However 
some limitations of the study include the principal focus on the United Kingdom. A major 
reason for this was due to access to data sources, especially interview participants. In 
addition, the study also focused on perspectives of UK’s public and private sector 
stakeholders alone. Other economies using government guarantees for PPPs have not been 
considered in this study.  
 
Furthermore, this study also focused mainly on Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) and Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) projects that have been backed with government guarantee. As 
such, other methods of infrastructure procurement including contracting and concession were 
excluded from this study. Another limitation of this study is that only three UK infrastructure 
PFI/PPP projects were considered for the multiple-case qualitative investigation in this study. 
A major reason for this is because the UK currently has a small but growing portfolio of 
government guarantee-backed PFI/PPP projects.  This research is also limited to 
accountability mechanisms and their significant contribution towards strengthening public 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. Hence, other forms of 
accountability including managerial accountability, personal, legal, or political 
accountabilities were not considered in this study. 
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     Chapter Structure 
 
Fig 1.2: The structure of the Thesis 
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1.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter explored contemporary issues relating to accountability in PFI/PPP 
infrastructure procurement and government guarantees in the UK. Global economic realities 
of the last two decades, coupled rising national debt amid growing infrastructure demands 
have led the UK government to adopt Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) for infrastructure 
delivery. However, while performance of so called privately procured public projects has 
recorded mixed results; concerns have been raised about public accountability in such 
transactions. This is especially as government now uses public sector guarantees to encourage 
the participation of private investors in such financial huge projects. To that extent, the 
central theme in this chapter focused on how accountability can be strengthened in the 
handling and management of government guarantees to PPPs. A major gap in knowledge 
identified is the paucity of research into key accountability mechanisms necessary for 
ensuring the protection of public interest in guaranteed projects against abuse, while 
achieving policy objectives. This chapter therefore sets the motion for the gaps in knowledge 
as well as justification for the study with a major focus on exploring concepts from 
accountability theory, to investigate the phenomenon. 
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Chapter Two: Project Finance, Public Private Partnerships (PPP) 
and Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) and Accountability 
Questions 
 
2.0 Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter two aims to set a solid foundation for the study by commencing with section 2.1 
which provides overview of history and principles underpinning project finance. Section 2.2 
examines Project Finance technique and compares it to other forms of financing approach 
(corporate finance, asset finance and forfeiture finance model), including the various sectors 
in which project finance method is being used. Section 2.3 explores the features of project 
finance and its global application. Section 2.4 extensively examines the “Public Private 
Partnership” (PPP) procurement model and the emergence of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
in the United Kingdom. Section 2.6 examines accountability issues in PFI/PPPs. Section 2.7 
Focuses on Public Sector Guarantees, while section 2.8 examines the recent UK Guarantee 
Scheme for Infrastructures (UKGSI). 
 
2.1  History and Concepts Underpinning Project Finance 
There have been several attempts by researchers across the literature to develop a universal 
definition for Project Finance, with many studies attempting to underpin the definitions 
around the core issues in project finance. However, in a recent study by Yescombe (2013, 
P.7); a consensus definition of Project Finance was presented by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as: 
“ The financing of a particular economic unit in which a lender is satisfied to 
consider the cash flows and earnings of that economic unit as the source of funds 
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from which a loan will be repaid and to the assets of the of the economic unit as a 
collateral for the loan” 
 
Kayser (2013) and Slivker (2011) also described project finance as a financing methodology, 
used for raising capital on a non-recourse or limited-recourse basis, towards funding an 
economically-independent capital project, where the financing decision is based on project’s 
ability to make debt repayments and reward capital invested, at a margin commensurable 
with the amount of risk inherent in the project being executed. In another in-depth study on 
drivers of economic growth in emerging nations, Kleimeier and Versteeg (2010) also viewed 
project finance as a unique financial instrument that results in more economic development, 
improved investment, administration, and governance. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
study, efforts have been made to evolve a more comprehensive definition for project finance 
as:  
 
“a financing technique whereby  large capital projects are executed through a newly formed, 
legally independent project company, also referred to as a special purpose vehicle, which is  
funded by a mixture of equity (shares or mezzanine debt) injected by private investors, 
coupled with a non-recourse or limited recourse debt raised by syndicate of lenders, under 
an arrangement where the debt is primarily repaid to the lender, from the forecasted cash 
flows generated from the project with the project assets serving as collateral“. 
(Hoffman, 2008. pp.4; Mills, 2010; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Gatti, 2008; Comer, 1996; 
Visconti, 2013, Zhang, 2005).  
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Figure 2.1: Simple demonstration of project finance arrangement 
  
In the last two decades, project finance has become the preferred mechanism for financing 
high-risk, large-scale infrastructure projects (Visconti, 2013; Demirag et al., 2011). Project 
finance is often applied, where the capital investments required and risk involved in projects 
far surpass the capacity of a single company, or even any consortium of firms (Kleimeier and 
Megginson, 2001; Delmon, 2011). This infrastructure finance method has attained much 
global relevance especially at the wake of the recent global financial crisis of 2007/2008 
(Demirag et al., 2011; Meng and McKevitt, 2011; Gardner and Wright, 2011). Typically, the 
average maturity of a project finance contract is in the range of 25-30years (Oyedele, 2013; 
Kleimeier and Megginson, 2001). According to Malini (1997) and Gatti (2008), the 
application of project finance technique allows private investors to finance new commercial 
ventures without incurring additional debts on existing balance sheet of the firms, since the 
new ventures exist as a separate entity (See Fig. 2.1 for Simple Demonstration of Project 
Finance Arrangement).  
39 
 
 
However, despite the wide acceptability given to project finance, it is not a new financing 
approach. According to Comer (1996) and Finnerty (2013), the history of project finance 
dates back, at least to 1299 AD when the English Royal Crown funded the exploration of the 
Devon Silver Mines, by reimbursing the Italian Merchants Bank (Frescobaldi) with 
production from the mines. As opined by Comer, the Italian Bankers were granted a one year 
mining and lease franchise, which gave them the opportunity to mine as much silver as 
possible during that year. In another related study, Yescombe (2013) argued that project 
finance techniques had been used in the 1880s when the French Bank Credit Lyonnais 
provided finance to the development of the Baku Oil fields in Russia. Additionally, as 
highlighted by Gardner and wright (2011), Roman and Greek merchants were also suggested 
to have been traded using the project finance approach to allocate risks inherent in their 
maritime trade, by repaying loans through the proceeds from their voyage cargoes.  
 
More recently however, the development of the North Sea Oil fields in 1970s (Finnerty, 
2013), the construction of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline in U.S, the Ras Laffan LNG project in 
Qatar (Farrell, 2002), Teesside power project in the United Kingdom, the Petrozuata heavy 
oil project in Venezuela, and several other high profile projects across many sectors of the 
global economy (See Table 2.1 and Fig. 2.2 below), were made possible using the project 
finance technique (Kleimeier and Megginson, 2001; Comer, 1996; Farrell, 2002). As a result, 
global application of project finance has grown dramatically from an annual investment of 
$12.5 billion (bn) in 1991 to $113.4 (bn.) in 2005 (Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2010).  
According to Kleimeier and Versteeg (2010), almost 4000 projects have been procured across 
113 countries, with total infrastructure project finance investments between 1991 and 2005 in 
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the range of $1077bn (Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2010), while a record of $375bn project 
investment was made in year 2012 alone (Yescombe, 2013; Demirag et al., 2011). 
 
Table 2.1: Global Volumes of Project Finance investment by sector (2010) 
Sectors                  US$ % 
 Telecommunications 
Transportation 
 Power 
Leisure & Property 
Oil & Gas 
Petrochemicals 
Industry 
Mining 
Water and Sewerage 
Water and Recycling 
Agriculture and Forestry 
 
13,382.70 
52,315.40 
73,300.40 
13,824.20 
25,950.80 
11,306.40 
6,306.00 
8,857.70 
1,577.50 
1,266.60 
86.3 
6.43% 
25.13% 
35.21% 
6.64% 
12.47% 
5.43% 
3.03% 
4.25% 
0.76% 
0.61% 
0.04% 
Global Total 208,173.90 100.00% 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Sectorial representation of global project finance market 
 
 
 
                 US$ 
Telecommunications
Transportation
 Power
Leisure & Property
Oil & Gas
Petrochemicals
Industry
Mining
Water and Sewerage
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2.2  Comparing Project Finance with Other Forms of Finance  
 
While, there are different approaches for financing a project, not all approaches are 
considered as project finance from the perspective of the lender (Mills, 2010). In this regard, 
this section therefore briefly examines the various existing methods of financing projects, 
while pinpointing the unique peculiarities of each approach as they differ from project 
finance. 
2.2.1  Corporate Finance 
 
Corporate finance, also known as “Complete Recourse Finance”  or “Balance Sheet Finance” 
(Hoffman, 2008) is a financing approach in which an existing firm raises capital from a 
lender by means of debt (loan) using its own assets and cash flows as a guarantee (Gatti, 
2008; Beaney, 2005).  In corporate finance, loans are granted to the investor rather than to a 
distinct project company (See Fig.2.3 for diagram showing the direction of loan in corporate 
finance). Hence, a lender has complete recourse to the assets represented on the balance sheet 
of the borrower in the event that a loan is being defaulted (Gatti, 2008; Mills, 2010; 
Kleimeier and Megginson, 2001; Slivker, 2011). As such, lender’s credit appraisal for 
corporate loans is carried out by examining the credit and operating history of a business, in 
order to identify areas of vulnerabilities, weaknesses and strength in the existing firm 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001; Mills, 2010). In order to grant corporate loan, lenders require 
some form of guarantee from the borrower, which serves as collateral security towards 
mitigating default risk (Hoffman, 2008). 
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Figure 2.3: Nature of Loan Advances under Corporate Finance. 
2.2.2  Project Finance 
On the other hand, project finance is an “Off-Balance Sheet” method of financing, which 
allows private investors to raise loan through a newly formed limited liability company, also 
known as Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), in order to finance a mutually exclusive project. In 
project finance, the project company has no prior operating or credit history (Gatti, 2008). 
Hence, repayment of debt to lenders is made entirely from expected streams of cash flows 
generated from the financed project (Comer, 1996; Delmon, 2011; Hoffman, 2008). Lender’s 
appraisal is therefore solely based on the degree of predictability of future cash flows from 
the project (Chemmanur and John, 1996). As a non-recourse or limited recourse type of 
financing, lenders have little or no access to the balance sheet of the investor in the event of 
project failure, since bank loans are given directly to the new SPV, as against the investor 
(Hoffman, 2008; Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000). Fig. 2.4 depicts the how loans are granted 
in project finance. 
   
 
Figure 2.4: Nature of Loan Advances in Project Finance 
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2.2.3  Asset-Based Finance 
Asset-based financing is mainly used for providing structured working capital and term loans 
to businesses (Finnerty, 2013), where such loans are secured by an asset (i.e. accounts 
receivable, inventory, machinery, equipment and/or real estate). Here loans are granted 
directly for the purchase of an asset required for the operations of a business (See Fig. 2.5 for 
the nature of loan in asset-based finance). Asset-based finance represents a sharp contrast 
from project finance, in that lender’s appraisal centres mainly on the commercial value of the 
asset to be financed, as against the balance sheet of the firm (Blanc-Brude and Strange, 2007; 
Hoffman, 2008). As a result, in the event of default on loan, lenders have the recourse power 
to over such asset (Carter and Barrett, 2006).  
 
Figure 2.5: Nature of Loan granting in Asset-Based Finance 
2.2.4  Forfeiture Model of Finance 
Forfeiture model is a method of financing projects in which a private contractor sells a claim of 
payment arising from the construction of a project for the public authority, to the bank (Daube et al., 
2008). The payment claims automatically makes the lender a creditor to the public authority who is 
now under the obligation to pay for the project’s construction cost to the bank by issuing a waiver of 
objection indicating its’ indebtedness to the bank (Loay, 2012). Where the project involves operation 
and maintenance, the operating charge will be made directly by the public sector to the private 
contractor. Table 2.2 below examines the similarities and differences in the four methods of 
financing: corporate finance, project finance, asset-based finance and forfeiture finance model. 
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Table 2.2: Diagram showing major similarities and difference among the four (4) approaches to finance 
Factor Project Finance Corporate Finance Asset Finance Forfeiture Model 
Loan Collateral Project Cash Flows and Assets 
 
 
Company and personal assets of the 
borrower 
Company 
Assets/inventories/Account 
Receivables 
Claim of 
Payment/Waiver of 
Objection Certificate 
Accounting 
Treatment 
 
Off-Balance Sheet 
 
 
On-Balance Sheet 
 
On-Balance Sheet 
 
On-Balance sheet 
Capital Structure  
Highly Leveraged 
 
 
Low leverage 
 
Low Leverage 
Complete 
Nature of Bank 
Lending 
 
Limited or Non- Recourse 
 
 
 
Complete Recourse 
 
Complete Recourse 
 
Non-Recourse 
Lenders 
Appraisal 
Cash flow Predictability of 
project 
 
 
Operating and Credit history of 
Borrower 
Commercial Value of 
prospective Assets 
Investors credit History 
and Public Authority’s 
credit rating 
 
Cost of Borrowing 
 
High Cost of Borrowing 
 
 
 
Cheaper cost of borrowing 
 
Cheaper than Project finance 
 
Cheaper than project 
finance 
 
Corporate 
identity 
 
SPV is separated from the 
project sponsors 
 
 
Borrower’s identity is same with 
company 
 
Borrowers identity is same with 
the company 
 
Borrower is separated 
from the project 
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2.3 Project Finance and Its Global Application 
Since its emergence into the modern financing arena, project finance has been widely used 
across many sectors of the global economy (telecoms, Oil and Gas, Energy and Power 
sectors etc.). Prior to this time, the project finance technique had been majorly applied to 
financing large capital investments in projects such as on-shore/off-shore oil fields or 
mining operations with project volumes typically beyond hundreds of millions of US$ 
(Comer, 1996).  However, the early 1990’s saw this financing methodology being applied to 
medium-sized capital projects (Demirag et al., 2008). 
 
According to Shen et al. (2006), the introduction of Public Private Partnership (PPP) scheme 
has resulted in wider application of project finance strategy. PPP model reflects the 
underlying principles of project finance in terms of financing and contractual arrangements 
(Delmon, 2011). Table 2.3 below highlights some of the sectors in which project finance 
technique has been used to facilitate investments.  
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Table 2.3: Common Sectors where the application of Project Finance has been more prolific in recent time 
            
               Oil and Gas 
 
 
         
Telecommunications 
       
Infrastructures via 
PPP/PFI 
                   
           Power & 
Energy 
 
Other Sectors 
 Exploration and 
development of 
oil fields, 
  pipelines, 
  Liquefied 
Natural Gas 
export and 
import plants, 
  petrochemicals,  
 Pipelines etc. 
 
 Satellite Networks  
 Fibre upgrades 
 wireless / mobile, 
wire-line projects, 
 Cloud computing 
Infrastructures. 
 Telepresence 
Infrastructures  
PFI/PPP Concessions:  
(User pays or Public 
sector pays) 
 Toll Roads 
 Hospitals 
 Schools 
 Prisons 
 Malls 
 Water 
 Waste and Sewage 
facilities 
 Football stadium 
 Ports 
  Airports 
 power 
generation 
(PPAs) & 
transmissions,  
 Sustainable 
Energy: 
 Wind 
Farms 
 Photovoltai
cs 
 Solar 
energy 
 Hydro 
Power 
projects 
 Leisure & Property 
 Water & Sewerage  
 Waste & Recycling  
 Agriculture & 
Forestry 
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2.4 Important Principles of Project Finance 
 2.4.1  Non-Recourse Financing 
 In non-recourse financing, the lender solely relies on the project cash flows as the means of debt 
repayment (Dew, 2005). Therefore, lender’s access to the project sponsor(s) is limited to the 
amount of equity contributed by the sponsor(s). As such, where the project cash flows become 
insufficient to fulfil debt repayment obligations, lenders have no legal powers to convert the 
assets of the sponsor. In the same view, the project sponsor has no legal obligation to make 
payments for the debt or accrued interest on the project (Hoffman, 2008; Delmon, 2011; 
Kleimeier and Megginson, 2001). The underlying assumption behind non-recourse financing is 
that project sponsors transfer all risk inherent in a project, to the lenders who then charges a very 
high interest on loan to cover for returns on investment as well as the risk assumed on the project 
(Mills, 2010; Delmon, 2009).  
2.4.2 Limited Recourse Financing 
Project finance has mostly been referred to as ‘Limited Recourse Finance’ and this is because 
there is hardly any financing that is entirely non-recourse (Hoffman, 2008). Limited Recourse 
lending is founded on the argument that, well-structured project financing requires careful 
analysis of inherent project risks, with every party to the project assuming certain risk, which it 
has control over (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002). In this regard, the lender may still have certain 
limited recourse to the sponsor, most likely to the extent of the sponsors’ equity contribution and 
in some cases, as may be agreed upon between the lender and sponsor during the pre-funding 
negotiation.  
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2.4.3  Off-Balance Sheet Financing 
According to Shah and Thakor (1987) and Delmon (2011), in project finance arrangements, the 
project sponsor (borrower) is able to finance new capital investments off the balance sheet of the 
existing company. As such, debts and liabilities arising from the new project do not impact on the 
leverage structure of the existing company, but rather increases the debt capacity of the sponsor 
(Chemmanur and John, 1996). Off Balance sheet financing allows the possibilities of bypassing 
the debt constraints imposed by accounting rules on existing balance sheets of companies 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999).  
2.4.4  Risk Sharing and Transferability 
One of the major attractions in project finance is the equitable distribution of project risks among 
various stakeholders involved in the project, including the lender (Daube et al., 2008). As 
highlighted by the HM Treasury (2007a) and other studies such as  Hoffman (2008), Thomas et al. 
(2006), Yescombe (2007) and Zhang (2005), project finance allows project risks to be 
contractually transferred or allocated among stakeholders under the principle of allocating risks to 
the party that best manages and controls such risk. According to Hoffman (2008), risk allocation 
or diversification engenders successful delivery of projects since each party has a stake and some 
roles to play towards the development of the project. Although there is an economic cost 
(premium) for transferring risks to parties in project finance, but sponsors are usually willing to 
accept such costs as long as it is reasonable (Klein, 1997; Wibowo and Kochendörfer, 2005). 
2.4.5  High Leverage Capital Structure 
The capital structure of a project company in typical project finance contracts is a mixture of debt 
and equity. However, unlike in corporate finance, the amount of equity capital or subordinate 
loan, which is usually contributed by a private investor is quite less ( in the range of about 10% - 
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30% of a project’s construction cost), while lenders (banks) provide the largest share, known as 
senior debt, up to the tune of 70% - 90% (Yescombe, 2013; Shah and Thakor, 1987; Brealey et 
al., 1996).  According to Hoffman (2008), the ratio of debt to equity in project finance is not static 
and often varies among projects. There are instances where the project lender may not be 
convinced of the credit risk of the sponsor or the predictability of the projected cash flows (Mills, 
2010). Such situations will often influence the Debt Equity Ratio accepted by the financier 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2002). 
2.5 Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and Private Finance Initiatives (PFI)  
The most common form of project finance in recent years is the Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
scheme (Gardner and Wright, 2011). According to Ng et al. (2012), a number of partnership and 
collaborative programmes between Governments and the private sector had existed since around 
1970s. However, the emergence of the UK version of PPP known as Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI), in November, 1992 led to the global proliferation of project finance, and had since become 
the model application of project finance technique (Oyedele, 2013, Demirag et al., 2011). 
 
Public Private Partnership is defined as:  
“A long term contractual relationship between parties in the public sector and the 
private sector for the purpose of providing public infrastructures such as roads, rail 
networks, Hospitals, schools etc.” (Delmon, 2011. p.2).   
Yescombe (2007) also referred to PPP as a private sector investments in public utilities, which 
involves long-term provisioning of service by the private sector, and the management of risks 
inherent in projects. In another related study by Jacob et al. (2014), the term Public Private 
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Partnership was also described as a holistic model which involves planning, construction, 
funding, operations, and maintenance of public infrastructural projects by private sector parties. 
 
According to Malini (2006) and Liu et al. (2014), PPP has become the preferred procurement 
method for public infrastructures, and has continued to receive global acclaim, against the 
backdrop of the widening gap between state resources and the immediate demands for 
infrastructures. In PPP arrangements, the age long traditional method of procurement through 
budgetary allocations is completely jettisoned by the public sector. The public sector is 
therefore allowed to bypass budgetary constraints to ensure that finance as well as innovative 
technologies of the private sector are optimally tapped to deliver large infrastructure facilities 
such as: Roads, Schools, Hospitals, Prisons etc. (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Zhang, 2005).  
 
According to Oyedele (2013), the underlying philosophy in PPP is using the finance and 
entrepreneurial skills of the private sector to develop facilities through a whole life approach. 
Whole life approach in PPP involves construction, operations and maintenance of constructed 
facility throughout the tenure of the contract, which usually ranges from 25-30 years (Demirag 
et al., 2011; Ng et al., 2012). This approach stems from the assumption in public sector that the 
private sector is better positioned to transparently deliver quality and timely projects with a 
better value for money to the taxpayers (Delmon, 2011).  
 
PPP projects are usually very complex, high-risk, long-term commercially driven projects, which 
require extensive paper work and negotiations (Delmon, 2009).  Most PPPs are carried out 
through a newly formed project company (SPV), which is established for the specific purpose of 
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executing a particular project, where the project cash flows and assets serves as both collateral 
and source of debt repayments to the project lenders (Yescombe, 2007). According to Delmon 
(2011), PPP projects are mostly implemented through Concession Contracts, which represents an 
explicit agreement of output specifications and performance standards between the Government 
and the private sector consortium. Other contractual structures in PPP include: Lending Contract, 
Offtake Contract, Operations and Maintenance Contract, Construction Contract, Input Supply 
Contract, Lenders direct contracts with Construction and O&M contractors etc. (Delmon, 2011). 
 
A notable assumption in PPP is the transfer of risks inherent in a project from the public sector 
party to the private sector consortium, who then manages these risks through effective and 
equitable allocation of risks to the party that best controls such risk (HM treasury, 1997b; 
Hoffman, 2008). The major parties in PPP arrangements usually include the project company, 
the public sector as the procuring authority, syndicate of lenders, construction, and facilities 
management (FM) sub-contractors (See Fig.2.6 for parties involved in PPP contracts).  There is 
also a lifecycle sub-contractor, an insurer, an off-taker and various input suppliers; all bonded by 
various contractual agreements that requires ensuring successful delivery and operation of the 
project (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Oyedele, 2013).  
52 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Major parties to PFI/PPP arrangement and the complex contractual relationships 
Typically in PPPs, the public sector enters into a concession contract with the project company, 
where the SPV is charged with the responsibility for the design, build, finance and operation 
(DBFO) of  a facility as well as maintaining and servicing it throughout the concession term 
(Ogunsanmi, 2014).  The public sector pays the SPV a “Unitary Charge” at regular intervals (i.e. 
monthly or quarterly) over the life of the contract (Mills, 2010).  However, the unitary charge 
payment is usually dependent upon the project’s achievement of various contractual deliverables 
stipulated in the concession contract (availability and operation targets). 
 
In most cases, payments of the unitary charge does not commence until after the new facilities 
have been constructed. This suggests that the procuring authority (government) only makes 
payment for the service being provided by the private sector (Oyedele, 2013). However, in other 
instances, the authority may seek to retain responsibility for delivering the main public service, 
as is common in education or medical services, which often adopt Build and Transfer (BT) PPP 
procurement model (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004, Hoffman, 2008).  
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2.6 Procurement Models in PFI/PPP  
 
According to Regan et al. (2010) and Delmon (2011), there are various procurement models or 
structures in PPP. While most of these models involve eventual transfer of projects to the public 
sector, they all indicate different types of cooperation within the wider range of public-private 
partnerships. Table 2.4 below presents some of the procurement models in PPP Arrangements. 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Procurement Models in PFI/PPP. 
Models Full Meaning 
BOO Build-Own-Operate 
BOOT Build-Own-Operate-Transfer 
DMO Design-Manage-Operate 
DBF Design-Build-Finance 
BOT Build-Own-Transfer 
DCMF Design-Construct-Manage-Finance 
DBFO Design Build Finance Operate 
DFBOT Design Finance Build Operate Transfer 
DFO Design Finance Operate 
BOOM Build Own Operate Maintain 
LDO Lease Develop Operate 
 
Source: (Mishrah and Muhanty, 2010; Delmon, 2011, Zhang, 2005) 
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Rather than using these structures to differentiate PPPs from one another, its’ accepted to 
consider them as representing diverse forms of cooperation that may be used or combined for 
delivering projects. Some of the most common of these PPP structures are the BOT, BOOT, 
DBFO and DBF (Yescombe, 2011). These structures are briefly described below. 
 
2.6.1 Build Operate Transfer (BOT) 
This form of public private partnership involves a contractual arrangement in which the public 
sector engages the private sector to build and operate a facility over a specified duration of time 
usually between 10-25years (Oyedele, 2013). As such, responsibilities of designing and 
construction are combined with the operations and maintenance of the facility (Carbonara et al., 
2014). Under a BOT arrangement, the private sector eventually transfers the project facility to 
the public sector at the expiration of the concession (Dey and Ogunlana, 2004). Thus, the client 
takes over the operations and ownership of the project at this stage. The cost of BOT projects 
often comprise the cost of building the facility and the maintenance cost over the concession life 
cycle (Delmon, 2011). The maintenance or operation of the projects is however carried out in 
line with pre-agreed operational and maintenance standards between the client and the project 
company (Hoffman, 2008).  
2.6.2 Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) 
The BOOT and BOT has similar features and in most cases may be used to refer to similar kinds 
of PPP arrangements (Yusof and Salami, 2013). However, it is instructive to clarify the concept 
on “ownership” in this type of PPP structure. The central argument under the BOOT 
arrangement is that, while the project is being designed, built and operated, the private sector 
assumes ownership of the project during its concession life (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015). As 
such, every obligations relating to the project and its operations and maintenance during this 
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period becomes the sole responsibility of the private sector until the project is finally transferred 
to the client (Boussabaine, 2013). 
2.6.3 Design Build Finance and Operate 
The most common type of PPP under the UK’s PFI arrangement is the Design Build Finance and 
Operate (Bing et al, 2005). According to Robinson and Scott (2009), DBFO is central to the 
cardinal notions behind government’s transfer of infrastructure procurement to the private sector 
in the UK. The PFI concept centers on the application of private sector finance, expertise and 
managerial acumen towards the delivery of public infrastructures (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2003). Under DBFO, the private sector is charged with the responsibility to design a project, 
build, finance and manage the operations of such facility under a robust contract (Javed et al., 
2013). Most PFI projects in the UK have been procured under DBFO arrangement including 
schools, roads, prisons and energy stations across different geographical locations. The essential 
point under DBFO is that, unlike traditional procurement methods or other forms of PPPs where 
the government provides or supports with funds for constructing a facility, the financing of 
facilities under DBFO is entirely through private capital (Oyedele, 2013). Such capital is then 
recouped by the investors over the 10-30years concession life through various schemes or 
strategies such as direct tolls, shadow tolls, other forms of user charges, or unitary payments 
(Boussabaine, 2013). 
2.6.4 Design Build Finance (DBF) 
Another form of Public Private Partnership is the design, build and finance approach (Delmon, 
2011). Under DBF, the private sector is only charged with the responsibility to design, build and 
finance the procurement of a facility (Dey and Ogunlana, 2004). The operations of such facility 
is either handled by the public sector directly or contracted out to another body (Boussabaine, 
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2013). This form of PPP is often used where the operations of a facilities requires certain level of 
special expertise, or involves services which the government feels more comfortable to run on its 
own (Ogunsanmi, 2014). Examples of such kind of PPPs can be found within the UK NHS 
Trusts where hospitals are delivered through private sector funds but operated by the public 
sector, public schools and rail services among others (Robinson and Scott, 2009). Usually, most 
of these services are considered public goods and their delivery are not often handed over to the 
private sector (Robinson and Scott, 2009). 
2.7 (PF2) Private Finance 2  
Although the UK PFI policy was introduced in 1992 with the aim of harnessing private sector’s 
commercial expertise and management skills for delivering public infrastructure (Bing et al., 
2005; Robinson and Scott, 2009), criticisms have since trailed the approach on different fronts 
(Boussabaine, 2013; Zhou et al., 2013; Panayiotou and Medda, 2014). Apart from the plethora of 
public outcry regarding its political rationale, analysts, academics and a significant section of the 
public have questioned the supposed value for money, risk allocation and cost efficiency claims 
of the PFI method (Heald, 2003; Carrillo et al., 2008; Eaton et al., 2006). Different studies such 
as Quiggin, (2005) and Hodge and Greeve (2007) have lamented that the PFI procurement 
process is slow and exorbitant, lacks flexibility and often lopsided in the treatment of risks in 
projects. Confirming these popular criticisms, the HM Treasury Report on New Approach to 
PPPs (2012, pp.15) agreed that PFI in some aspects have proved ineffective and resulted in sub-
optimal value for money in many projects, while transparency regarding the true cost of future 
PFI liabilities have become a challenge. 
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In addressing these shortcomings, the HM Treasury kick started a wave of reviews and reform 
strategies (Hellowell et al., 2015), but in December 2012 embraced the phasing out of the PFI 
method (HM Treasury, 2012). A new approach to Public Private Partnerships was introduced 
under the name PF2 (Private Finance 2) (HM Treasury, 2012).  According to the UK 
Government’s infrastructure policy document (HM Treasury, 2012, pp.11), PF2 addresses 
various concerns under the PFI by redefining issues relating to equity holdings in projects, 
efficiency, value for money, accelerated project delivery, flexible service provision, and greater 
transparency among others. Quoting directly from the Treasury Policy Document (2012, pp.11-
12): 
“The UK Government has engaged directly with institutional investors, banks, credit rating 
agencies and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to assess the range of alternative financing 
options available to support infrastructure delivery and the credit requirements and project 
characteristics required to meet investor requirements. PF2 will be structured in such a way that 
it:  
a. Facilitates access to the capital markets, capitalising on the appetite of 
institutional investors and of other sources of long-term debt finance. 
Capital markets, whether public or private, have a deep pool of investors 
who are attracted to the relatively low risk infrastructure asset class;  
b. Provides deleveraged capital structures, facilitated by public sector co-
investment, combined with better risk allocation and the removal of certain 
operational risks which are expected to facilitate access to institutional 
investor capital; and  
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c. Continues to encourage alternative financing sources including loan, 
guarantee and credit support products provided by commercial banks, the 
EIB and other financial institutions. To achieve this, the tender process will 
require bidders to develop a long-term financing solution where bank debt 
does not provide the majority of the financing requirement. Institutional 
investment will, therefore, become an important source of finance for PF2”. 
 
Coming from the above perspective, it suffice to say that the private sector will continue to play 
a major role in UK’s infrastructure financing as it proceeds into the future (Martin and Pollard, 
2017), with over 64% of future infrastructure investment being targeted to come from the private 
sector (NAO, 2015).  This new drive has therefore seen different infrastructure funding practices 
and mechanisms being adopted in various places across the UK, with new forms of contracting 
and funding engagements emerging between the public and private sector parties (Martin and 
Pollard, 2017).  
 
 
 2.8 Accountability Challenges in PFI/PPP Infrastructure Projects 
 
The challenge of public accountability has become one of the more important of the policy 
questions raised especially with the increased adoption of PPPs, (see, e.g., Guttman 2000; Sclar 
2000). According to Forrer et al., (2010), PPPs alter the dynamics of public accountability by 
involving private partners in government decision making and program delivery. While 
governments work to serve the public in capital investment projects, private partners are 
understandably “focused on recouping [their] investment and on generating a profit” (Buxbaum 
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and Ortiz 2007, 8). Willems (2014) argued that accountability easily gets lost in the cracks of 
horizontal and hybrid governance’ that is typical in PPPs. A dominant account in the literature on 
PPPs points exactly to this assumed lack of accountability. According to Skelcher (2010), PPPs 
raise important issues of governance due to the changed nature of the state when it engages in 
cooperative activities with private actors’. Hodge (2009) suggest that PPP erodes the principle of 
ministerial responsibility, which is considered crucial for embedding democratic accountability. 
As argued by Boussabaine (2013) PFI/PPPs also ensure government accumulates huge future 
debt in unitary payments on PFI/PPP projects, while placing public expenditure outside the direct 
control of the state (Gaffey, 2010). Some of these accountability flaws have led Hodge and 
Greve (2007) to question whether the present method of public expenditure accounting and 
disclosure can result in proper accountability for public resources and transactions. 
 
In a recent study, Fombard (2012) emphasized how PFI/PPPs blur the lines of accountability, 
especially with the erosion of direct control of government ministers becoming more evident in 
such contractual arrangements (Forrer et al., 2010). Also, Siemiatycki (2007) highlighted the 
raging tensions between public clamor for transparency and private quest for commercial 
confidentiality in PFI/PPPs. He argued that the establishment of appropriate safeguards was 
crucial for preventing public interests and policy objectives from being sacrificed for private 
profit motives in PPPs. According to Li and Akintoye (2003), although responsibilities are 
shared between public and private actors, the imbalance of responsibilities in PPPs weighs 
heavily on the public sector. This is because the public sector not only has to contribute to 
project success by accepting certain residual risks and project monitoring, but also ensure the 
achievement of overall policy goals designed for the projects (Hodge and Greve, 2011). Coming 
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from the above perspectives, urgent calls for robust accountability mechanisms for holding both 
public managers accountability in PPPs have become popular across diverse literature (Clifton 
and Duffield, 2006; Robinson and Scott, 2009; Hodge and Greve, 2010; de Castro et a., 2016).  
 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
 
Although Project finance dates back to many centuries ago, it is currently becoming the preferred 
method of financing long-term and high-risk capital projects. This chapter therefore examined 
the principles underlying project finance as a non-recourse and limited recourse method of 
financing, its comparison with other methods of financing (Corporate finance, Asset-Based 
Finance etc.) as well as its applications, especially in Public Private Partnership (PPP) schemes. 
The chapter also discussed the evolution of Private Finance Initiative (PFI)/Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) Schemes. Some Procurement models under the PFI/PPP method was also 
explored. The chapter was wrapped up by shedding light on the newly introduced approach to 
Public Private Partnership in the UK popularly referred to as PF2. 
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Chapter Three: Public Sector Guarantee for Infrastructure and 
Challenges of Accountability.  
 
3.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter explores public sector guarantee scheme from a theoretical perspective by 
describing its features and the various forms of guarantee that are often used in relation to 
PFI/PPPs. Given its critical influence as context for this study, the UK Government Guarantee 
Scheme for Infrastructures is extensively elaborated. Furthermore, the critical issue of 
accountability in government guarantee schemes is examined from a theoretical perspective. This 
then followed by a critical review of existing studies on government guarantee scheme and 
PFI/PPP infrastructures. Other critical topics relevant to accountability in PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme such as transparency, Austerity and Efficiency were also extensively 
explained. 
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3.1 Public Sector Guarantee 
Generally speaking, guarantee refers to a person’s promise to pay the debt of another person’s in 
the event the beneficiary fails to make repayment or to fulfill certain contractual obligation 
(Gropp and Tonzer, 2016). From the above definition, guarantee (or suretyship) represents a 
secondary contractual obligation (Ng and Loosemore, 2007; Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2015). 
However, the term may also be interpreted from a broader sense, to mean something that assures 
a specific outcome (Takashima et al., 2010), which may take a legal form of indemnity, or 
certain undertaking. Within the context of this study, public sector guarantees are contracts under 
which a sovereign entity (“Government”) agrees to undertake some or all the cost of a project 
(Gropp and Tonzer, 2016).  Coming from this perspective, government assumes financial 
obligation in the likely occurrence of specified events in a project (Wibowo et al., 2012). 
According to Baglioni and Cherubini (2013), guarantee constitutes a contingent liability for 
which there is uncertainty as to whether the Government may be required to make good her 
pledge in terms of payments. Government guarantees may come in different forms and could 
include an indemnity, insurance policy, financial option among other types of contractual 
pledges. 
 
 
Generally in practice, governments commonly adopt guarantees when debt providers (e.g. 
international financial institutions, national, commercial banks, capital markets, and hedging 
firms etc.) become unwilling to lend to a project company due to various concerns (Allen et al., 
2015). These concerns may range from issues relating to the credit risk profile of the project 
investors, technical consideration that heightens potential for losses, high country risk profile, 
project viability issues among others (Wibowo et al., 2012). As highlighted by Asenova (2013), 
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the last one decade has seen government guarantees become a major policy tool for promoting 
private sector involvement in Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Many nations across the 
world including the United Kingdom, Argentina, Chile, France, Germany etc., have used one 
form of state guarantee or the other in infrastructure procurements, depending on the various 
peculiarities within their domain. For instance, France uses a type of state guarantee for PPP 
known as “cessions”, which is a mechanism for securing certain percentage of debt repayments 
to senior lenders (Bordeleau, 2014). In order to avoid accepting performance related risks in PPP 
projects, French banks request for cessions from the government, which allows the government 
to accept the payment of certain amount of repayments under specific conditions, regardless of 
whatever happens to the project (Bordeleau, 2014). In Germany, a “Forfeiture model” of state 
guarantee is used, in which government and lenders enter an agreement (Kostka and Fiedler, 
2016). This agreement allows public authority to waive its rights to suspend payments of certain 
components of the unitary charge through which debt repayments are made, in the case of poor 
or non-performance of a PPP project (Doloi, 2012). In the UK, although various government 
guarantee schemes have been implemented in the past and across different key areas including 
businesses loan guarantees, export guarantee, depositors’ guarantee among others (Cowling, 
2010). However, the July 2011 enacted UK Government Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructure 
(UKGSI) is seen as the most recent in terms of state aids for infrastructure PPPs (NIP, 2011). 
 
3.1.1 UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructure (UKGSI)   
 
Following the aftermath of the last global financial crisis which resulted in drastic reduction in 
long term private financing for numerous critical infrastructures (Meng and McKevitt, 2011; 
Hampl et al; 2011; Demirag et al; 2011; Farrell, 2003), the UK Government in 2012, passed into 
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law the Financial Assistance Act. This act empowered the Treasury Department to provide 
financial guarantees for critical infrastructure in the UK (Owolabi et al., 2015) and resulted in 
the introduction of a 4year UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructures (UKGSI). The UKGSI was 
conceived to provide an unconditional government cover for risks as well as other liabilities 
associated with financing large-scale infrastructures in UK. This HM Treasury’s policy was 
backed by a £40billion cover made accessible to potential investors in UK infrastructures. The 
scheme was to facilitate successful implementation of the 2011 National Infrastructure Plan 
(NIP). The NIP, which is a 5-year infrastructure master plan, is coordinated by Infrastructure UK 
(IUK), a department in the HM Treasury. The NIP highlighted priority sectors for new 
infrastructural investments within the UK economy. Additionally, the policy had earlier 
documented about 500 new infrastructure projects within the UK, requiring investments to the 
tune of £250billion, with two-thirds of such investments to be privately financed using schemes 
such as the PFI/PPP. See Fig.3.1 below for conceptual framework of the scheme and the focus of 
the study: 
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework for UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructures  
 
3.1.2 Other Generic Forms of Government Guarantee in PFI/PPP Concessions 
Below in Table 3.1 are other forms through which government guarantee may be applied in 
infrastructure PPPs. 
Table 3.1: Various Types of Government Guarantee Common in PFP/PPP Concession 
Operations 
& Construction 
Guarantee 
GG1. Guarantee 
to prevent 
competition 
 
 
 
GG2. Operating 
Revenue Guarantee 
 
The host government provides guarantee to the private sector to 
prevent competition that may affect the project from making 
income (e.g. where government promises not to construct 
another project that could compete with the current one in terms 
of income). 
 
A pledge by the government to the private sector by providing 
minimum income guarantee relating to minimum investment 
earnings, minimum purchase price etc. 
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GG3. Guarantee for 
supply of raw 
materials 
 
Government  promises the private sector to guarantee the 
provision of raw materials needed for construction of project 
Financing 
Guarantee 
GG4. Loan  
Guarantee 
 
 
GG5. Standby  
loan 
 
GG6. Guarantee 
through stock capital 
The government provides the bank with guarantee to repay a 
part or whole of the loan sum granted to a private sector and 
pledges that the investor is able to fulfil debt obligations. 
 
Government provides standby loan to the project company in 
case its income drops to a minimum due to certain agreed 
reasons 
A guarantee by the host government to provide funds as stock 
capital to the private investor 
Legal & Political 
Guarantee 
GG7. Legal risk  
guarantee 
Government provides guarantee to the private investors against 
changes in law that could result in economic loss to the 
investors and affect the PPP contract. 
 
 
 
 
Macro-economic 
environment 
guarantee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GG8. Concession  
right guarantee 
 
 
GG9. Foreign 
exchange guarantee 
 
 
 
GG.10 Interest rate 
guarantee 
 
 
 
Government promises to ensure reasonable reimbursement to 
the private sector in the event that the concession was cancelled 
due to public interest considerations. 
 
Government guarantees to allow the private investor repatriate 
the project income into foreign convertible currencies and in the 
event of exchange rate fluctuation below agreed margins, 
government guarantees to reimburse the shortfall. 
The government provides guarantee to the private sector against 
interest rate fall below agreed margins and agree to reimburse 
the investor in the event of loss due to exchange rate fluctuation. 
With a letter of comfort, government encourages private 
investor to invest in a project and assures of her support. 
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Others GG11. Letter of 
Comfort 
 
 
3.2 Accountability Questions in Government Guarantees 
Various studies have explored the significant roles played by government guarantee in the 
development of PPP projects globally (Burnside et al., 2004; Hemming, 2006; Alonso-Conde et 
al., 2007; Takashima et al., 2010; Newberry, 2015). According to Atmo and Duffield (2014), the 
world’s most vibrant PPP markets are those where the government sustains and advances 
projects through incentives such as public guarantees. Many developing economies have been 
able to fast-track their infrastructure development by offering state guarantees to the private 
sector (Cowling, 2010; Grande and Visco, 2011; Willems, 2014). For Instance, Canada and 
Brazil, who are globally considered one of the major PPP markets, have used state guarantee 
including what is referred to as, “Project viability gap fund” to transform their nation’s 
infrastructure portfolio (Setiawan and Surachman, 2016). Other major economies such as the 
UK, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong have also launched numerous guarantee schemes at 
one point or the other. All these were aimed at stimulating the bankability of much needed 
critical infrastructures via PFI/PPPs (Owolabi et al., 2015), while maintaining government 
supervisory and regulatory roles (Yang et al., 2013).  
 
However, while government guarantee may not be wrong from a public policy perspective, it has 
raised serious questions of public accountability (Willems, 2014). These questions range from: 
“Should the government really assume demand risk in a project? Could government accurately 
estimate the cost of its guarantee prior to granting approval? If so, does government have enough 
mechanisms and processes in place to prevent abuse and ensure the achievement of policy goals? 
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More generally, could government projects have been cheaper if implemented using the direct 
procurement route, as against PFI/PPP private finance? Or would it have been better to adopt 
other methods of state support such as subsidy, grants rather than using guarantees (Xu et al., 
2014). These questions are ranging and they seat at the epicenter of current policy debates on 
government guarantee scheme for PPPs. 
 
In a relevant study by Kostka and Fiedler (2016), government guarantee for PFI/PPP is 
suggested to suffer from fundamental flaws, especially as it theoretically contradicts the basic 
assumptions of PPP. As argued by Maarse and Jeurissen (2016), the theoretical assumption 
behind PFI/PPP is premised on private sectors’ managerial expertise, finance and capacity to 
assume and handle project risks that are commensurate with investor returns. Hence, since the 
private sector traditionally expects a risk-reward relationship in PFI transactions (Walker et al., 
2016), it therefore has the duty to ensure projects truly transfers risk away from the public sector 
(Smyth and Whitfield, 2016). From this perspective, Xu et al., (2014) argued that the adoption of 
guarantees, at any rate, effectively erodes the private sectors’ initiative and risk taking 
responsibility to successfully deliver projects structured purely on commercial terms. According 
to De Schepper et al., (2014), contingent liabilities associated with PFI/PPPs are usually 
contracted on a long term basis and relies heavily on a nation’s economic and political scenarios, 
making it difficult to identify the inherent risks. Hence, De Bruyckere, et al. (2013); Bringselius 
(2014) and Xu et al., (2014) argued that successful application of guarantee for PPPs requires 
comprehensive framework and sufficient definition of mechanisms governing its 
implementation.  
 
69 
 
3.3 Existing Literature and Knowledge Gaps 
Numerous studies have explored the issue of government guarantee and associated fiscal risks, 
while others have also examined its adoption for PFI/PPP infrastructure projects (De Bruyckere, 
et al., 2013; De Schepper et al., 2014; Bringselius, 2014; Xu et al., 2014). For instance, Wibowo 
and Kochendoerfer (2011) explored the selection of BOT/PPP infrastructure projects for 
government guarantee under conditions of budget and risk. The study used a project selection 
methodology called the “Chance-Constrained Goal-Programming” (CCGP) framework to select 
a project portfolio of guaranteed projects that yields maximum gain to the welfare of the 
economy and lowest fiscal risk to the public sector. The study found that using the CCGP 
methodology allows government to examine relationships among budget-at-risk allocated for 
guaranteed projects and expected total payment. However, despite the huge contribution, the 
study failed to explore the issue of public accountability in the allocation of guarantee to PPP 
projects. In addition, since the focus of the study was on Indonesia, which is a developing 
economy, it is therefore unlikely that the findings from the study may be generalizable to 
developed economies such as the UK. 
 
In another related study, Gropp et al., (2013) examined the impact of public sector guarantee on 
Banks’ Risk-Taking behaviors. Using secondary data from a sample of 452 Savings Banks in 
Germany between 1996 and 2006 to carry out an experimental study. The study examined the 
behaviour of banks to risks when guarantee is available and when guarantee is removed. The 
result showed that Savings banks whose government guarantee was removed tend to mitigate 
credit risk by declining credit lines to the riskiest borrowers. Banks also adjust their liabilities 
away from debt instruments with high risk profile. Although this study helps confirm previous 
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studies on many issues that are central to the criticisms of PPP financing under guarantees 
(Glaister, 1999; Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004); the study only focused on lenders risk attitude and 
failed to recognize public sector concerns on accountability.  
 
In another recent study by Newberry (2015) on public sector reforms and sovereign debt 
management, accruals-based appropriations by government and outcome-based strategy 
statements were identified to weaken legislative control on the executive arm of government 
regarding the management of sovereign debt. Using thematic cum discourse analysis, the study 
examined patterns from strategic government statements published in New Zealand between 
2002 and 2014. Newberry argued that governments’ strategic planning and statements offer little 
in terms of accountability especially in relation to managing sovereign debt. Despite the 
contribution of his study, the principal focus was on New Zealand government and failed to 
unpack the critical components of sovereign debt, one of which is government guarantees. 
 
Furthermore, in another relevant study by Burnside et al., (2004); the role of government 
guarantee in banking-currency crisis and composition of banks’ assets and liability was explored. 
With the aid of a simple-equilibrium model, the study demonstrated how banks willingly expose 
themselves to exchange rate risk when borrowing foreign currencies. This, it argued leads to a 
“Twin Risk”, in which the availability of government guarantee influence’s banks’ appetite for 
foreign currency risk exposure and agents’ self-fulfilling beliefs that fixed exchange rate will 
collapse. The study argued that as banks’ default on their foreign currency borrowing and file for 
bankruptcy when devaluation occurs, contingent liabilities turn to actual liabilities for 
government. Despite its huge significance, the fundamental flaw remains that the study’s 
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government guarantee impact evaluation did not explore accountability impacts of government 
guarantee and lenders behavior, especially as it relates to privately financed public projects. 
 
Finally, Xu et al., (2014) carried out a study to determine the appropriate government guarantee 
for concession projects using a sample of Chinese PPP projects. Using content analysis, the 
performance of 10 guaranteed PPP projects were compared relative to the amount of guarantee 
provided by the government. Findings from the study suggested many instances of government 
issuing guarantee to undeserving projects while excessive guarantee was noted to result in high 
performance cost for government. This was identified a clog preventing smooth implementation 
of concession agreement (Xu et al., 2014). Although the study contributed significantly to the 
literature by calling for more understanding on risk sharing between public and private sectors, 
the sampled PPP projects reflects only Chinese features and contexts (see Xu et al., 2014, 
pp366). The study also offered no perspectives on what structures or processes may be needed to 
achieve better understanding of risk, while it completely ignored accountability issues relating to 
government guarantee in PFI/PPPs. 
 
Although other studies such as Tiong (1995); Zou et al., (2008); Kwak et al., (2009) also 
examined government guarantee for PPP concession contracts, however, most of these studies 
have neglected the core accountability questions raised by the adoption of public guarantees for 
PPPs. In addition, existing studies on government guarantee have only been examined within the 
context of other economies such as Germany, China, New Zealand among other (Xu et al., 
2014).  Currently, there is a dearth of academic literature on government guarantee within the 
context of the United Kingdom, especially as it examines public accountability issues in PFI/PPP 
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projects. This therefore represents a huge gap in knowledge, precipitating the necessity of the 
current study.  
 
3.4 Austerity and Implication for Government Guarantee  
 
Practitioners and researchers alike have tried to examine the complex issues that resulted in the 
last global financial crisis, which provoked broad adoption of austerity reforms among Eurozone 
governments (Andon, 2012; Blyth, 2013; Krugman, 2013; Bracci et al., 2015). While the goal of 
this study is not to venture into such issues (Bracci et al., 2015), it is instructive to say that many 
advanced economies had initially implemented economic stimulus packages, the most popular of 
which was financial bailouts to banks (Grimshaw and Rubery,  2012). These fiscal stimulous 
were intended to galvanise economic activity and strengthen consumer’s purchasing power, 
which is necessary for curtailing the recession and restoring economic growth (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008). However, by the beginning of 2010, the massive government debt resulting 
from financial bailouts to banks had plunged many Eurozone economies into serious national 
debt crisis (Bechtel et al., 2014; Bracci et al., 2015).  In the UK, the increasing value of 
contingent liabilities such as government guarantees, pension’s scheme, etc. that is reflected on 
the public balance sheet and the huge debt in future unitary payments on PFI projects, had piled 
additional pressure on gross national debt, which stood at £1.387Trillion by the end of 2012. 
Consequently, the adoption of austerity measures by the European Union at the 2010 G20 
summit meeting in Toronto was argued on the need to bring down public debt to sustainable 
levels (Bracci et al., 2015). According to Bracci et al. (2015), the UK government was at the 
forefront in calling for immediate uptake of austerity policies and the adoption of fiscal 
discipline, by introducing far-reaching fiscal reforms within the public service (Peters, 2012). 
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One of the most important austerity policies (asides privatisation, tax cuts, wage freeze etc.) 
propagated by the European Union is the “Six-pack” and “Two-pack” Fiscal Compact Treaty 
(Verdun, 2015). Enacted in December 2011 to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact (which 
itself is a Treaty founded on ensuring stability of the Economic and Monetary Union through 
fiscal surveillance on member states and yearly fiscal recommendations), the “six pack” and 
“two pack” policy extends the Union’s powers to macroeconomic surveillance on the 28 member 
states (Verdun, 2015). It commits all Eurozone nations, including the UK to a country-specific 
medium-term objective (MTO) that prescribes strict compliance to deficit within 3% of GDP and 
public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP (Greer, 2014). Hence, with the adoption of accrual 
accounting treatment for government guarantee (Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama, 2006), state aids 
such as guarantees constitute liability on the public balance sheet, contributing to the national 
deficit and affecting compliance to the MTO fiscal requirement of the EU. In the overall, with 
increasing significance of fiscal surveillance through macroeconomic parameters (i.e. debt/GDP 
ratios, balance budgets, etc.), contingent liabilities like government guarantees have come under 
immense pressure (Buti and Pench, 2012). 
 
3.5 Transparency and Implication for Government Guarantee  
Although it has been used interchangeably with accountability in many studies (Gleeson and 
Donnabháin, 2009; Shaoul, 2005; Smyth, 2012), transparency in public service focuses on 
openness and absence of opaqueness in the process of public decision-making (Boven et al., 
2014). It also involves reasonability of decisions being made and availability of information 
about such decisions in the public domain (Boven et al., 2014).  Bringing this perspective into 
PFI/PPP, transparency in the procurement process is considered essential for enhancing value for 
money (Bing et al., 2005). The transparency notion rests on efficient and open communication 
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among project parties, precise requirements and decisions, and full information disclosure 
(Gupta, 2008). As an essential accountability dimension, transparency in the handling of 
government guarantees is critical to fiscal discipline, which is a major issue for governments 
under austerity. According to Hemming (2006), Cangiano et al. (2006), Junxiong (2007) 
transparency in valuation and reporting of government guarantees would help protect public 
finances against fiscal shocks, especially during the period of economic crisis. Wang and Tiong 
(2000) argued that the recent adoption of accrual accounting methods by many developed 
nations had provided some clarity regarding accounting treatment for government guarantees. 
Relly and Sabharwal (2009) and Campbell et al. (2009) suggested improving transparency in 
government guarantees might be further strengthened by incorporating supplementary 
information about such liability in reports and other budgetary documents. 
 
3.6 Efficiency and Government Guarantee 
Efficiency in public service provisioning and procurements is another dimension of 
accountability that is crucial for achieving government’s policy objectives under the 
infrastructure guarantee scheme (NAO, 2015). The central argument behind efficiency in public 
service delivery centres on having a slim government, in which decreasing public activity results 
in cost savings and speed of service (Lapsley, 2008). Promoters of efficiency in public service 
had hinged this on the need to reverse perceived lack of cost effectiveness and competition, 
unprofitability, and wastage associated with the public sector (Bovaird, 2004; Coulson, 2008; 
Järvinen, 2009; Bracci et al., 2015). This accountability criterion has played a crucial role in 
PFI/PPP procurements in recent times (Humphrey et al., 1993). According to Robinson and Scott 
(2009), the introduction of penalties, performance bonuses, output specification, and competitive 
bidding processes among other measures have become major components of new public 
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procurement policies. However, in government guarantees, efficiency consideration for PFI 
projects should focus on policy requirements that promote public savings on associated fiscal 
cost of insuring private investments in infrastructures (Burnside et al., 2004). Such requirements 
may include ensuring competitive process for evaluating and awarding guarantees to only 
projects that deliver better value with minimal commitment in public resources, among other 
measures (Ruane, 2010). 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter explored public sector guarantee in relation to PFI/PPP. To contextualize the study, 
the chapter also explored UK government guarantee scheme for infrastructure by looking at its 
various features. Other forms of public sector guarantee often adopted in the case of PPP 
infrastructures such as revenue guarantee, legal risk guarantee among others were examined. The 
critical question of accountability as it relates to government guarantee scheme and PFI/PPP 
projects are also dealt with. The study proceeded to discuss a critical review of existing studies 
on government guarantee schemes. This is then followed by an exploration of some the critical 
issues like austerity, efficiency and transparency as they affect government guarantee scheme for 
infrastructures. 
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Chapter Four: Theory of Accountability and Hypotheses 
Development. 
 
4.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter examines the theoretical approach to the study. In this chapter, accountability as a 
concept is deeply explored especially as it relates to “giving account” in the interest of the 
public. Since the case of government guaranteed PFI/PPP projects centers on judicious 
application of public resources, public accountability was examined in relation to accountability 
mechanisms suitable for evaluating publicly guaranteed PFI/PPP projects in UK. In this sense, 
the study explored Bovens’ “Two concepts of Accountability” as a conceptual basis by 
examining “Accountability as a virtue” and especially “Accountability as a Mechanism”. It is 
important to note that “Accountability as a Mechanism” is central to this study. As such, various 
theoretical hypothesis generated from the identified accountability mechanisms were developed 
for empirical investigation. In summary, Section 3.1 of the chapter examined accountability and 
some of its conceptual arguments and controversies. Section 3.1.1 explored various dimensions 
of accountability (i.e. Legal, Managerial, Public accountabilities). Section 3.1.2 of the chapter 
looked deeply at Public accountability due to its significance to the study. Section 3.2 examined 
Bovens’ Conceptualisation of “two-accountabilities” and specifically focused on Accountability 
as a Mechanism. Section 3.3 identified various Public accountability mechanisms relevant for 
evaluation government guaranteed PPP projects. Finally, section 3.4 developed series of 
theoretical hypothesis from identified mechanisms to be tested for empirical analysis in the 
study. The chapter ultimately ended with a chapter summary. 
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4.1 Theory of Accountability and Conceptual Issues  
Accountability has been termed an abstract, evocative, and multi-faceted concept (Sinclair 1995; 
Robinson, 2002, Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011). Sinclair (1995, pp. 219) once described the 
“chameleon-like” nature of accountability due to its constantly changing dynamics and contexts. 
Accountability, despite its popularity in political, policy and academic discourses is understood 
to mean different things for different set of people (Bovens et al., 2008). As defined by Auel 
(2007, pp. 495), “accountability means being answerable for one’s actions to some authority and 
having to suffer sanctions for those actions”. In another study, Bovens (2009, pp.184) also define 
accountability as “a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct to some significant other”. Although, these definitions provide valuable 
insights into its basic structures, in practice however, Willems (2014) believes accountability is 
more complex and muddled than definitions suggest.  
 
Conceptualising accountability has apparently become an exercise enmeshed in what Bovens et 
al. (2015, pp.7) described as minimal “conceptual confusion”. This is due to the fact that “many 
authors take different ways” and “address different accountability dilemmas, practices and 
potential crisis” (Bovens, 2010, pp.947). Roberts and Scapens (1985 pp.447) while exploring 
accounting and organisational contexts, presented vital elements of accountability namely, - a 
relationship, an account and an underlying power basis. According to Roberts and Scapens 
(1985), for any arrangement to be classified as accountability, (1) there must be an evident 
relationship between the account giver and receiver, (2) an obligation to be performed and upon 
which an account is demanded including (3) the power of the accountee to demand account.  
Dubnick (1996, 1998, 2003&2005) in his own studies proposed a framework for conceptualising 
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accountability based on ethical theory. According to Dubnick (2003), two major perspectives of 
accountability exist namely: the ethno-methodologist view of “accountability of conduct” 
(Dubnick, 1998, 2001; Fombad, 2012; Behn, 2002), and the political scientists’ legal and 
institutional framework concerned with the “conduct of accountability” (Dubnick and Justice, 
2002). Describing the former as exploring individuals’ use of rationalisation and excuses during 
event of perceived wrongdoing due to feeling of being accountable, Dubnick labels the later as 
“answerability” (Dubnick, 2014).  According to Dubnick (2014), actors, under answerability 
notion give answers and account on demand concerning obligations, particularly due to the 
position they occupy (Dubnick, 2014).  
 
However in a separate study, Smyth (2012, pp.231) criticised as misleading, the interpretation of 
accountability as simply “answerability”, a confusion he opines currently “pervades the 
literature, where accountability is used interchangeably with diverse concepts”. In confirming 
Smyth’s perspective, Visoka and Doyle, (2014) differentiates between accountability, 
responsibility, answerability and responsiveness. Kamuf (2007) also identified this challenge, 
especially where other concepts like transparency are equated with accountability. While Bovens 
et al. (2015, pp.4) framed accountability as a relational phenomenon and communicative 
mechanism of account giving, Smyth (2012, pp. 232) challenged that accountability relationship 
is meaningless without an essential core that focuses on “reward and sanctions”. In addition to 
these ensuing arguments, various other studies such as Sinclair (1995), Mulgan, (2000), Jantz 
and Jann (2013), Willems (2014), and Smyth (2017) have also emerged on the changing nature 
of accountability. Accountability is considered a very fluid concept that adapts to different 
stakeholder demands, different information expectations and also different nature of “account 
giving” (Newcomer, 1998; Willems, 2010; Bebbington et al., 2014). 
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To sum this up, the multiplicity of thoughts on accountability has continued despite concerted 
efforts at producing a consensual understanding (Bovens, 2010, Schillemans and Busuioc, 2015). 
According to Dubnick and Justice (2004 pp.7) this “notorious ambiguity”, has allowed observers 
generate different dimensions of accountability that suits their persuasions. Some of these 
dimensions of accountability include professional accountability, managerial, personal, 
bureaucratic, political, legal or even public accountabilities - upon which this study is based 
(Jones, 1977; Sinclair, 1995; Bovens et al., 2008; Christensen and Lægreid, 2015).  
4.1.1 Accountability Dimensions 
 
Relevant to this study is the clarification of the question “what dimension of accountability fits 
the context of scrutinising publicly guaranteed PFI/PPP projects in the UK”? This is quite 
essential, especially since accountability as a concept has now expanded into various contexts 
and typologies (Forrer et al., 2010; Brenton, 2014; Bovens et al., 2015).  As can be seen across 
different literature, perspectives into accountability vary from providing answers to a forum 
(Mulgan, 2000) or some element of responsiveness and responsibility (Bovens et al., 2015); to 
oversight and control (Robinson, 2003); explaining and taking responsibility for one’s actions 
(Bovens, 2007); versus facing consequences for one’s actions and inactions (Dubnick, 2003); 
accounting for the use of public resources (Humphrey et al., 1993), among others. Such evolving 
nature of accountability has allowed different typologies of accountability to emerge (Roberts 
and Scapens; 1985; Barberis, 1998; Tan and Kao, 1999; Dubnick 2003; Bovens, 2010; Boven et 
al., 2015).  
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According to Bovens et al. (2015), public, outward or horizontal accountability may be described 
as account giving for the interest of the public, in which information provided by the actor is 
freely accessible to the public. This could involve account giving to interest groups, clients, 
affected stakeholders or other stakeholders from the larger society (Luke, 2010; Morallos and 
Amekudzi, 2008). Political or upward accountability involves account giving to political forums, 
including members of parliaments or other political agents (Willems, 2014; Bovens et al., 2015). 
Robinson (1971) and Luke (2010) refer to managerial accountability as direct or formal way of 
account giving to superiors at an organisational or ministerial level and involve bureaucratic 
arrangements and processes. Managerial accountability is often referred to as hierarchical or 
vertical accountability across diverse literature.  
 
In the same vein, Ashworth (2000), Brandsma and Schillemans (2012) describe administrative 
accountability as involving account giving to forums such as regulatory and administrative 
bodies, including courts of audits, inspectorates and commissions. In the case of professional 
accountability, actors are obliged to comply as members with regulations and standards fixed by 
professional bodies, government and industry regulators (Luke, 2010; Bovens et al., 2015). In 
addition, legal accountability involves accountability to forums that include legal bodies, such as 
judges, courts, magistrates and other prosecutors (Flinders, 2001; Noonan et al., 2009). However, 
in this study, the principal focus is on public accountability, especially as it affects identifying 
relevant accountability mechanisms for protecting public interest in PFI/PPP government 
guaranteed projects in the UK.  
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4.1.2 Public Accountability  
As suggested by Ismail and Azzahra (2014), PFI/PPP changed the dynamics of public 
accountability particularly with the involvement of private partners in government project 
delivery. However, with the wide adoption of government guarantee schemes for promoting 
PPPs globally (Wibowo et al., 2012), concern for the protection of public interests has become 
even more pertinent (Anginer et al., 2014). Government guaranteed PPP projects is connected 
with the use of public resources and thus remains a matter for public debates (Yakubu and 
Anigbogu, 2016). It is therefore conceptually appropriate to examine the research topic within 
the public dimension of accountability. As analysed by Bovens et al. (2015), accountability to 
the public is essentially an examination of the public character of formal accountability. This 
concept has long been identified as the foundation for successful public sector management 
(Forrer et al., 2010). Public accountability focuses on structural, systemic accountability forms 
for public service provisioning (Bovens et al., 2015). According to Allen et al. (2013), the 
concept of “publicness” in accountability can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, the word 
“public” epitomises “openness” or “transparency” (Bovens et al., 2015; Hall et al., 2016). In this 
context, account giving is carried out openly and information are not treated as confidential but 
freely accessible by members of the public (Hall et al., 2016).  The second perspective to 
“publicness”, which is central to this study relates directly to the public sector (Allen et al., 2013; 
Hall et al, 2016). This perspective of accountability has to do with account giving regarding the 
exercise of public authority, power, policy, or the application of public resources among others 
(Klenk, 2015). 
 
Bovens’ careful evaluation of scholarly literature and political discourse has revealed the 
dominance of two conceptual usage of public accountability (Bovens et al., 2015). These are 
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“Accountability as a Virtue” and “Accountability as a Mechanism” (Bovens et al., 2010; Bovens 
et al., 2015). According to Bovens et al. (2015, pp.7) accountability has so far been examined by 
many authors, either “as a set of behavioural standards for evaluating public actors” or “as an 
institutional relation or mechanism for holding actors accountable”. Bovens referred to these 
concepts as accountability patterns and went further to highlight the contexts within which each 
pattern of accountability may be found or applied. 
 
Coming from the above, since this study looks to identify and explore suitable accountability 
mechanisms for evaluating PFI/PPP government guaranteed projects, hence, Bovens’ 
conceptualisation of “two accountabilities” form the theoretical core of this study. As such, this 
research brings under focus, the important role of institutional mechanisms for holding public 
agents accountable within the context of government guarantee scheme for PFI/PPPs in the UK. 
The study argues that there is an important nexus between institutional mechanisms and the 
notion of accountability. This nexus apparently requires adequate strengthening in recent times, 
especially given the increasingly blurry lines of accountability in many public-private 
procurements. Although, the study also carefully explored “accountability as a personal virtue” 
(Friedrich, 1940; Gallie, 1962; Bovens, 2010), its central focus lies in the significance of 
“accountability mechanisms” and their efficacy for strengthening public sector accountability in 
government guaranteed PFI/PPP projects.  
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4.2 Bovens’ Conceptualisation: “Accountability as Virtue” and 
“Accountability as a Mechanism” 
Bovens’ theoretical concepts of “two-accountabilities” has become an essential branch of 
literature on public accountability (Bovens, 2010, pp. 946; Goodyear, 2015; Bovens et al., 2015). 
This conceptualisations quite opened up new frontiers for empirical investigation by 
differentiating between “Accountability as a virtue” and “Accountability as a mechanism”. In 
this regard, the study contributes to existing literature by developing hypothetical propositions 
from key accountability mechanisms, while testing their empirical validity and suitability within 
the context of the UK government guaranteed PFI/PPP projects.  
4.2.1 Accountability as a Virtue 
According to Bovens (2007), “accountability as a virtue” describes accountability as a desirable 
attribute of states, institutions, firms and individuals. Bovens (2010) referred to this pattern of 
accountability as a normative concept, which focuses on the actual behaviour and performance of 
public actors (public officials, government, institutions etc.). Accountability here centres on the 
existence of certain behavioural standards upon which performance and compliance of public 
managers are measured (Luke, 2010; Bovens et al., 2015). For example, accountability has been 
loosely used as synonyms for normative concepts like “Transparency”, “Openness” or 
“Responsibility”, all of which alludes to accountability as a desirable attribute.  As suggested by 
Bovens et al. (2015), examining accountability as a personal virtue takes individualistic view 
towards determining whether a public actor demonstrates the quality of “being accountable”. In 
this context, lack of accountability is mirrored as wrong behaviour, ineffectiveness, poor 
governance, unresponsiveness, irresponsibility among others (Bovens, 2010). For example, 
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sayings such as “public officials need to show that they are accountable and render 
accountability” are some of the utterances that explain accountability as a desirable quality.  
 
Although, virtuous accountability is much popular in the American, Canadian and some 
European academic and political discourse (Bovens, 2010; Romzek, 2015). Interestingly, similar 
governance approaches can be noticed within the UK public service, especially under the Private 
Finance Initiatives (PFI) and Public Private Partnerships (PPP) schemes. Albeit, these exist at a 
minimal level. Nevertheless, issues such as the public outcry against commercial confidentiality 
in PFI/PPP procurements (Glaister, 1999; Hodge and Greeve, 2007), emphasis on transparent 
and competitive bidding (Mustafa, 2017), and clamour for increased visibility for government’s 
unitary charge payments and contingent liabilities in PFI/PPP deals (Smyth and Edkins, 2007; 
Forrer et al., 2010; Harada, 2015), all highlight demands for accountable behaviour from UK 
public officials (Anderson, 2014; Orchard and Stretton, 2016). As expected, the issue of 
“Transparency” or “Open disclosure”- which is a popular normative concept - remained at the 
epicentre of these discourses, as observed from above. Although viewed from the angle of a 
social mechanism rather than a mere acceptable behaviour, transparency in UK government 
transactions is considered essential for improving efficiency and trust in the public service 
(Hodge and Greve, 2009; Eadie et al., 2013; OBR, 2015).  According to Pete (2014), increased 
regulation on information disclosure has had huge impact on the UK public service by 
entrenching public confidence and encouraging better collaboration and operational 
performance. König et al. (2014) emphasized transparent reporting and disclosure as a huge 
panacea for minimising various risks associated with public sector transactions.  
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However, without seeking to diminish the above supposition, it is important to highlight that, the 
extent to which “accountability from a virtuous behaviour standpoint” is reflective of governance 
across the UK public sector transactions remains debatable. Highlighting Bovens (2010) and 
Bovens et al (2015), the British usage of accountability is considered narrower, often descriptive 
and tend to view accountability as a mechanism rather than a desirable quality from a public 
actor. In this regard, it is fair to say that virtuous approach to accountability (Romzek, 2015) has 
minimal presence within the British discourse on public accountability as argued by Ferry and 
Eckersley (2015) and Allen et al. (2016). From the perspective of Allen et al. (2016), 
accountability within British academic and public discourse thrives heavily on the existence of 
institutional arrangements, mechanisms and systems. Hence, a mere focus on accountable 
behaviour, within the context of this study, would restrict the scope of investigation into the 
research problem.  
 
In addition to the above, studies such as Bovens (2010, pp.949), Romzek (2015), Christensen 
and Lægreid (2016) and Pawar et al. (2017) have highlighted some conceptual weaknesses in 
mirroring accountability as a “virtuous behaviour”. According to Bovens (2010) and Romzek 
(2015) this conceptual approach is strongly flawed since there is absence of overwhelming 
consensus regarding the standards for defining accountable behaviour. As argued by Romzek 
(2015), standards of accountable behaviour vary in line with roles, context and political 
perspectives. For instance, Goodyear (2015) identified confidentiality as an ethical demand 
which falls under the domain of “Responsibility” - an aspect of accountable behaviour. 
According to Goodyear (2015), public officials’ confidentiality responsibilities, on a lot of 
occasions often clash with government’s statutory demands for disclosure. As such, what is 
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viewed as accountable behaviour may stumble on other forms of accountabilities, thereby 
creating conflicts and more complexity regarding what accountable behaviour entails.  
4.2.2 Accountability as a Mechanism 
“Accountability as a mechanism” is a theory describing a relationship or arrangement in which 
actors may be held to account by another actor or institutions (Kaboolian, 1998; Mulgan, 2003; 
Philip, 2009; Forrer et al., 2010; Bovens, 2015). Pollit (2003) referred to this concept as a social 
arrangement involving a commitment to provide justification and clarification for ones’ conduct. 
Under this notion of accountability, the issue of whether a public actor demonstrates accountable 
behaviour is not as important as the way in which institutional arrangements shape and govern 
actors’ behaviours (Bovens, 2010). As Schillemans and Bovens (2015) puts it, the accountability 
standpoint here goes beyond the provision of information about performance and conduct, but 
equally involves the likelihood of debates, questions by forums and answers by the actors 
including the passing of verdict on the actor’s conduct. Thus the concept of holding actors to 
account using various mechanisms or arrangements i.e. tools, process and systems, is the 
hallmark of accountability as a mechanism (Bovens, 2010; Bovens et al.,, 2015; Schillemans and 
Bovens, 2015). Expectedly, this perspective of accountability has become very prominent across 
numerous economic, political and socio-legal transactions in the UK public sector in recent times 
(Bovens, 2010; Forrer et al., 2010; Salmond, 2014; Bovens et al., 2015). Described as multiple 
accountabilities, Salmond (2014) and Schillemans and Bovens (2015) noted the emergence of 
dispersed and complex governance mechanisms in UK public sector management. According to 
Pollock and Winton, (2016), public administration now thrives on increasing pressure of 
managing multiple and oftentimes competing accountability demands. Hence, conventional view 
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of political responsibility and administrative accountability no longer fit the current reality of 
public management (Bovens and Schillemans, 2011). 
 
Bringing these perspectives to accountability within public sector guarantee for PFI/PPP 
projects, the need for more accountability mechanisms has become increasingly important. This 
is very essential due to the huge vulnerabilities of government guarantee schemes to fiscal 
opportunism and policy abuse (Hix, 2014). According to Hix (2014), the typical lack of rigorous 
public scrutiny due to its contingent nature, and the rising public debt in unitary payments to 
many PFI/PPP projects (Krumm, 2016), all make increased accountability necessary within 
public guarantee schemes. Albeit recent adoption of various fiscal governance and accountability 
mechanisms within the European Union (EU) has brought state aids (especially guarantees 
schemes) under much spotlight (Bracci et al., 2015). However, the dearth of academic literature 
examining broad-based accountability mechanisms and framework for publicly guaranteed 
PFI/PPP projects, is apparent.  
 
4.3 Accountability Mechanisms in PFI/PPPs and Government Guarantee 
Scheme  
4.3.1 Process-based Accountability Mechanisms 
A general review of extant literature on PFI/PPP and government guarantee have revealed 
different important mechanisms for ensuring public accountability. Relying on the works of 
Brennan and Solomon (2008), and Bovens et al. (2015) some of these mechanisms may be put in 
two broad categories namely, process-based accountability mechanisms and outcome-based 
accountability mechanisms. According to Tetlock and Mellers (2011b), most accountability 
mechanisms are evolving process-outcome hybrids that lean towards either side, depending on 
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the context or task. Patil et al. (2014) while examining “Process vs. Outcome Accountability”, 
suggested process-based accountability mechanisms focus on the procedures or methods through 
which accountability is ensured across public transactions. Theorists of process accountability 
argue that realisation of desired outcomes may not be as important as efforts and systems that are 
put in place to arrive at informed judgements (Simonson and Staw, 1992; Lerner and Tetlock, 
1999; Langhe et al., 2011; Patil et al., 2014). Hence, accountability concerns should be to 
strengthen processes or systems through which decisions are reached (Patil et al., 2014). In this 
sense, mechanisms in PFI such as competitive bidding (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003), 
monitoring (Robinson and Scott, 2009), benchmarking (Eadie et al., 2013) and public sector 
comparator (Smyth and Edkins, 2007; Boussabaine, 2013) tend to reflect themselves as process-
oriented tools focusing on improving governance in PFI/PPPs. Robinson and Scott (2009), 
Smyth and Whitfield (2016) and Santandrea et al. (2016) also identified audits and internal 
control as process driven mechanisms common in the UK public sector and have been used by 
public managers for embedding best practices and accountability in PFI over time.  
 
 
4.3.2 Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms 
Outcome-based accountability or accountability based on the realisation of stipulated goals have 
also received increased attention within the literature (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Schalock, 2001; 
Carnoy and Loeb, 2002; Bovens et al., 2015). Although, this accountability standpoint is often 
based on different contexts, more managers in the UK public service in recent times are having 
their performances evaluated based on the achievement of certain policy goals or outcomes 
(Bracci et al., 2015). As such, outcome-based accountability mechanisms in UK public 
procurement may include value for money (Heald, 2003, Akintoye et al., 2003; Demirag and 
Khadaroo, 2010), budgetary visibility or reporting (Smith, 1993; Nisar, 2007), service 
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quality/output specification (Akintoye et al., 2003), environmental sustainability (Deegan and 
Rankin, 1996), risk management (Clifton and Duffield, 2006; Robinson and Scott, 2009), 
collaborative partnership (Forrer et al., 2010) among others. These accountability mechanisms 
have all become prominent performance mechanisms for bringing accountability into PFI/PPP 
procurement.  
  
4.3.3  Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms 
In addition, existing literatures within accounting, legal, political, and public administration 
fields have also examined diverse accountability mechanisms outside the context of PFI/PPP and 
public sector guarantees. For instance, Bersoff and Miller (1993), Luke (2010), Fombad (2013) 
explorations of ethics and accountability provided valuable insights into issues such as public 
trusts, responsibility and moral accountability mechanisms. Theorists described ethical 
accountability as a concept that focuses on the actors’ moral conscience and the feeling of being 
responsible or accountable (Finlay, 1996; Zadek, 1998; Shearer, 2002; Banks, 2004; 
Frederickson and Ghere, 2013). In public administration, ethical mechanisms of accountability 
emphasizes institutional systems for curtailing indiscretions among public actors and holding 
them accountable to certain moral standards (Mulgan, 2000). As such, popular mechanisms such 
as whistle-blower-policy (Hodge and Greve, 2007; Bovens et al., 2015), and anti-corruption 
(Gendron et al., 2001; Meagher, 2005) have been very important for imposing high moral 
responsibilities on public managers. 
4.3.4  Democratic Accountability Mechanisms 
There is also fairly widespread consensus that well-developed institutions are essential 
constituents of democratic accountability, and a lack of effective accountability processes and 
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arrangements weakens democracy (Olsen, 2013). Institutions in this context are portrayed as 
mechanisms for oversight, control and compliance. Public actors are presumed to be more likely 
to act in the interest of the public when they are accountable to the governed (Bovens et al., 
2015). Democratic accountability mechanisms therefore play huge role in holding public 
managers accountable to the people within a democratic system (Bertelli and Sinclair, 2016). To 
this end, Bovens et al. (2008), Luke (2010) and Bovens et al. (2015) identified three mechanisms 
relevant for holding public office holders accountable within democratic systems, which include 
rule of law, parliamentary scrutiny and stakeholder engagement. In another related studies 
Ranson (2003) and Ashworth (2000) identified social and political impact assessment as another 
key mechanism for ensuring that actors take into cognizance the interest of the larger society, 
especially in terms of impact of public policy (see Table 4.1 below for accountability 
mechanisms).  
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Table 4.1: Accountability Mechanisms identified for Evaluating Government Guarantee Schemes for PFI/PPPs 
 Outcome-Based mechanisms Literature Sources  Ethics-based Mechanisms Literature Sources 
1.  Risk Management Lowry et al. (1998) 1.  Whistle-blower-policy  Hodge & Greve (2007) 
2.  Environmental Sustainability Deegan & Rankin (1996) 2.  Anti-corruption Meagher (2005) 
3.  Collaborative Partnership Forrer et al. (2010)    
4.  Budgeting (visibility) Hodge & Greve (2007); Grout 
(2005) 
   
5.  Value for Money Demirag and Khadaroo (2010)    
      
      
      
      
      
 
 Democratic Mechanisms Literature Sources  Process-related Mechanisms Literature Sources 
1.  Social and Political Impact Forrer et al. (2010) 1.  Competition Bidding Kaboolian, (1998) 
2.  Stakeholder engagement Brandsma & Schillemans (2012) 2.  Benchmarking Goddard (2005) 
3.  Rule of Law Afonso et al. (2005) 3.  Monitoring Nisar (2007) 
4.  Parliamentary scrutiny Luke (2010); Morallos & 
Amekudzi, (2008) 
 
4.  Audits Bovens et al. (2010) 
   5.  Public Sector Comparator Bovens et al. (2015) 
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Based on the above analysis, this study identified eighteen (16) mechanisms. These mechanisms 
are considered relevant for evaluating accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee schemes 
(See Table 4.1 above for Accountability Mechanisms identified for Evaluating Guarantee 
Schemes for PFI/PPPs). The next section will therefore analyse the significance of each 
accountability mechanism within the above context by developing hypotheses for the study.  
  
4.4 Hypothesis Development under Outcome-based Accountability 
mechanisms 
This sections explored each of the six (6) outcome-based accountability mechanisms identified 
from the literature. Being constructs from accountability, each mechanisms were theoretically 
discussed in order to identify factors contributing to each concepts (Table 4.2 below for 
accountability mechanisms with associated measures and literature sources). This is in addition 
to the theoretical framework for the study in Fig 4.1. 
4.4.1 Value for money (VFM) and Government Guarantee  
Many studies including Heald, (2003), Ball et al. (2003), Pollock et al. (2007), and Coulson 
(2008) have described the concept of Value for Money (VFM) as ambiguous and difficult to 
evaluate in PFI/PPPs. However, assessing for VFM is considered even more essential when 
considering accountability in government guarantee schemes for PPPs (Chan et al., 2010).  
According to Burnside et al. (2004), the use of government guarantee schemes needs to be 
justified in terms of the public value it brings to taxpayers. Corbacho and Schwartz (2008) also 
suggested that, unless government obtains value that is equal or greater to the incentives derived 
by private investors, public guarantee schemes may become a mere generous reward for doing 
nothing. Defining VFM however has often focused on the critical drivers that defines value in 
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projects. According to Ameyaw et al. (2015), cost or price is often a major determinant of value 
in PFI/PPP projects. Ameyaw suggested that most PPP clients prefer projects with the least 
procurement cost as cost efficiency is directly attributed to value. However in a different study, 
Yescombe (2007) rejected as misleading suggestions that cost may be the main driver of value in 
PPPs. From Yescombe’s perspective other important qualitative value metrics such as service 
quality, equitable risk transfer (Ball et al., 2003), and whole life costing (Robinson and Scott, 
2009) are very crucial for evaluating VFM. This position aligned with a report by Arthur 
Andersen and Enterprise LSE (commissioned by Treasury Taskforce 2000), which identified 
three critical drivers of value for money in PPP as risk transfer, output specification and long 
term contracts. According to the report, PFI/PPP project performance is a measure of how well 
projects meet pre-agreed technical and operational standards specified by the concession. 
Outputs specification may also relate to service quality in which the project contractor is 
expected to deliver innovative solutions that meets or surpassed client’s expectations (Rintamaki 
et al., 2007; Coulson, 2008). Due to the high risk profile of PPPs (Ball et al., 2003), projects 
risks must be equitably distributed to parties best capable of managing such risks (Wojewnik-
Filipkowska and Trojanowski, 2012), whilst effectively managing the project over the long term 
period (Chan et al., 2010). Different studies have also suggested that VFM may be justified if 
associated costs incurred by the project is marginal compared to generated income streams over 
the project’s whole life cycle (Eadie et al., 2013; Ismail, 2013; Atmo and Duffield, 2014) 
including a competitive bidding process that allows creative and valued added options (Pollock 
et al., 2002). Based on the above perspectives, this study hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (VFM): Determining the Value for money in guaranteed projects will contribute 
positively towards public accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme. 
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4.4.2 Risk Management and Government Guarantee Schemes for PPPs 
Risk Management is now considered a critical dimension of accountability and service delivery 
in public administration (Palermo, 2014). According to the National Audit Office Report on 
Managing Risks to Improve Public Service (2004, pp.1), the UK government considers effective 
risk management as a vital tool for curtailing failures in service delivery and improving overall 
efficiency. In view of this, government has consistently advocated the adoption of risk 
management strategies and controls across all public sector transactions (Drennan et al., 2014). 
However, despite the seeming importance, many public organisations often neglect the idea of 
managing risks systematically (Mulgan and Albury, 2003; Diabat and Govindan, 2011). A major 
reason for this is, whilst some public transactions does not appear to be very risky (.i.e. schools, 
public transport etc.), once risks are effectively prevented, nothing actually happens (Drennan et 
al., 2014). Such lack of definable output to prove that risks management has been successful 
typifies the current accountability issues in government guarantee schemes (De Castro et al., 
2016). Albeit, public guarantees pose risks with huge fiscal consequences for governments 
especially during uncertain economic conditions such as now (Setiawan and Surachman, 2016), 
most policy formulators appear passive about these risks and have continued to guarantee many 
PFI/PPPs (Owolabi et al., 2015). In view of this, studies such as Drennan et al. (2014) and 
Correa et al. (2014) have suggested further developments of public sector competences in 
managing contingent risks especially in hybrid relationships like PFI/PPPs. According to 
Drennan et al., (2014) and De Bruyckere (2013), integrating risk management systems into 
public sector evaluative frameworks will help prevent failures and strengthen public 
accountability. Boussabaine (2013) also suggested regular risk identification and reporting as a 
contributing factor for improving public sector risk management capabilities. Proactive 
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evaluation of past risk events is also suggested to help public organisations spot warning signs 
and eliminate risks before they get out of control (Drennan et al., 2014). Sparrow (2011, pp.195) 
in a recent study on “controlling risks and managing compliances” suggested that a strong stance 
on compliance with regulatory frameworks in public organisations will curtail risk-induced 
behaviours in public transactions and prevent breach of public trust. Coming from the above 
perspective, this study therefore developed the two hypothesis below: 
Hypothesis 2 (RM):  Effective public sector risk management will strengthen public 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
 
4.4.3 Collaborative Partnership 
The complex nature of PFI/PPP projects and the long time frames between conception and 
project completion requires robust management of relationships among parties (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2003; Smyth and Edkins, 2007). According to Zou et al. (2014), evidences have 
shown that most successful PPP arrangements are the ones in which greater collaboration exist 
between the government and private parties. When PPPs enjoy government guarantee backing, 
collaboration among project parties becomes even more essential considering the intertwined 
objectives of government and huge stake on such project (Nugroho, 2014). As suggested by 
Smyth and Edkins (2007), developing non-adversarial relationships among parties in PFI/PPPs is 
seen by the government as an effective way to improve project effectiveness. Studies on 
managing stakeholders in PPPs such as El-Gohary et al. (2006), Yang et al. (2011) and Stapel 
and Schneider (2014), have suggested open and honest communication among project parties as 
a means of building trust and ensuring better cooperation. Such transparent and honest dialogue 
is crucial for avoiding the usual incidence of information asymmetries and moral hazards 
associated with government guarantee schemes (Zou et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2016). Although, all 
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parties in PPP projects are exposed to one form of risk or the other (Delmon, 2011), however, 
public guarantee schemes present additional risk to the public sector (Ismail, 2013), which may 
only be avoided via successful project delivery (Roumboutsos and Pantelias, 2015). In line with 
this perspective, Jelodar et al. (2016) and Pal et al (2017) suggested that commitment and 
participation of senior officials among public-private parties on the project is needed to drive the 
required vision for successful partnership. As such top management efforts will ensure that the 
relationship being build is not superficial (Pal et al., 2017). Hwang (2013) also suggested other 
factors encouraging collaboration in PPPs such as existence of clearly defined relationship and 
communication sharing strategy among project parties, commitment of the project delivery team 
(Torchia et al., 2015;); fair risk allocation among public-private parties (Du et al., 2016), 
multidisciplinary team to be responsible for handling collaboration with project parties (Noble 
and Jones, 2006), integrating information systems with all projects parties (Weihe, 2008), and 
early warning signals for detecting and solving conflicts or crisis (Meng, 2015). In line with the 
above perspective, this study hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 3 (CP): Better collaboration between government and private sector parties on 
publicly guaranteed projects will strengthen accountability in government guarantee scheme to 
PFI/PPPs. 
 
4.4.4 Budgetary Reporting of Government Guaranteed PFI/PPPs  
Wildavsky (1975) once described budgeting as a rational way of making hundreds of actors 
agree on thousands of budget lines in a very short period of time. According to Wildavsky 
(1986), budgeting is an art of transforming monetary resources into human purposes, by 
connecting projected expenditures to future happenings. Budgeting has been the major vehicle of 
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fiscal policy in both advanced and developing economies, especially in the past three to four 
decades (Bhatti and Phaup, 2015). In public administration, it is a tremendous policy tool that 
has huge ramifications for the smooth functioning of government and the larger society (Rubin, 
2016). As argued by Mikesell and Mullins (2011), budgets are used for achieving important 
fiscal objectives including (1) maintaining fiscal discipline, responsibility, control and fiscal 
sustainability (2) providing transparent information about public finances and programmes 
among others. Lately, the issue of reporting government’s contingent liabilities (government 
guarantee etc.)  and, future PFI/PPP payments on the budget statements have attracted much 
debate within the UK public sector (Ma, 2013; Lindwall, 2013; Funke et al., 2013; Kopits, 
2014). According to Bergmann (2014), the non-fiscal nature of contingent liabilities creates 
some form of ambiguity regarding such sensitive financial obligations of government. As such, 
by reporting government guarantees and other contingent liabilities in the national budget 
(through accrual accounting method), much needed fiscal clarity is provided the parliament, 
which ultimately allows better fiscal judgements (Newberry, 2014; Chan and Zhang, 2013). In 
addition, Funke et al. (2013) and Marcel (2014) argued that the critical essence of budgetary 
reporting of fiscal liabilities is not so much about information disclosure, but the facilitation of 
oversight and control. Such fiscal vigilance in the application and administration of public 
guarantee schemes provides a means of ensuring the long term financial well-being of 
government (Dabbicco, 2013).  Based on this background, this study hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (BR): Reporting government’s contingent liabilities in publicly guaranteed 
PFI/PPPs on national budgets will improve public accountability in government guarantee 
scheme for PPPs.  
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4.4.5 Environmental Sustainability and Government Guaranteed PFI/PPPs 
Environmental sustainability is described as responsible preservation of the environment to 
prevent depletion of natural resources and ensure quality environment in the long term (Bjørn 
and Hauschild, 2013; Marans, 2015). Hirsh (2014), also referred to sustainability as the 
adaptation of individual behaviours and organisational policies to the long-term survival of 
human society. Many perspectives of sustainability abound in the literature, from the strategic 
management literature - sustainability as a means to fortify competitive advantages (Anderson et 
al., 2010; Nidumolu et al., 2009), to the cultural domain - the important role of organizational 
identity (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Gioia et al., 2013). In addition, environmental management 
perspective of sustainability focuses on resource efficiency (Carrillo-Hermosilla et al., 2010; 
Frondel et al., 2008; Potts, 2010). This standpoint emphasises the utilisation of natural resources 
in a manner that generates lasting benefits to the population of a country, while protecting the 
environment (Bell and Morse, 2013; Chambers et al., 2014). In the UK, sustainability is a critical 
policy and regulatory issue, with most aspects of public sector and corporate dealings needing to 
comply and promote practices that helps preserve the environment and encourage socio-
economic transformation (Radnor and Johnston, 2013; Ball et al., 2014). Currently, different 
sustainability policies and initiatives have gained much relevance such as reduction in carbon 
emissions (Marans, 2015), energy efficiency in constructed facilities (Potts, 2010), construction 
and food waste minimisation (Ajayi et al., 2015), Landfill Tax and Climate Change Levy 
(Akadiri and Fadiya, 2013), Sustainable Business and Sustainable Procurements among others 
(Walker and Brammer, 2009/2011; Lawrence et al., 2013). Under the UK’s sustainable 
procurement agenda, all public sector procurements are legally required to conform with various 
sustainability laws and standards of the government (Brammer and Walker, 2011; Meehan and 
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Bryde, 2011). Amidst all of these, government retains the dual role of being a purchaser, using 
her purchasing power to promote agendas of socio-environmental justice while also carrying out 
regulatory functions (Akadiri and Fadiya, 2013). However, from the procurement outlook, the 
UK’s largest public procurement is clearly within the construction sector (NAO, 2001; Hall and 
Purchase, 2006), with government procuring nearly 40% of the nation’s construction activities 
(NAO, 2001; Eadie et al., 2011). It therefore suffice to say that where public projects are 
delivered including via contracting routes such as the PFI/PPPs, a critical component of public 
accountability is the evaluation of the project’s impacts on sustainable environment (Nisar, 
2013). Putting this perspective in the context of PFI/PPP projects, accountability through socio-
environmental protection is very important and  studies like Hall and Purchase (2006), Du 
Plessis (2007), Zainul Abidin et al. (2013), Nawawi et al. (2015) and Akadiri and Fadiya, (2013) 
have identified different sustainability indicators in projects. For instance, Nawawi et al. (2015) 
suggested three indicators of sustainable projects as project’s contribution to social participation 
and inter-racial cohesion, project’s contribution to increased utilisation of local materials, and 
adoption of energy efficient solutions. In another related study Akadiri and Fadiya (2013) and 
Zainul Abidin et al. (2013) identified project’s contribution to reduction in material wastage and 
compliance with regulatory standards on sustainable construction. Also, prevention of massive 
changes to landscape (Korkmaz et al., 2010), project’s impact of surrounding plant and animals 
are considered as relevant sustainability considerations during project development (Swarup et 
al., 2011). Contribution to economic and social prosperity of surrounding communities in terms 
of impacts of on peoples’ lives and business were also suggested to define sustainable project 
performance (Du Plessis, 2007). Security of project host community (Dangelico and Pujari, 
2010) and Contribution towards replenishing non-renewable mineral and energy resources 
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(Labuschagne et al., 2005) are also identified as indicators of sustainability in project delivery. 
As such, coming from the above perspective, this study hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 5 (ES): Ensuring sustainable project delivery will strengthen public accountability 
in Government Guarantee Scheme for PFI/PPP projects. 
 
4.5 Hypothesis Development under Ethics-Based Accountability 
Mechanisms 
This sections explored each of the two (2) ethics-based accountability mechanisms identified 
from the literature. Being constructs from accountability, each mechanisms were theoretically 
discussed in order to identify factors contributing to each concepts.  
 
4.5.1  Whistle-Blowing and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Schemes 
In recent times, whistle blowing has become an important governance mechanism amidst rising 
cases of corporate scandals in many multinational corporations (Maroun and Atkins, 2014; 
Alleyne et al., 2013; Henik, 2015). Whistle-blowing is defined as “the disclosure by an 
organization’s member [or former member] of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the 
control of their employers to persons or organizations that might be able to effect action” (Miceli 
& Near, 1992:pp15). Whistle blowing could also mean disclosures of matters’ of public interest 
by members of an organisation (Brown, 2013; Department of Business Innovation and Skills, 
2015). Within the UK public sector, reports have shown that more employees are passing on 
information against perceived violations and wrongdoings especially in the Health, social 
services and banking sectors (Vandekerckhove and Lewis, 2012; Moberly, 2012; Jones and 
Kelly, 2014). The Government’s whistle blowing law (Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998) has 
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also recently widened offences covered under the Employment Rights Act 1996, to include 
disclosures relating to personal grievances such as work place bullying, discrimination and 
harassment (NAO, 2014; Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2015). However, whilst 
voluntary disclosure culture has gained acceptance in some sectors (Outterson, 2012; Reader and 
Gillespie, 2013), much has not been seen within public sector procurements. The UK public 
procurements especially in PFI/PPPs have remained tainted by criticisms of commercial 
confidentiality of financing terms including the true fiscal cost of associated government 
guarantee cover (Koenig‐Archibugi and Macdonald, 2013; Jones and Kelly, 2014). Hence, 
employee-voluntary disclosures have long been canvassed as a necessary mechanism for 
strengthening accountability in such hybrid contracts (Lambert and Lapsley, 2006; Whitfield, 
2007; Spence and Dinan, 2011; Kew and Stredwick, 2016).  Different studies have identified key 
drivers of voluntary disclosure within public sector institutions (Bashir et al., 2011; Brown, 
2013; Miceli and Near, 2013; Jones and Kelly, 2014). Jones and Kelly (2014) suggested the 
existence of effective institutional arrangement to inculcate culture of openness among staff 
through open meetings. This, according to Jones and Kelly (2014) helps staffs especially new 
employees to freely express their concerns while also aligning them with organisational culture 
of openness from inception. Studies such as Bashir et al., (2011) and Ash (2016) also canvassed 
adequate protection for whistle blowers against institutional witch hunt or ostracism. Protections 
such as confidentiality of whistle-blower identity and protection of whistle blowers’ personal and 
employment rights will help facilitate transparency and accountability (Ash, 2016). In addition, 
implementing procedurally correct actions to address reported wrongdoings is suggested to help 
strengthen openness and compliance (Brown, 2013; Miceli and Near, 2013).  Callahan and 
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Dworkin (1992) also suggested financial incentives for encouraging whistle blowing among 
public employees. Based on the above analysis, this study developed three hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6 (WB):  Encouraging whistle blowing among employees involved in PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme will have positive impact on public accountability.  
 
4.5.2 Anti-corruption and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Schemes 
One of the biggest concerns in government guarantee schemes is the problem of corruption 
arising from moral hazards and other vulnerabilities (Rose-Ackerman, 2013). Corruption is 
described as a fraudulent and unethical conduct by a person or persons seeking to obtain 
underserved personal advantage in a transaction (Rose-Ackerman, 2013). According to Allen et 
al. (2015), corruption can have debilitating impacts on policy goals under government guarantee 
schemes and often create rooms for resource leakages and abuse of systems and institutions 
(Philip and Peter, 2013). From the perspective of Moser et al. (2008) and Bringselius (2014), the 
challenge for government with guarantee schemes is not only about fulfilling targeted objectives 
but avoiding vulnerabilities that could encourage opportunistic behaviours from beneficiaries and 
applicants alike.  As such, effective management of state guarantees is often a tricky one given 
government’s limited in-house expertise in complex financial structuring (Niehaus and 
Sukhtankar, 2013). According to Bringselius (2014), guarantee schemes are often replete with 
reports of different corrupt behaviours like of false or incomplete information declaration (Huang 
and Wang, 2012), conflict of interest in decision-making, undue political influence, fraud in 
evaluations (OECD, 2016), dubious documentation (Bringselius, 2014), and sometimes weak due 
diligence and scrutiny by public officials (Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Rowell and Connelly, 2012). 
As a result, studies such as Moser et al. (2008), Agusman et al. (2014), Bringselius (2014), and 
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OECD (2016) have suggested strong stance against corruption in guarantee schemes while also 
highlighting different strategies for combatting such menace. According to OECD (2016), clear, 
adequate and timely information about happenings, processes and rules creates level playing 
field for businesses and ensure transparency. Investors often require adequate information in 
order to make business decisions in terms of how government support schemes benefits 
businesses. Also, Turner (2011) suggested effective internal and external oversight and control as 
a key mechanism for preventing risk-induced behaviour among public officials and the private 
sector in state aid arrangements. In another study, Campbell et al. (2009) and Niehaus and 
Sukhtankar (2013), also identified effective sanctions against corrupt practices as an important 
panacea for curbing corruption in public procurements. According to Campbell et al. (2009), 
sanctions against corruption and similar tendencies helps create deterrence and stimulate 
compliance among officials and stakeholders. In addition, Agusman et al. (2014), suggested 
more robust due diligence appraisals through extensive information gathering, will ensure better 
reaction to fraud by public officials. Coming from the above analysis, this study hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 7 (AC): Prevention of corrupt practices and dishonest behaviours in the handling of 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme will have a positive impact on public accountability. 
 
4.6 Hypothesis Development under Process-Based Accountability 
Mechanisms 
This sections explored each of the six (6) process-based accountability mechanisms identified 
from the literature. Being constructs from accountability, each mechanisms were theoretically 
discussed in order to identify factors contributing to each concepts.  
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4.6.1 Competition and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Schemes: 
Market competition is an essential ingredient of free-market innovations like the PFI/PPPs 
(Smyth and Edkins, 2007). According to Kappelman et al. (2006), competition is described as an 
instrument of choice that allows the elimination of market inefficiencies by facilitating rivalry 
among suppliers within an economic system. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) suggested that when 
firms compete to achieve goals such as maximising profits, increasing market share or bigger 
turnover, innovation and value is brought to the market thereby resulting in efficient allocation of 
resources and value. In PFI/PPP procurements, the role of market competition has also become 
pivotal to cost efficiency and value for money considerations (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015). 
Through competitive bidding and tendering processes, public authorities are able to award 
PFI/PPP concessions to contractors based on different value indicators like least procurement 
cost, innovation, performance, quality, and equitable risk transfer among project parties (Smyth 
and Edkins, 2006; Galford and Drapeau, 2004; Robinson and Scott, 2009). However, when 
PFI/PPP concessions are provided government support via guarantee schemes, accountability 
gaps become noticeable, especially because competitive bidding is not known with government 
guarantee approval processes (NAO, 2015). Such flaw, according to the NAO (2015), may result 
in underserving projects benefiting from government support, irrespective of their unsuitability. 
As such, studies have suggested the need for a competitive process in choosing guarantee-
deserving public projects (NAO, 2015; Whyte, 2015; Owolabi et al., 2015). Such competitive 
arrangement is believed could help free up UK’s infrastructure finance market space for potential 
investors, and thus enhance efficiency in the guarantee scheme (Georghiou et al., 2014; NAO, 
2015). In the light of the above perspective, different drivers of competition in public sector 
procurement have been suggested (Loader, 2013; Georghiou et al., 2014; Gong and Zhou, 2015; 
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Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015). According to Georghiou et al. (2014), increasing the number of 
potential bidders or applicants will stimulate competition in public sector bidding processes. 
Such atmosphere of competition also require level playing field among participants in order to 
prevent skewing the process in favour of select few (Gangwar and Raghuram, 2015). These will 
allow thus encourages investors to compete through innovative and quality solutions that bring 
better value to the public sector (OECD, 2011). In another study, Botswana (2013) argued that 
the amount of in-house commercial skills available to the public sector will influence 
government’s ability to create and drive competitive procurement. According to Botswana, 
government requires sufficient in-house expertise to understand targeted market including its 
various attributes and trends that may jeopardise the desired competition. Uyarra (2013) and 
Gong and Zhou (2015) also suggested open and comprehensive bidding parameters as an 
essential factor for creating an unbiased competitive procurement process. This, as argued by 
Loader (2013) allows all bidders have access to similar information which helps eliminate unfair 
advantage.  Similarly, while Raisbeck et al. (2010) suggested transparent bidding and tendering 
process, Marty and Voisin, (2008) suggested timely dissemination of information to bidders, and 
Lember et al. (2014) proposed adequate incentives to encourage the supply of innovation from 
the private sector, . According to Lember, such incentives could catalyse bidder competition 
since most participants will seek to take advantage of such incentives to drive down their cost. 
Coming from the above analysis, the study suggested the proposition below: 
Hypothesis 8 (CA): Competitive project selection process under government guarantee scheme 
for PFI/PPPs will have positive impact on public accountability. 
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4.6.2 Bench-Marking and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Schemes: 
Over the years, evidences has shown the vast difference in the performance between leading 
companies and average companies in performing particular activities (Berger and Gattorna, 
2001; Rolstadas, 2013). Through benchmarking, leading organisations have experienced 
significant success in upgrading their organisational capabilities (Boussabaine, 2013). The 
ambition and drive of organisations and governments to measure best value and performance has 
heralded the increasing application of various benchmarking techniques (Boussabaine, 2013). 
Halachmi and Montgomery (2000: p 406) defined benchmarking as “a systematic process of 
comparing, measuring and analysing the products, services or processes of an establishment 
against current best practices of other establishments in order to attain superior performance”. 
According to Van Dooren et al. (2015), benchmarking as an instrument for quality improvement 
has become prominent in the transformation of public-sector organisations especially under the 
New Public Management philosophy. In public sector procurements especially under PFI/PPPs, 
benchmarking remains a critical tool for assisting project stakeholders to identify key indicators 
and success factors for measuring projects’ performance (Boussabaine, 2013). Benchmarking 
allows the performances of projects at construction and operations stages to be measured against 
pre-agreed output specifications, which helps deliver quality services to levels desired by clients 
(Bogetoft, 2013). As an accountability tool, benchmarking can play crucial roles in managing 
infrastructure projects to be approved or approved for government guarantee schemes. However, 
the selection of guarantee-deserving projects have over time been done based on contextual 
factors peculiar to different nations under different circumstances (Feng et al., 2015), as against 
widely applied global benchmarking best practises for potential projects (Wanhill, 2013; Hamza 
et al., 2014).  According to Karafolas and Woźniak (2014), comprehensive articulation of 
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historically good practices and processes will help public sector learn from experiences and 
understand measures that have yielded better outcome over time. Projects can therefore be 
benchmarked against carefully articulated measures, as a starting point before any complex 
evaluation (Karafolas and Woźniak, 2014). Mori Junior et al., 2016) also suggested that 
benchmarking techniques require constant improvements in line with current realities in order to 
succeed as a useful mechanism. In addition, Yasin (2002) also suggested a provision of adequate 
resource committed to benchmarking exercises. Based on the above viewpoint, this study 
evolved two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 9 (BM): Benchmarking potential guaranteed PPP projects against historically good 
standards and processes under the government guarantee scheme will have positive impact on 
public accountability. 
 
4.6.3 Monitoring and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Schemes: 
In PFI/PPPs, the existence of a suitable monitoring mechanism is seen as a critical element for 
ensuring effective service delivery through vigilant observation of actors’ behaviours (Asenova, 
2013; Stelling, 2014). According to Liu et al. (2016), monitoring helps avoid poor decision-
making that may result in undesired consequences for projects. Evidences have shown that, 
where monitoring is lax, abuse and inefficiency hinders the achievement of public policy goals 
for PPPs (Hodge and Greve, 2007; Campagnac, 2011; Shaw, 2011). As suggested by Robinson 
and Scott (2009), fulfilling the theoretical value for money (VFM) claims in PFI will also largely 
depend on the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms in place for ensuring practical value 
in service delivery. McDowall (2000) adds that since PFI projects involve the public sector 
paying for services delivered over 25-30years of concession, effective project performance 
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monitoring is necessary for achieving service level agreements. However, despite its importance 
and the well-known monitoring role of project lenders in PPPs (Oyedele, 2013), monitoring of 
government guaranteed projects often become less vigilant once projects are given guarantee 
(Allen et al., 2015). A good reason for this is because project lenders, inspite of their knack for 
monitoring PFI/PPP progress, often succumb to adopting riskier investments and leverages once 
loans are guaranteed by government (Gropp et al., 2013; Allen et al., 2015). According to Gropp 
et al. (2013), the presence of loan guarantees often encourage lenders to willingly expose 
themselves to different forms of risks ranging from currency risk to leverage risk. This 
apparently creates moral hazard situations with grave consequences for government’s fiscal 
sustainability and policy objectives. Based on this reality, the normal monitoring regimes for 
PPPs may therefore prove insufficient for handling the complexities of publicly guaranteed 
projects. Studies such as Beck et al. (2010), Mladenovic et al., (2013), and Javed et al. (2013) 
have argued that continuous monitoring of corporate and external dealings of the project 
consortium during the period of guarantee may be needed to prevent practices that could later 
jeopardize the project. In addition, Priemus et al. (2007); Robinson et al, (2009); and 
Boussabaine, (2013) have called for more qualitative public awareness on fiscal risks arising 
from contingent liabilities and external monitoring through audit institutions. Carbo-Valverde et 
al. (2013) and Gozzi and Schmukler, (2015) also suggested the use of sanctions against wrong 
practices to serve as incentive for actors to ensure effective monitoring or projects and scheme. 
Based on the above-mentioned perspectives, this made the propositions below: 
Hypothesis 10 (M): Effective monitoring of government guarantee scheme, actors and 
beneficiary PFI/PPP projects will have positive impact on public accountability.  
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4.6.4 Performance auditing and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Schemes 
Evaluation of performance through audits is a critical ingredient of the neo-liberal market 
philosophy of New Public Management (NPM) (Arnaboldi et al., 2015). Performance audit is an 
impartial evaluation of clearly stated administrative goals or objectives of projects, programs, 
functions and activities, based on economy, efficiency, effectiveness and ‘good management 
(Pollitt et al., 1999, Robinson and Scott, 2009). According to Pollitt et al. (1999, pp128 ), 
auditing of effectiveness and good management ‘demands an investigation of outcomes, which 
by definition, take place in the world beyond the organisation or program’, and requires the use 
of independent evaluation criteria. Performance audits focuses on measuring improvements in 
outputs (efficiency) and outcomes (effectiveness) of public sector products or services against 
pre-articulated standards (Ameyaw et al., 2015). Under PFI/PPP procurement, auditing project 
performance is seen as a critical aspect of accountability especially given PFI’s political and 
financial significance (Edwards et al., 2004; Pollock and Price, 2004). A major reason for this is 
due to various theoretical and empirical arguments regarding the validity, cost and value of 
privately procured public infrastructure (Owolabi et al., 2015).  As suggested by Yaun et al. 
(2009), conducting effective performance audit relies on a clearly identified overall objective for 
such evaluation. In the case of PFI/PPPs, the ultimate objective for the public sector client is the 
achievement of best value in projects and service delivery (Christensen and Lægreid, 2015). Best 
value, which Oyedele (2013) described as the maximum obtainable outcome from any 
infrastructure development, emphasizes value elements such as quality, effectiveness, efficiency, 
value for money and performance (Yaun et al., 2009). The significance of these best value 
elements is often reliant on the integration of stakeholder requirements, project characteristics 
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and the achievability of the value elements vis-a-vis available resources (Bawole and Ibrahim, 
2016). In line with these perspectives, studies have suggested different performance indicators 
that mirrors best value proposition in PFI/PPPs and thus require audit evaluations (Diefenbach, 
2009; Yaun et al., 2009; Hodge and Greve, 2013; Fombad, 2014). Bourn (2007) suggested 
project life cycle cost reduction as an indicator of performance which originally has huge impact 
on the overall rationale for adopting a private procurement route. Adequate risk transfer among 
project parties (Akbıyıklı, 2013), acceptable project quality (Diefenbach, 2009), and quality 
service delivery (Christensen and Lægreid, 2015) were also identified a measures determining 
the performance of PFI infrastructure. In another related study, Hodge and Greve (2013) and 
Fombad (2014) also suggested on-time project completion, and economic empowerment of local 
community as essential factors reflecting the performance of PPP projects. Based on the above 
analysis, this study put forward a proposition that: 
 
Hypothesis 11 (PA):  Greater effective performance auditing of projects benefitting from 
government guarantee scheme will have positive impact on public accountability. 
 
4.6.5 Public Sector Comparator and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Schemes 
Public sector comparator (PSC) is the hypothetical, risk-adjusted cost of a project when that 
project is financed, owned and implemented by government (Bain, 2010; Cruz and Marques, 
2013). PSC is commonly used in public procurement decision-making as a yardstick against 
which private investment proposals are compared (Khadaroo, 2008). If, when converted into 
present values, the private costs are lower than the PSC, then the proposal is deemed to be more 
efficient than conventional public-sector procurement (English, 2007). Thus, PSCs are central in 
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the decision-making process about where, when and how to use privately-financed infrastructure 
solutions—such as those encouraged under the UK’s private finance initiative (PFI) (HM 
Treasury 2003). 
 
The UK HM Treasury claims the use of the PSC is designed in a way as to ensure there is no 
preference for any particular model of infrastructure financing (HM Treasury, 2007). However, 
various criticisms of the PSC abound in the PFI/PPP literature ranging from the apparent bias of 
ministers and other political actors for PSC (Coulson, 2008), arbitrary choice of parameters to 
suite PFI as against traditional procurement (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002), contentious arguments 
about possible cost savings from PFI and bias of public evaluators for PFI among others (Hodge 
and Greve, 2007). In a scathing remark against the PSC, Ball et al. (2001), described the tool as 
lacking in objectivity, clarity and necessary information regarding methodological approach. 
However, despite these disapprovals, PSC remains the important tool for deciding PFI 
procurements and important considerations like value for money, risk transfer, and projects’ 
impact assessments among others still form the core of it (Cruz and Marques, 2013). In the 
context of publicly guaranteed PFI/PPPs, the possible use of the PSC will attract serious 
accountability questions. One of the big questions is the supposed relevance of the PSC in 
government guarantee program, and whether the comparison of overall benefit derived from 
guaranteeing private infrastructure finance vis-a-vis the immediate and contingent cost to 
government may necessary. In addition, since government guarantee is considered a booster to 
projects’ bankability, initial PSC exercise at PPP stage therefore requires revisiting. This study 
therefore argue that, given the shortcomings in the objective evaluation of projects under the 
current infrastructure guarantee scheme (NAO, 2015, pp7; Whyte, 2015), introducing PSC for 
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deciding guarantee-deserving projects offers best value to the public.  In addition, the study also 
posit that PSC evaluation at both PPP and guarantee scheme levels will have significant impact 
is aligning possible accountability cracks in project evaluation under government guarantee 
schemes. This study therefore hypothesize thus: 
Hypothesis 12 (PSC): Adopting public sector comparator for deciding guarantee-deserving 
infrastructure projects will have positive implication for public accountability under PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme. 
 
4.7 Hypothesis Development under Democratic Accountability Mechanisms 
This sections explored each of the four (4) democratic accountability mechanisms identified 
from the literature. Being constructs from accountability, each mechanisms were theoretically 
discussed in order to identify factors contributing to each concepts.  
 
4.7.1 Socio-Political Impact and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Schemes 
One of the underlying arguments behind PFI/PPP is maximising the social welfare of the project 
users and host communities, whilst fulfilling government’s political objectives (Pierre, 1998).  
Hence, designing PPPs often involve considerations for various social and political factors and 
benefits (Qi et al., 2010). According to the HM Treasury Green Book (2003), examining wider 
society’s impact of projects plays important role in value for money (VFM) analysis. Example of 
social factors that may be examined include project’s impact on job creation and unemployment 
(Ugwu and Haupt, 2007), project’s impact on travel time and journey quality (Warner, 2013), 
affordable user charges (Tsamboulas et al., 2013), access to services (Ng et al., 2012), better 
stakeholder engagement (Shen et al., 2011), adequate security (Marcelino-Sádaba et al., 2015), 
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impact on biodiversity among others (Leigh and Neill, 2011; Zeng et al., 2015). As argued by 
Vining and Boardman (2008), social impact analysis of projects facilitates more comprehensive 
cost-benefit evaluation, by ensuring net gains to the society outweighs unintended negative 
impacts (Ruckert and Labonté, 2014). In addition, political imperatives of government and 
pressures of host communities also have huge influence on PPP projects (Aldred, 2008). As 
suggested by Brugha,  and Zwi (1998) most PPPs are a product of high level political 
considerations, therefore often get caught in the web of different political manoeuvres and 
pressures (Ng et al., 2012). As such, key considerations during PPP appraisals usually focus on 
some factors that has political cum policy implications such as sufficient risk transfer away from 
public sector (Asenova, 2013), adequate response to public needs through timely project delivery 
(Kalidindi and Singh, 2009), minimal life cycle cost (Hu et al., 2014), and better collaboration 
between public and private sector (Essig and Batran, 2005). However, whilst socio-political 
impact evaluation of PPPs abound in the literature as common practice (Pierre, 1998; Boardman 
and Vining, 2012; Warner, 2013, Ameyaw and Chan, 2015), it remains opaque how government 
guarantee evaluators examine socio-political impact of guarantees when deciding on projects. 
According to the NAO (2015), without objective means of choosing guarantee-deserving 
projects, comprehensive impact assessment of projects appear unrealistic. In this regard, given 
that sovereign guarantee provides project investors with stronger credit standing with lenders 
(Immergluck, 2008), a benefit which could not be obtained elsewhere (Saunders and Allen, 
2010), a more robust socio-political cost-benefit evaluation of projects under the scheme is 
fundamental. Coming from the above background, this study hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 13 (SPI): Robust social and political impact evaluation of PPP projects at the 
government guaranteed scheme level will have positive effect on public accountability. 
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4.7.2  Stakeholder Engagement and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Schemes. 
Stakeholder engagement is a key aspect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and has been 
considered one of the critical success factors in PFI/PPP (Sierra‐García et al., 2015). According 
to Ei-Gohary et al. (2006), many PPP projects across the world have failed as a result of poor 
management of stakeholders resulting in public opposition in most cases. Typically, PPP 
involves multiple participants that include but not limited to the project client (governing 
authority), project sponsors, senior lenders, construction and operation contractors, insurers, host 
communities among others (Li et al., 2005; Smyth and Edkins, 2007; Cheung et al., 2010). 
However, on most occasions, the interests of these participants often conflict due to competing 
motivations and objectives (Smyth, 2008). In addition, the complex arrangements in PPP 
contracts in addition to the long term nature of the relationships among project parties sometimes 
create difficulty in aligning all interests at all times (Boussabaine, 2013). As such, engagement 
among project stakeholders is seen as a means of reaching common grounds while also achieving 
individual objectives (De Schepper et al., 2014). That said, under infrastructure government 
guarantee schemes, the nature of relationships among parties become even more complex due to 
increased number of participants and the complexity of such fiscal transactions (Owolabi et al., 
2015). New parties such as the guarantee administering authority (i.e. HM Treasury), 
Infrastructure and Project Authority (in the UK it’s called Infrastructure UK), external 
stakeholders like pressure and advocacy groups, the media among others all contribute towards 
the protection of different vested interests (NIP, 2011). Due to the increased complexity, 
Swoszowski et al. (2013) suggested effective communication and dialogue as a necessary 
condition for managing every stakeholder in order to achieve successful project delivery. 
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According to Wiek et al. (2012), dialogue provides a means for parties to express their candid 
views and thus allow smooth resolution of issues. Two-way free flow of communication also 
ensures all stakeholders are on the same page at all times (Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006). Other 
studies such as Anvuur et al. (2011) and Golob and Podnar, (2014) have also suggested effective 
communication channels and staff commitment to laid down stakeholder engagement strategy. In 
another study Erkul et al. (2016) and Yang et al. (2009) also identified transparent decision-
making process and clear understanding of stakeholders’ area of interests as critical success 
factors for managing projects’ stakeholders. Based on the above standpoint, this study develop 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 14 (SE):  Effective management of all stakeholders involved in government 
guaranteed PFI/PPPs will have positive impact on public accountability.   
 
4.7.3 Rule of Law and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Schemes 
The concept of rule of law is considered the fundamental basis of modern democratic society 
(O'Donnell, 2004). As suggested by Belton (2005), the origin of the notion may be traced to the 
French phrase 'La Principe de Legality', which means “the principle of legality”.  Rule of law 
refers to the submission of people to the dictates of the law regardless of their position in the 
society (poor or rich, high born or low born) (Fallon Jr, 1997; Chesterman, 2008). From a 
narrower perspective, rule of law implies that government’s authority may only be exercised in 
line with enshrined laws (Skaaning, 2010). In this sense, the law is superior to the wishes or 
dictates of individuals or rulers. Albeit, governments’ authority permeates all aspects of public 
sector transactions with various parties (Endicott, 1999; Møller and Skaaning, 2014), such 
dealings or contracts often happen within legal limits (Skaaning, 2010). In public sector 
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transactions such as PFI/PPP procurements, government’s interaction with the private sector is 
also governed by legally bonded contractual arrangements which are enforceable under the law 
(Yehoue et al., 2006). This fact is also applicable to transactions like government’s implicit or 
explicit guarantees, with such arrangements having legal implications within relevant public 
policy frameworks (Joshi, 2010). However, under government guarantee schemes for public-
private procurements, the big legal concern is the intertwined role of the public sector as a 
project partner, regulator and supervisor (Hodge and Greve, 2007; Forrer et al., 2010). Such 
complex and conflicting roles creates ambiguity regarding public accountability (Hodge and 
Greve, 2007), and could weaken public managers’ resolve towards enforcing the rule of law 
(Fombad, 2014). In line with these challenges, studies have suggested effective enforcement of 
contractual agreements (De Jong et al., 2010) and adequate institutional arrangements for 
enforcement (Fombad, 2013; Fombad, 2014), would ensure public accountability in public-
private contracts. Whilst Shen et al. (2006) and Hodge and Greve (2007) also suggested legal 
scrutiny and evaluation of policy, projects and performance; Zhang et al. (2015) and Delmon 
(2017) argued for more clarity in legal/contractual rights and responsibility among PPP project 
parties. Based on the above perspectives, this study developed the following hypotheses below: 
Hypothesis 15 (RL): Upholding the rule of law in the management of PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme will have positive impact on public accountability. 
 
4.7.4  Parliamentary Scrutiny and Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Schemes 
In recent times, one issue that has attracted policy analysts’ and academics’ clamour for more use 
of parliamentary scrutiny is the management of’ fiscal liabilities (Gulati and Buchheit, 2013). 
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The World Bank and European Union recently attributed the economic crisis in some Eurozone 
countries to, among other factors, poor management of fiscal liabilities (Nelson et al., 2011; 
Lane, 2012). Many scholars have called for greater parliamentary oversight on EU member 
nations’ management of state aids (Featherstone, 2011; Buiter and Rahbari, 2012; Beck, 2012; 
Karanikolos et al., 2013). Government guarantee schemes, which is one of the commonest forms 
of state aids for promoting private investments in the economy, has come under heavy knocks for 
weak scrutiny (Maskin and Tirole, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011; Weil et al., 2013). 
Parliamentary scrutiny is an institutional activity that involves the evaluation of the expenditures, 
policies and general administration of government (Grube, 2014; Thompson, 2014). From a 
broader perspective, scrutiny is one of the three cardinal responsibilities of the parliament, with 
the remaining two being the enactment of legislation and approval of government’s financial 
budgets (Ward, 2015). In parliamentary democracies like UK, Belgium etc., the traditional 
vertical accountability has often placed much emphasis on ministerial responsibilities (Bovens, 
2005). As such, formal accountability is often done via ministerial responsibilities to the 
parliament, while public managers are not considered politically accountable (Bovens et al., 
2015). However, over the past decades, hierarchical accountability approach has given way to 
diversified accountability relationships, with more studies calling for more parliamentary 
engagement of public managers (Shaoul et al., 2010; Laegreid and Christensen, 2013; Bovens et 
al., 2015). Accountability forums are now calling for increased use of parliamentary questioning 
and policy debates to hold public managers to account in the performance of their specific duties 
(Bovens et al., 2015; Van Dooren and Van de Walle, 2016). Such accountability dimension of 
bringing institutions and individual officials under parliamentary scrutiny could help address the 
criticisms of weak scrutiny of government guarantee schemes, especially in relation to PFI/PPPs. 
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This study therefore argue in addition that, since government guarantees involves a decision with 
great futuristic importance, perspectives of broader stakeholder of experts and interest groups 
should be allowed for better insights (Ennser‐Jedenastik, 2014; Willems and Van Dooren, 2016). 
More parliamentary oversight will therefore step up accountability on individual public 
managers making monumental decisions on behalf of government. Based on the above 
perspective this study hypothesized that: 
  Hypothesis 16 (PS): Parliamentary scrutiny of public managers’ decisions and actions as they 
affect effective management of government’s fiscal liabilities on guarantee schemes to PPPs will 
strengthen public accountability. 
Based on the above critical analysis, Table 4.2 below presents the sixteen (16) accountability 
mechanisms and 85 associated measures identified from the literature. In addition, Table 4.3 
below also presents the 16 theoretical hypotheses formulated from the sixteen (16) accountability 
mechanisms identified from the study. 
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Table 4.2: Latent measures and Observed Measure for Initial Model Development 
Latent 
Variables/Constructs 
Observed Variables/Measures 
Abbreviation 
References 
 
Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms 
Value for Money 
Hypothesis 1: Determining the Value for money in guaranteed projects will contribute positively towards public 
accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme 
 Least procurement cost VFM1 Ameyaw et al. (2015), Yescombe 
(2007), Heald, (2003); Pollock et 
al. (2007), and Coulson (2008), 
Rintamaki et al., (2007), 
Coulson, (2008), Eadie et al., 
(2013), Ismail, (2013), Atmo and 
Duffield (2014), Robinson and 
Scott, (2009). 
 service quality/output specification VFM2 
 equitable risk allocation among project parties VFM3 
 minimal whole life costing of project  VFM4 
 effective management of project over the long term 
period 
VFM5 
 competitive bidding process VFM6 
 innovative solutions VFM7 
Risk Management 
Hypothesis 2: Effective public-sector risk management will strengthen public accountability in PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme 
 Improved public sector risk management 
competences/capabilities. 
RM1 
Drennan et al. (2014), Correa et 
al. (2014), Drennan et al., (2014), 
De Bruyckere (2013), Sparrow 
(2011), Drennan et al., (2014), 
Mulgan and Albury, (2003),  
Diabat and Govindan, (2011). 
 Integrating risk management systems into public 
sector evaluative frameworks 
RM2 
 regular risk identification and reporting RM3 
 Proactive evaluation of past risk events RM4 
 strong stance on compliance with regulatory 
frameworks 
RM5 
Collaborative Partnership 
Hypothesis 3: Better collaboration between government and private sector parties on publicly guaranteed projects 
will strengthen accountability in government guarantee scheme to PFI/PPPs. 
 open and honest communication among project 
parties 
CP1 
El-Gohary et al. (2006), Yang et 
al. (2011,  Stapel and Schneider 
(2014), Zou et al., (2014), Shi et 
al., (2016), Delmon, (2011), 
Jelodar et al. (2016), Pal et al 
(2017), Hwang (2013), Torchia et 
al., (2015), Du et al., (2016), 
Meng, (2015), (Noble and Jones, 
 Consortium senior officials’ commitment towards 
successful collaboration 
CP2 
 existence of clearly defined relationship and 
communication sharing strategy 
CP3 
 commitment of the project delivery team CP4 
 fair risk allocation among public-private parties CP5 
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 Early warning signals for detecting and solving 
conflicts or crisis. 
CP6 
2006), Weihe, (2008). 
 Multidisciplinary team to be responsible for 
handling collaboration with project parties. 
CP7 
 integrating information systems with all projects 
parties 
CP8 
Budgetary Reporting 
Hypothesis 4: Reporting government’s contingent liabilities in publicly guaranteed PFI/PPPs on national budgets 
will improve public accountability in government guarantee scheme for PPPs. 
 reporting government guarantees and other 
contingent liabilities in the national budget 
BR1 
Newberry, (2014), Chan and 
Zhang, (2013), Funke et al. 
(2013), Marcel (2014)  oversight and control BR2 
Environmental 
Sustainability 
Hypothesis 5: Ensuring sustainable project delivery will strengthen public accountability in Government 
Guarantee Scheme for PFI/PPP projects 
 project’s contribution to social participation and 
inter-racial cohesion 
ES1 
Hall and Purchase (2006), Du 
Plessis (2007), Zainul Abidin et 
al. (2013), Nawawi et al. (2015), 
Akadiri and Fadiya, (2013), 
Nawawi et al. (2015), Akadiri 
and Fadiya (2013), Zainul Abidin 
et al. (2013), Korkmaz et al., 
(2010), Swarup et al., (2011), 
Du Plessis, (2007), 
Labuschagne et al., (2005),  
Dangelico and Pujari (2010) 
 project’s contribution to increased utilisation of local 
materials 
ES2 
 adoption of energy efficient solutions ES3 
 project’s contribution to reduction in material 
wastage 
ES4 
 compliance with regulatory standards on sustainable 
project delivery 
ES5 
 prevention of massive changes to landscape ES6 
 project’s impact of surrounding plant and animals ES7 
 Contribution to economic and social prosperity of 
surrounding communities 
ES8 
 Security of project host community ES9 
 Contribution towards replenishing non-renewable 
mineral and energy resources 
E10 
Ethics-Based Accountability Mechanisms 
Whistle-Blowing 
Hypothesis 6: Encouraging whistle blowing among employees involved in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme 
will have positive impact on public accountability. 
 effective institutional arrangement to the inculcate 
culture of openness among staff 
WB1 
(Bashir et al., (2011), Brown, 
(2013), Miceli and Near, (2013), 
Jones and Kelly, (2014), Jones 
and Kelly (2014), as Bashir et al., 
 adequate protection for whistle blowers against 
institutional witch-hunt 
WB2 
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 implementing procedurally correct actions to address 
reported wrongdoings 
WB3 
(2011), Ash (2016), Brown, 
(2013); Miceli and Near, (2013), 
Callahan and Dworkin, (1992).  Financial incentives for encouraging whistle blowing 
among public employees. 
WB4 
Anti-Corruption 
Hypothesis 7: Prevention of corrupt practices and dishonest behaviours in the handling of PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme will have a positive impact on public accountability. 
 strong stance against corruption in guarantee schemes AC1 Moser et al. (2008), Agusman et 
al. (2014), Bringselius (2014), 
OECD (2016), Turner (2011), 
Campbell et al. (2009), Niehaus 
and Sukhtankar (2013), Campbell 
et al. (2009), Agusman et al. 
(2014). 
 clear, adequate and timely information about 
happenings, processes and rules 
AC2 
 effective internal and external oversight and control AC3 
 effective sanctions against corrupt practices AC4 
 robust due diligence appraisals through extensive 
information gathering 
AC5 
Process-Based Accountability Mechanisms 
Competition 
Hypothesis 8: Competitive project selection process under government guarantee scheme for PFI/PPPs will have 
positive impact on public accountability. 
 Increasing the number of potential bidders or applicants C1 (Loader, (2013), Georghiou et al., 
(2014), Gong and Zhou, (2015), 
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015), 
Georghiou et al. (2014), OECD, 
(2011), Botswana (2013), Uyarra 
(2013), Gong and Zhou (2015),  
Loader (2013), Lember et al. 
(2014), Marty and Voisin, 
(2008). 
 Availability of in-house commercial skills within the 
public sector. 
C2 
 Open and comprehensive bidding parameters and 
requirements 
C3 
 Transparent bidding and tendering process C4 
 Adequate incentives to encourage the supply of 
innovation from the private sector 
C5 
 Timely dissemination of information to bidders C6 
Bench-Marking 
Hypothesis 9: Benchmarking potential guaranteed PPP projects against historically good standards and processes 
under the government guarantee scheme will have positive impact on public accountability. 
 comprehensive articulation of historically good practices 
and processes 
BM1 
Karafolas and Woźniak (2014), 
Mori Junior et al., (2016), Yasin, 
(2002).  Constant improvements on benchmarking techniques. BM2 
 Adequate resource committed to benchmarking exercises BM3 
Monitoring 
Hypothesis 10: Effective monitoring of government guarantee scheme, actors and beneficiary PFI/PPP projects will 
have positive impact on public accountability. 
 continuous monitoring of corporate and external 
dealings of the project consortium members during the 
period of guarantee 
M1 
Beck et al. (2010), Mladenovic et 
al., (2013), Javed et al. (2013), 
Priemus et al. (2007), Robinson 
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 more qualitative public awareness on fiscal risks arising 
from contingent liabilities 
M2 
et al, (2009), Boussabaine, 
(2013), Carbo-Valverde et al. 
(2013), Gozzi and Schmukler, 
(2015). 
 External monitoring through audit institutions and other 
interest groups. 
M3 
 the use of sanctions against wrong practices M4 
Performance Auditing 
Hypothesis 11: Greater effective performance auditing of projects benefitting from government guarantee scheme will 
have positive impact on public accountability. 
 project life cycle cost reduction PA1 Diefenbach, (2009), Yaun et al., 
(2009), Hodge and Greve, 
(2013), Fombad, (2014), Bourn 
(2007) Akbıyıklı, (2013), 
Diefenbach, (2009), Christensen 
and Lægreid, (2015). 
 Adequate risk transfer among project parties PA2 
 acceptable project quality PA3 
 quality service delivery PA4 
 on-time project completion,  PA5 
 economic empowerment of local community PA6 
Public Sector 
Comparator 
Hypothesis 12: Adopting public sector comparator for deciding guarantee-deserving infrastructure projects will have 
positive implication for public accountability under PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
 Compulsory PSC evaluation both at project and 
guarantee scheme levels. 
PSC1 
Cangiano et al. (2006), NAO, 
(2015), Whyte, (2015). 
 Integrating PSC evaluation into government guarantee-
decision making process. 
PSC2 
Democratic Accountability Mechanisms 
Socio-Political Impact 
Hypothesis 13: Robust social and political impact evaluation of PPP projects at the government guaranteed scheme 
level will have positive effect on public accountability. 
 project’s impact on job creation and unemployment SP1 Ugwu and Haupt, (2007), 
Warner, (2013), Tsamboulas et 
al., (2013), Ng et al., (2012), 
Shen et al., (2011), Marcelino-
Sádaba et al., (2015), Leigh and 
Neill, (2011), Zeng et al., (2015), 
Ruckert and Labonté, (2014), 
Aldred, (2008), Brugha,  and Zwi 
(1998), Ng et al., (2012), 
Asenova, (2013), Kalidindi and 
Singh, (2009), Hu et al., (2014), 
Essig and Batran, (2005), 
Saunders and Allen, (2010). 
 project’s impact on travel time and journey quality SP2 
 affordable user charges SP3 
 access to services SP4 
 better stakeholder engagement SP5 
 adequate security SP6 
 project’s impact on biodiversity SP7 
 sufficient risk transfer away from public sector SP8 
 adequate response to public needs through timely 
project delivery 
SP9 
 minimal life cycle cost SP10 
 better collaboration between public and private sector SP11 
Stakeholder Hypothesis 14: Effective management of all stakeholders involved in government guaranteed PFI/PPPs will have 
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Engagement positive impact on public accountability.   
 effective communication and dialogue SE1 Swoszowski et al. (2013), Wiek 
et al. (2012), Anvuur et al. 
(2011), Golob and Podnar, 
(2014), Erkul et al. (2016),  Yang 
et al. (2009). 
 Clear and effective communication channels SE2 
 staff commitment to laid down stakeholder engagement 
strategy 
SE3 
 transparent decision-making process SE4 
 clear understanding of all stakeholders’ area of interests SE5 
Rule of Law Hypothesis 15: Upholding the rule of law in the management of PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme will have 
positive impact on public accountability. 
 enforceability of contracts and agreements in projects RL1 De Jong et al., (2010), Fombad, 
(2013), Fombad, (2014), Bovens 
et al. (2015), Shen et al. (2006), 
Hodge and Greve (2007), Zhang 
et al. (2015), Delmon (2017). 
 adequate institutional arrangements for supporting 
contract enforcement 
RL2 
 Legal scrutiny and evaluation of policy, projects and 
performance. 
RL3 
 Clarity in legal/contractual rights and responsibility 
among project parties. 
RL4 
Parliamentary Scrutiny Hypothesis 16: Parliamentary scrutiny of public managers’ decisions and actions as they affect effective management 
of government’s fiscal liabilities on guarantee schemes to PPPs will strengthen public accountability. 
 Effective use of committee hearings to evaluate the 
management of government guarantee scheme 
PS1 
(NAO, 2015), Grube, (2014), 
Thompson, (2014), Martin and 
Vanberg (2004).  Interactions with external experts and interest groups to 
examine wider impact of government guarantee scheme 
PS2 
 Encouragement of policy debates on government 
guarantee scheme  
PS3 
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Table 4.3: List of Sixteen (16) Theoretical Hypothesis Formulated from Accountability Literature 
 
List of Hypotheses 
 
Propositions 
 
Hypothesis 1 (VFM) Determining the Value for money in guaranteed projects will contribute positively towards public accountability in 
PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme 
Hypothesis 2 (RM)  Effective public-sector risk management will strengthen public accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme 
Hypothesis 3 (CP) Better collaboration between government and private sector parties on publicly guaranteed projects will strengthen 
accountability in government guarantee scheme to PFI/PPPs. 
Hypothesis 4 (BR) Reporting government’s contingent liabilities in publicly guaranteed PFI/PPPs on national budgets will improve public 
accountability in government guarantee scheme for PPPs. 
Hypothesis 5 (ES) Ensuring sustainable project delivery will strengthen public accountability in Government Guarantee Scheme for 
PFI/PPP projects. 
Hypothesis 6 (WB)  Encouraging whistle blowing among employees involved in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme will have positive 
impact on public accountability. 
Hypothesis 7 (AC) Prevention of corrupt practices and dishonest behaviours in the handling of PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme 
will have a positive impact on public accountability. 
Hypothesis 8 (CA) Competitive project selection process under government guarantee scheme for PFI/PPPs will have positive impact on 
public accountability. 
Hypothesis 9 (BM) Benchmarking potential guaranteed PPP projects against historically good standards and processes under the 
government guarantee scheme will have positive impact on public accountability. 
Hypothesis 10 (M) Effective monitoring of government guarantee scheme, actors and beneficiary PFI/PPP projects will have positive 
impact on public accountability. 
Hypothesis 11 (PA)  Greater effective performance auditing of projects benefitting from government guarantee scheme will have positive 
impact on public accountability. 
Hypothesis 12 (PSC) Adopting public sector comparator for deciding guarantee-deserving infrastructure projects will have positive 
implication for public accountability under PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
Hypothesis 13 (SPI) Robust social and political impact evaluation of PPP projects at the government guaranteed scheme level will have 
positive effect on public accountability. 
Hypothesis 14 (SE)  Effective management of all stakeholders involved in government guaranteed PFI/PPPs will have positive impact on 
public accountability.   
Hypothesis 15 (RL) Upholding the rule of law in the management of PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme will have positive impact on 
public accountability. 
Hypothesis 16 (PS) Parliamentary scrutiny of public managers’ decisions and actions as they affect effective management of government’s 
fiscal liabilities on guarantee schemes to PPPs will strengthen public accountability 
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Chapter Summary 
 
Accountability as a theory continues to be dynamic and evasive, with multiple contexts, 
meanings and dimensions constantly emerging. This chapter explored Bovens’ “Two 
Concepts of Accountability” (accountability as a virtue and accountability as a mechanism), 
which is used as a theoretical framework to examine the importance of accountability 
mechanisms in strengthening PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme in UK. Hence, different 
concepts of accountability such as Process-based, Outcome-based, Ethics-based and 
democratic accountability, were theoretically explored. In the process, the study identified 
eighteen accountability mechanisms that are considered useful for investigating public 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. Each accountability mechanism 
were analysed, leading to the generation of sixteen hypothetical propositions which were later 
empirically tested through Structural Equation Model.  
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Chapter Five: Research Methodology 
5.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter examines the entire research design employed in the study. Sections 4.2 to 4.3 
explored the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the study with a strong 
justification for the adoption of critical realism theoretical perspective. Section 4.4 discussed 
retroduction as the research approach for the study, as against induction, deduction and 
abduction. Section 4.5 examined the research strategy for the study i.e. Case study strategy as 
well as the motivations for its adoption. Section 4.6 centres on the research choice where a 
mixed methodological approach was employed in the study. Sections 4.7 however examined 
the research methods adopted to generate relevant data for the study: unstructured interviews 
and literature review. Section 4.8 focuses on the strategies for data analysis. Two main 
strategies were adopted in the study: qualitative analysis using a Nvivo 10 software and 
quantitative analysis using Amos IBM SPSS tool. 
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5.1 Research Design 
Research planning often involves the consideration of over lapping themes and action plans 
such as conceptual approach, design, strategies for data collection, sampling techniques 
among others. The Saunders’s (2011) research onion diagram gives a clear illustration of a 
typical research design which many studies have borrowed leave from. In the onion diagram, 
the entire research design is captured in hierarchical and sequential order to present a holistic 
framework for the research process (Mizsey and Fonyo, 1995). This includes research 
philosophy, approach, strategy, choice, time horizon, techniques and procedures (Saunders’s, 
2011). Research problem in the current study will be addressed by borrowing ideas from the 
onion diagram. However, a more comprehensive approach to the entire process will be 
introduced. The selected research options are highlighted in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Important Choices in the Research Designs 
        
         Area of Choice 
          
                Available Choices 
  
  Choice employed 
 
Ontology 
 
Realism (Objective) 
Idealism (Subjective) 
 
Realism 
   
 
Epistemology 
 
Objectivism 
Subjectivism 
Constructionism 
 
Subjectivism/Objectivism 
   
 
 
 
 
Research Paradigm 
 
Positivism 
Interpretivism 
Constructionism 
Post-Positivism 
Postmodernism 
Participatory Action Research 
Critical Realism 
 
 
 
Critical Realism 
   
Research 
Approach/Reasoning 
Deduction 
Induction 
Retroduction 
 
Retroduction 
   
Method of Qualitative Design Mixed Method Design 
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Inquiry/Design Quantitative Design 
Mixed Method Design 
   
 
 
Research Strategy 
Narrative Research 
Phenomenology 
Grounded Theory 
Ethnography 
Case Study etc. 
 
 
            Case Study 
   
Type of Case 
Designs/Studies 
 
Single-Case Designs 
Multiple-Case Designs 
 
 
Multiple-Case Designs 
   
 
 
 
Sampling Strategy for 
Selecting Case studies 
and research 
participants 
Random Sample 
Stratified Sample 
Maximum Variation cases 
Paradigmatic Cases 
Convenience Sample 
Purposive sampling  
Snowball Sampling 
 
 
Maximum Variation case 
studies, Purposive 
sampling and Snowball 
sampling strategies 
   
 
 
Source of Qualitative 
and Quantitative 
Evidences. 
Documentations 
Archival Records 
Existing Literature  
Interviews 
Direct Observation 
Participants Observations 
Questionnaire survey 
 
 
Documentations, case 
study Interviews, 
literature review and 
questionnaire survey. 
   
Methods of Data  
Analysis 
Reparatory Grid 
Self-Questions 
Cognitive Mapping 
Thematic Analysis 
Conservational Analysis 
Statistical Analysis 
 
 
Thematic and Structural 
Equation Modelling 
(Statistical Analysis) 
   
 
 
Analytical Strategy 
Use of Theoretical Propositions/ 
Research Questions/Themes 
Developing Case Descriptions 
Use of Qualitative and 
Quantitative Data 
 
Use of Research 
Questions& theoretical 
propositions. 
   
 
 
Analytical Technique 
Pattern Matching 
Explanation Building 
Time-series Analysis 
Cross-case Analysis 
 
 
Cross-case Analysis 
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5.2 Research Process   
Research process or research workflow is described as series of logical and systematic 
actions or steps carried out in order to generate knowledge (Gerrish and Lacey, 2010). It 
involves sequential procedures for examining a research problem as well as the techniques of 
data collection and analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). For the purpose of this study, the 
research process is diagrammatically represented in Fig 5.2 below and depicts the order in 
which the entire research was carried out. 
5.3 Research Philosophy 
Every research stems from a belief background or assumption about the nature of reality and 
how such reality can be known (Crotty, 1998). These belief systems and the means of 
knowledge acquisition often provide justification for our approach to research, methodology 
and adopted methods (Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009). Research Philosophy therefore 
examines the theoretical assumptions underlying our research using two lenses, namely 
Ontology and Epistemology (Crotty, 1998).  
5.3.1 Ontology  
Ontology is the study of independent nature and reality of being (Heidegger, 1962). Ontology 
examines what can be known or what is possible for us to know about reality (Ritchie et al., 
2013). This reality claim may be classified into Realism and Idealism (Rosenberg, 1980). 
According to Popper (1972), cited in the study of Cruickshank (2007), the ontological 
assumption that reality and knowledge exist independently of our perceptions, interpretations 
and beliefs is regarded as realist (objectivist) ontology. On the other hand, Idealist 
(subjectivism) ontological assumption describes the philosophical claim that reality exists 
only as experienced by the subject of the research (Airenti and Colombetti, 1992; Archer 
2007).  
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Figure 5.1: The Research Process for the study 
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Every researcher therefore embarks on his research activities on the basis of either of these 
two ontological assumptions about reality and knowledge claims (Burns, 2000).  
 Ontological assumption underpinning the current Study: 
In this study a realist ontological assumption based on the acceptance of value free 
knowledge of reality is embraced. By this philosophical stance, we argue that truth or 
knowledge claims (accountability) exist as an independent theoretical model (Bhaskar, 1975).  
Our actions as researchers are therefore that of a causative agent for the observed 
phenomenon. This study posits that, the impact of public accountability on government 
guaranteed projects can be known from observation of regular sequence of causes and effects. 
Therefore, externality of reality within the context of observed phenomena strongly holds.  
5.3.2 Epistemology 
The word epistemology emerged from two Greek words episteme, (knowledge) and logos, 
(reason) (Grix, 2002). Epistemology is described as the theory of the source, nature and limits 
of knowledge or social reality (Blaikie, 2007). According Crotty (1998), epistemology 
examines the way we understand and acquire the knowledge of reality. The question of what 
constitutes valid knowledge is therefore an epistemological question (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994; Blaikie, 2007). As argued by Da Silva (2011), the demarcating line between 
epistemology and ontology is quite blurred. In most cases, ontological assumptions usually 
inform epistemological stances on knowledge claims (Blaikie, 2000). As suggested by Crotty 
(1998), three major epistemological assumptions about knowledge have been identified 
namely, Objectivism, Subjectivism and Constructionism.  
Objectivism   
As Agassi (1990) rightly opined, objectivist epistemology holds the assumption that truth or 
knowledge is pre-existing, fixed, out there and that only careful scientific research can obtain 
such scientific knowledge. Hence, only researches conducted with strict adherence to 
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scientific laws are regarded as valid knowledge of reality (Burns, 2000; Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), objectivist epistemological view argues that, 
if a real “reality” exists at all, then the relationship between the knower and the known must 
exhibit value freedom. To obtain such knowledge in a credible manner will therefore require 
a value-free approach that is outside the bias interpretation of the researcher (Burns, 2000). 
Subjectivism  
Subjectivist epistemology on the other hand, is rooted in scepticism of the universality of 
theory or value-free objective reality (White, 2007). This theoretical assumption holds that 
the knowledge of reality is only based on the interpretations that individuals and groups 
ascribed to it (Crotty, 1998). Therefore, meaning is imposed on reality via the subjective 
experience of the individual (Burns, 2000). According to Blaikie (2011), subjectivist 
epistemology is regarded as idiographic and focuses on individual interpretation of meaning 
rather than establishing universal laws.  
Constructionism 
Constructionism is a philosophical assumption that the world is socially constructed and 
knowledge of reality is created out of the interplay between the researcher and the external 
world (Crotty, 1998). According to Parker (1998), since a number of people may have 
different interpretations of reality, therefore, knowledge of reality is constructed based on 
individual perceptions through social relations and interactions with reality. From the 
perspective of Blaikie (2007), constructionist theoretical assumption presupposes that 
meaning arise through the collectively shared perception of reality (inter-subjectivity) by 
social actor. 
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 Epistemological stance underpinning the current study: 
After thorough consideration of the aim, objectives and research questions for this thesis, a 
subjectivist epistemological assumption is adopted for the study. This may sound a little 
contradictory, based on the adoption of realist ontology (Value-free reality) for the study. 
However, doubts over the choice of epistemology will be cleared when discussing the 
research paradigm underpinning this study (Critical Realism). But more importantly, 
although the study believes in the objectivist approach towards examining accountability 
theory is essential; the subjective interpretations of reality from actors experiences is not 
neglected in this study (Bhaskar, 1975). To this end, the study combined actors’ (UK public 
and private sector employees) subjective accounts of “accountability and mechanisms” 
suitable for evaluating government guarantee in PPPs, with value-free data collection 
methods to explore wider views of participants.  
  
5.4 Research Paradigm 
Weaver and Olson’s (2006, p. 460) as quoted in Bally (2012) defines research paradigm as  
“patterns of beliefs and practices that regulate inquiry within a discipline by providing 
lenses, frames and processes through which investigation is accomplished”. Research 
paradigm, also referred to as theoretical perspective, describes an all-embracing and 
procedural thought process that organises scientific research (Bettis and Gregson, 2001). 
Paradigms represent the world view of the researcher which informs the approaches, 
strategies and methods adopted for our research process (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Crotty, 
1998). Some of the popular paradigms in social science research are Positivism, 
Interpretivism, Constructionism, Postmodernism, Critical Realism, Logical Positivism, 
Radical Structuralism, Post-Positivism etc. (Bashkar, 1978; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994; Crotty, 1998; Blaikie, 2007). 
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Although the theoretical assumption underpinning this study emerged from critical realism 
philosophical paradigm, however, efforts will still be made to offer brief discussion on few of 
the major paradigms (Positivism, Interpretivism, Constructionism and Critical Realism) in 
order to draw adequate comparisons and justification for its adoption (Table 5.2 highlights 
the different research paradigms). 
 
Table 5.2: Research Philosophies and Applications 
Philosophical 
Basics 
Positivism Interpretivism  Critical 
Ontology Objectivist Subjectivist Objectivist 
Epistemology Objectivist Subjectivist Subjectivist 
Theory Generalize Particular Particular 
Reflexivity Methodological Hyper Epistemic 
Role of Researcher Distance from data Close to data Close to data 
 
5.3.1 Positivism 
The philosophical assumption of positivist research is objectivism (Crotty, 1998). Positivism 
philosophical paradigm lays claim to value-free proposition, that is, knowledge exist 
independently of the mind (Smith et al., 1996). This proposition sees a separation of the 
knower (researcher) from the knowledge attained (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), positivist research assumes that scientific knowledge 
can only be acquired through standardized questions, numerical data, facts, statistics, random 
sampling etc. Therefore, any dilution of research with the subjective interpretations of the 
researcher will create bias as well as weaken generalizability of research findings (Crotty, 
1998). Positivism paradigm rejects the idea that meaning is either socially constructed or 
135 
 
imposed on reality (Olsen, 2004). This research philosophy is very common in natural and 
some social science researches (Burns, 2000). 
5.3.2 Interpretivism 
In contrast to the positivist’s stance on meaning and world reality, interpretivism 
philosophical assumption stems from idealist or subjectivist ontological and epistemological 
background respectively (Tuli, 2011). Interpretivism theoretical assumption challenged the 
value free proposition of positivism and argued that, meaning and social reality only exists on 
the bases of the interpretations ascribed to it (Gerring, 2003; Crotty, 1998). Hence, 
knowledge or meaning is relative and does not exist outside of the mind (Blaikie, 2007). 
Rather, meaning is imposed through subjective interpretations of the individual (Williams, 
2000). As a result, interpretivism focuses on research techniques that demonstrate 
interactions between the researcher and the participants. 
5.3.3 Constructivism 
According to Crotty (1998), constructivist research holds the assumption that there is nothing 
as objective truth, neither is there such thing as subjective reality. Rather, constructivism 
argues that knowledge or meaning is only constructed by individual through interactions with 
the external environment (Blaikie, 2007). According to Neuman (2003), social dialogue and 
interplay defines what reality is under a constructivist philosophical paradigm. Hence, 
meaning is made out of the relationship between the knower and the known (Blaikie, 2007).  
5.3.4 Critical Realism and Justification for its adoption in the study  
As stated earlier in the study, the theoretical assumption underpinning this thesis is critical 
realism. Critical realism emerged due to the challenge of sustaining the concept of 
universality or independent reality of being, in the face of knowledge relativity (Bashkar, 
1975; Archer, 2013). According to Danermark (2002), critical realism theoretical perspective 
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holds that the relationship between independent reality (quantitative) and the perceptions that 
we make of it (qualitative) is the primary focus of research. This therefore allows objective 
reality to find a common ground with socially interpreted reality (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
Critical Realism combines ontological realism (objectivism) with epistemological relativism 
(subjectivism) as well as an emancipatory axiology (Easton, 2010; Archer et al., 2013). 
Although, critical realism agrees with the positivists’ assertion of value free proposition, it 
argues that such knowledge of reality is socially constructed (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008: pp 
17).  
 
Within the context of this study, the adoption of critical realism philosophical paradigm was 
based on three essential considerations which include: 
1. This study seeks to investigate theoretical constructs from accountability. 
“Accountability” is considered a socially constructed theory regarding the notion of 
being answerable for ones’ actions or inactions to a forum or a superior authority 
(Auel, 2007; Bovens, 2008). Being abstract concept, objective testing of theoretical 
assumptions is necessary for obtaining generalizable findings (Archer et al., 2013). 
However, since accountability here is treated as an abstract mechanism (Bovens et al., 
2015), independent reality is only understood via human interactions (subjective 
interpretations) with the phenomenon (Downward and Mearman, 2007). Critical 
realism therefore enables objective reality to be combined with subjective reality 
(Downward and Mearman, 2007). Also, the motive of this study, which focuses on 
exploring public accountability mechanisms through the views of UK public and 
private sector experts on PFI/PPP government guarantee, is perfectly in line with this 
study.  
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2. Triangulation – critical realism paradigm encourages triangulation of data, methods, 
theory and investigators in a research activity (Olsen, 2004). Hence, it allows the 
researcher to extract ideas and insights from various data sources and employ suitable 
methods to generate diverse viewpoints (Seale, 1999). Triangulation improves 
internal rigor in research and helps to cross validate findings (Creswell, 2007). 
According to Downward and Mearman (2007), through triangulation, qualitative 
findings can be validated through quantitative analysis of findings and vice versa. 
This study will thus rely on extracting qualitative data as inputs for quantitative 
analysis. 
  
3. Methodological Pluralism – the adoption of critical realism is also based on method 
pluralism. Method pluralism rests on the proposition that research method and 
methodology in a study is influenced by the identified research questions (Wildemuth, 
1993; Olsen, 2004). This assumption, as further buttressed by Danermark (2002), 
allows combination of different research methods or methodology. As such, this study 
will triangulate qualitative data collection methods with quantitative methods of data 
collection and analysis respectively. This approach is common in inter-disciplinary 
research where data and findings may emerge from disciplines having different 
ontological believes (Danermark, 2002). Critical realism thus allows such interface of 
standpoints and methodology to hold in a single study.  
 
Based on the above arguments, it suffices to say that critical realism is the appropriate 
philosophical paradigm for this study. It encourages mixed method triangulation which my 
thesis strongly rely on, in terms of using quantitative techniques to analyse qualitative 
findings.  
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5.4 Research Approach 
The research approach in this thesis is “Retroduction”, as against deduction (theory testing), 
induction (theory generation). According to Peirce (1998), Reichertz (2004) and Downward 
and Mearman (2007), retroduction, also regarded as abduction in many studies (Peirce, 1957; 
Darden, 1987; Paavola, 2004; Deledalle,1990), borrows ideas from existing known structures 
(induction and deduction) (Sæther, 1998). Retroduction encourages triangulation of methods, 
especially quantitative and qualitative methods (Downward and Mearman, 2007). This 
therefore allows it to avoid the epistemological weaknesses of inductive and deductive 
reasoning (Walters and Young, 2005), in order to extend the boundary of knowledge 
(Downward and Mearman, 2007). As Oliver (2011) and Downward and Mearman (2007) 
right opined, the major tool in critical realism is retroductive inference (See Fig 5.2 below). 
 
Figure 5.2: Retroduction borrows ideas from inductive and deductive approaches 
 
5.5 Research Choice/Method of Enquiry 
Research choice usually reflects the objectives which the researcher intends to pursue in a 
study (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005). According to Blaikie (2000), in many studies on social 
enquiry, research choice has been broadly classified under two categories namely, qualitative 
and quantitative. Conversations on these two approaches have been used to define (i) 
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methods of data collection, (ii) types of data collected (iii) research in which certain methods 
are applied (iv) paradigms, theoretical perspectives and strategies of enquiry (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994; Blaikie, 2000; Brannen, 2005; Creswell, 2013). While some studies are 
regarded as qualitative based on certain choices of data collection techniques, analysis or 
research strategy (Morgan and Smirch, 1980; Berg et al., 2004; Neuman and Neuman, 2006), 
others are classified as quantitative (Martin and Bridgmon, 2012; Creswell, 2013). Yet, more 
recent literatures have embraced a combination of different methods, also known as mixed 
methodology (Morse, 1991; Bryman, 1992; Blaikie, 2000; Olsen, 2004; Creswell, 2013). 
This study therefore explores both qualitative and quantitative strategies to provide a basis for 
its research choice (mixed methodology). 
5.5.1 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research involves subjective analysis and exploration of social phenomena, within 
their natural enviroment (Morgan and Smirch, 1980; Berg et al., 2004; Neuman and Neuman, 
2006). Qualitative research dwells on theory generation and discursive descriptions that 
examines social actors (Blaikie, 2000; Crotty, 1998). As such, efforts are centred on 
understanding the patterns or meaning that individuals or group attribute to social phenomena 
(Creswell, 2014). Researchers in this field employ interpretive approaches such as 
unstructured or semi-structured techniques, participants’ observations, focus group 
discussions among others (Blaikie, 2000; Creswell, 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 2008).  
5.5.2 Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research on the other hand is an approach for objective testing of theoretical 
assumptions (Newman, 1998, Creswell, 2014). Quantitative research lays emphasis on facts 
that directly or indirectly emerge from observed regularity in social phenomena (Crotty, 
1998). This type of research are mostly well-detailed, uses more of randomized experiments 
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and structured data collection methods i.e. sample surveys, multivariate statistical analyses, 
frequency etc. (Bryman, 1992; Blaikie, 2000). The assumption underlying quantitative 
research is that of value-free relationship between the researcher and the research participant 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994).Quantitative research is more common in the field of natural 
sciences and usually emerges from positivist’s theoretical background. 
5.5.3 Mixed Method Research and its Justification in the study 
In order to examine accountability in public sector guarantee for PFI/PPPs, this study adopted 
exploratory sequential mixed methodology approach. With this strategy, initial exploration of 
the constructs from accountability through qualitative research approach was followed with a 
quantitative approach to research.  According to Creswell and Zhang (2009), sequential 
mixed method is suitable where a phenomenon is yet to be conceptualised, adequately 
explored in the literature or is being examined in a context whose research questions are 
unknown. Webb et al. (1966) referred to mixed method approach to research as “multiple 
operationism”, which allows the combination of various methodologies in single study 
(Blaikie, 2000). According to Denzin and Lincoln (2008), integrating quantitative and 
qualitative methods and data in a single study is essential towards increasing richness and 
rigor in social inquiry. As a result, mixed method augments the non-overlapping weaknesses 
of either methods (qualitative and quantitative), with strengths of the other (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Creswell, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, this study is not unmindful of a number of opposing arguments against mixed 
methodology approach to a research (Creswell and Tashakkori, 2007; Philip, 1998; O'Cathain 
et al., 2007, Tashakkori and Creswell, 2008). According to Philip (1998), many of these 
arguments have centred on the feasibility of a mix of methods in a single study. Blaikie 
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(1991) argued that triangulation in mixed method research is hindered by the notion of 
incommensurability of different ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpins 
different methods. O'Cathain et al. (2007) also doubted the practicality of gaining any unique 
insight through a mixture of methods in research. In addition, mixed methodology faces the 
challenge of validity of research findings due to weakness associated with integration of 
different methods (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2006). Despite the opposing views, mixed 
method approach continues to gather tremendous following and proponents (Morse, 2003; 
Brannen, 2005; Creswell and Tashakkori, 2007; Saunders et al., 2011; Creswell, 2013), and 
it’s thus adopted for this study. 
 
The adoption of mixed methodology approach in this study therefore aims to address the 
objectives identified for it which include: 
 To identify accountability mechanisms that are suitable for evaluating government 
guarantees to PFI/PPP projects. 
 To explore the perception of UK public and private sector experts on each 
accountability mechanism identified and their suitability in the context of PFI/PPPs 
government guarantee scheme. 
 To identify the top ranked accountability mechanisms that can be used for evaluating 
in government guarantees for PFI/PPPs. 
 To develop a structural model for evaluating accountability in government guarantees 
in PFI/PPP projects. 
  
Based on the above stated objectives, it is evident that the first and second objectives of the 
study adopt interpretive approaches (literature review case study interviews, and 
documentation). However, the third and fourth objectives employed randomized statistical 
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analysis in order to arrive at a more generalizable conclusion. Based on these objectives, 
mixed methodology approach is therefore suitable for the study.  
5.6 Research Strategy   
5.6.1   Case Study Strategy and justification for its adoption in the study 
The research strategy for this study is “Case Study”. Case study has a long history in clinical 
medicine, social anthropology and currently in political science, sociology, management etc. 
(Blaikie, 2000). According to Yin (2014. p.2), case study research is defined as:  
“a research approach which tends to investigate contemporary phenomenon 
(the “case”) in its real world context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident”.  
  
From the perspective of Creswell (2007), case study methodology involves examining a 
research problem through one or numerous cases in a confined system. Researchers have 
argued that case study strategy allows investigation of the complexity and particular nature 
of a phenomenon (Blaxter et al., 1996; Blaikie, 2000). As such, investigations in case studies 
often take different forms such as explanatory, exploratory or descriptive approach, 
depending on the research questions of the study (Yin, 2014).  
 
In this study, exploratory case study strategy was adopted to explore public accountability in 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. In this sense, perspectives of UK public sector 
employees and private sector participants were explored to identify suitable accountability 
mechanisms for evaluating PPP government guarantee schemes.  
5.6.2  Identifying the case 
According to Yin (2012), identifying the “case” to study is often the first step towards 
designing case study research. Blaikie (2000) describes a case as a social object or unit 
whose unique character and context must be carefully studied within a bounded system.  
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Such unit may be an entity, a thing, a person, a family, a group, a set of relationships, 
processes etc. (Blaikie, 2000; Stake, 2013). In this study, “the cases” being studied are three 
public-private collaborative projects (PFI/PPP) backed by UK government guarantee 
scheme. Such types of projects are special with unique characteristics and contexts. In 
addition, the selection of  projects from the United Kingdom was informed by the prolific 
nature of the country’s PFI procurement policy, the volume of her PFI project portfolio and 
her adoption of infrastructure guarantee scheme in 2011 at the wake of the 2007/08 global 
recession. 
5.6.3 Multiple or Single Case Study  
Many criticisms of a single case study design abound in numerous literature (Stake, 1995; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006; Campbell and Stanley, 1966). For instance, Vaus (1991) criticised the lack 
of comparison with another case, whilst Campbell and Stanley (1966) doubted the possibility 
of drawing a scientific inference from a single isolated case. However, other studies like 
Flyvbjerg (2006), Noor (2008), and Yin (2012) have debunked these traditional claims and 
argued that generalization is possible in case studies, since multiple cases and sources of 
evidences could generate research findings that can be replicated in similar contexts. 
 
Coming from the above arguments (Yin, 2012; Creswell, 2012), this study opted for 
multiple-case study approach. Hence, three case studies of PPP projects currently being 
guaranteed by the UK government were investigated. This strategy, the study believed will 
allow multiple perspectives to be explored, thereby enriching the research findings (Baxter 
and Jack, 2008).  
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5.7  Sampling Strategy  
Sampling involves selection of units or cases from a much larger population in order to 
observe the smaller group, with the intention of making precise generalization about the 
larger population (Bryman, 2004; Neuman, 2007; Thompson, 2012). Through sampling, 
representativeness among constituent parts of a population can be ensured (Neuman, 2003; 
Neuman, 2007; Merriam, 1988; Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
 
In this study, qualitative and quantitative sampling strategies play huge role in addressing the 
research questions. According to Doherty (1994), quantitative sampling methods are usually 
randomised and based on probability or chance. On the other hand, qualitative sampling 
methods are non-probabilistic in nature (Neuman, 2003). The differences in these two 
sampling approaches centre on the size of the sample population as it affects margin of error 
and confidence level (Neuman, 2007). From quantitative perspective, the larger the sample 
size, the smaller the sampling error and the higher the confidence level, hence 
generalizability of findings (Marshall, 1996; Cooper et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
qualitative research focuses on the depth of knowledge and context of a social phenomenon 
(Blaikie, 2000).  
5.7.1 Qualitative Sampling Strategy  
At the qualitative stage of this study, two sampling strategies were employed. The first is 
Maximum Variation Sampling Method which was used for selecting the three case studies 
of publicly guaranteed PFI/PPP projects in UK. According to Suri (2011), maximum 
variation sampling, which is also referred to as maximum diversity sampling is a type of 
purposeful sampling (Neergaard et al., 2009). This sampling method is very useful when 
examining small sample population and when a random or quota sampling methods would be 
impossible (Patton, 2005). Maximum variation sampling focuses on selecting samples from a 
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population that are entirely different from one another in order to reflect their heterogeneity 
(Perry 1998; Draucker et al., 2007).  Through this method, multiple perspectives are 
explored, which allowed the capture of essential and variable features of a phenomenon 
(Koerber and McMichael, 2008). Studies such as Memarian et al. (2007); Louis et al., 
(2005); Brewer and Selden (1998) and Haverland and Yanow (2012), have used maximum 
variation sampling to explore different research problems within accountability literature and 
public sector administration. 
 
In line with the above, this study chose three extremely diverse UK government guaranteed 
PPP projects namely, (1) A Six-lane Toll bridge in Northwest England, (2) a Power Station 
Project in South West England and (3) a Rail Line Expansion between South East and South 
West of England. 
The selected projects were chosen based on the following reasons: 
 Case Study Selection-  
 Although each of the three (3) PPP projects selected were guaranteed by the 
UK government under the “UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructure (2011-
2015)”. However, the three projects are of different types in terms of 
structure, characteristics, purpose, and project value.  
 Each case study projects are also distinct by their geographical locations. 
 The project sample population is not large as the UK government has only 
guaranteed few infrastructure PPP projects, whilst about a number of other 
projects has been pre-qualified for guarantee under the UK government 
guarantee scheme. 
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The second stage of the qualitative study involved twenty three (23) semi-structured 
interviews with public and private sector employees. As such, selecting information rich 
participants for the interviews adopted a “Purposive Sampling Method”. Purposive 
Sampling, also known as “Judgemental Sampling” is a technique through which a researcher 
participants based on careful consideration of certain criteria in mind (Neuman, 2007). In the 
context of this research, purposive sampling technique was adopted based on the following 
identified reasons: 
 Semi-structured Interviews participants  
 Interview participants considered are public and private sector stakeholders 
with experience or involvement in UK government infrastructure guarantee 
scheme either as a team member of a guarantee beneficiary-institution or 
firm or involved stakeholder at lower capacity in beneficiary-firms or 
government institutions. 
 Also considered for the interviews were guarantee beneficiary team 
members or staff with experience in PFI/PPP procurements. 
 Interviewers selected were also based on ease of access to project 
information by research participants.  
 
Examples of studies on accountability and PFI/PPPs that have employed this sampling 
approach include Dicke (2002), Wallenburg et al. (2010), Li et al. (2005), Meng and 
McKevitt (2011). 
 
5.7.2 Quantitative Sampling Approach  
Confirming wider applicability or generalizability of the qualitative findings from this study 
required survey to large sample of population via questionnaires. At the moment, the UK 
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public sector workforce is currently estimated at 5.354 million as March, 2016 (ONS, 2016). 
In addition, based on list of operational PFI projects contained in the HM Treasury database, 
the total number of contracting, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and financial firms 
currently stands at 305. However, due to the absence of any reliable and open database for 
UK public sector employees and the unique nature of government guaranteed PFI/PPPs, a 
randomized sampling method was not possible. As such, the study adopted “Snowball 
Sampling Method”. Snowball Sampling is also known as network, chain referral or 
reputational sampling (Blaikie, 2000).  According to Blaikie (2000), snowball sampling 
involves identifying your sample population by building on network of contacts to access 
other likely participants (Neuman, 2007). As such, the researcher built on referrals from 
various existing contacts within UK Public service and PFI/PPP Construction Industry to 
recruit respondents and build large sample questionnaire respondents over time.  
5.8 Methods of Data Collection 
Two principal methods of data collection were employed in this study namely, qualitative and 
quantitative data collection methods. These methods are discussed below: 
5.8.1 Qualitative Data Collection  
The first phase of the study involves a two-way qualitative data collection strategy 
comprising literature review and case study investigation. Through extensive literature 
review, the study explored constructs in accountability theory towards identifying 
accountability mechanisms relevant for evaluating government guarantee in PFI/PPPs. 
However, confirming the applicability of the identified accountability mechanisms and 
associated measures within real life contexts was also deemed necessary to the study. As 
such, multiple case studies of three (3) PFI/PPP government guaranteed projects in the UK 
were explored through documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. The interviews 
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conducted involved twenty-three (23) UK public and private sector employees with varying 
experiences and involvement with UK infrastructure guarantee schemes and projects.  
5.8.2 Quantitative Data Collection Technique 
The second phase of the study involved quantitative data collection through questionnaire 
survey distributed to 118 UK public and private sector employees. The sampled public and 
private employees have diverse years of experiences with government guarantee schemes and 
PFI/PPPs. The principal objective behind the survey was to confirm wider applicability of the 
accountability mechanisms identified through the qualitative study.  
5.9 Validity 
Validity is described as measuring of the extent to which a measurement or concept is well-
established and conforms accurately to social reality (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Research 
validity measures the correctness of a research design and the method adopted for arriving at 
a scientific conclusion (Neuman, 2007). Within the context of this study, the research design 
shows a careful sequence of procedures for both the qualitative and quantitative sections of 
the study. In more detailed manner, the validity of this is further explored below: 
5.9.1 Internal Validity/ Credibility 
Qualitative study: The research problem in this study was explored using case study 
interviews and documentary evidences which were combined with theoretical data from 
literature review. As such, multiple sources of data and collection methods helped facilitate 
better insights in to the phenomenon (Sommer and Sommer, 2002). This perspective align 
with studies such as Neuman (2007), Lincoln and Guba (1994), Creswell (2007), who argued 
that relying on multiple sources of data and methods enrich the validity of qualitative 
research via triangulation.  In addition, twenty (23) semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with public and private sector employees experienced with government guarantee 
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scheme and PFI/PPP projects. This showed sufficient sample size for a qualitative study 
based on the recommendation of Moutaskas (1994) who suggested a minimum of 5 and 
maximum of 25 participants was suitable for qualitative interviews. The selected case studies 
were also identified using based on maximum case variation sampling, which ensured 
heterogeneity of sample, representativeness and multiple insights (Dicke, 2002; Wallenburg 
et al., 2010). 
Quantitative Study: Here, structured questionnaire using data from the qualitative study were 
developed. Albeit, snowball sampling was used to gradually recruite questionnaire 
respondents, the eventual relatively large sample population attained for the study was very 
significant for statistical analysis and generalisation. 95% confidence level with 5% margin 
of error was adopted for the study. Questionnaires were also piloted with selected participants 
within the academia. Reliability test was also carried out on the questionnaire data to ensure 
internal consistency of the measurement scale and reliability of measures.  
5.9.2 External Validity/Transferability 
External validity often referred to as “Generalizability” in quantitative research or 
“Transferability” in qualitative studies, examines whether results generated from a scientific 
research, when replicated or repeated under similar conditions will lead to the same results 
(Bracht and Glass, 1968; Calder et al., 1982; Neuman, 2007). Within the context of this 
study, external validity of findings is enhanced with the adoption of triangulation of methods 
and data sources. This is in line with Lincoln and Guba (1994) who argued that triangulation 
enriches qualitative research and enhances transferability. In addition, the adoption of 
multiple case studies at the qualitative stage of the study has been suggested to enhance 
transferability of findings (Vaus, 1991). Also, since this study also employed questionnaires 
whose internal consistency was confirmed, generalizability is maximized, whilst significantly 
diminishing bias in findings (Blaikie, 2000).  
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5.10 Ethics  
This study raises no ethical concerns as it involves exploring perceptions of public and 
private sector experts who do not fall within the group of vulnerable citizens as identified by 
the University’s Ethics Committee Guidance Document. Whilst data collection strategy 
within the study also included examining documentary evidences relating to UK government 
guarantee projects, in no way did the study sought sensitive documents. In addition, the study 
ensured anonymity of research participants’ identities, whilst also complying with informed 
consent by obtaining respondents express permission before filling questionnaires.  
5.11  Negotiation of Access: 
Negotiation of access to sources of data is a very difficult issue in a PhD thesis. In this regard, 
with full cognizance of the nature of the research participants (public and private sector 
stakeholders) and the specialised nature of the research topic, purposive and snow ball 
sampling approaches were used to gain access to interview participants and questionnaire 
respondents for the qualitative and quantitative studies. In line with the above, the researcher 
employed gate keepers (insiders) within various public and private sector institutions, 
PFI/PPP contractors and project companies. Overall, the study consolidated on networks of 
referrals to recruit research participants. 
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Chapter Six: Qualitative Study and Development of 
Hypothesized Model 
6.0 Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter looks at the qualitative data collection strategy for the study and the 
development of a hypothesized model. Section 6.1 discusses literature review and multiple-
case study strategy (semi-structured interviews and document analysis) used to identify and 
explore accountability mechanisms and associated indicators for evaluating publicly 
guaranteed PFI/PPPs. Section 6.2 presents the sampling strategy for both case study and 
interview participant identification and selection. Section 6.3 presents the three case studies 
investigated in the study. Section 6.4 describes the data collection methods namely, semi-
structured interviews and documentation used as sources of evidence for the study. The final 
section 6.5 presents the overall findings from the qualitative study: 16 identified 
accountability mechanisms and 85 associated indicators for evaluating public accountability 
in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. Finally, a hypothesized model for accountability 
in publicly guaranteed PPPs is then developed from the qualitative data, after discarding 7 
unconfirmed associated indicators. 
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6.1 Qualitative Study 
The first phase of the qualitative study involved a two-way strategy comprising theoretical 
review of extant literature and case study exploration. While the literature review provided a 
robust background for the study and ensured the identification of useful theoretical data. The 
case studies provided real life context for investigating accountability mechanisms in 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
6.1.1 Literature Review 
The literature review stage explored current state of knowledge on PFI/PPPs, government 
guarantee scheme and accountability theory. In addition, based on the objective of the study, 
there was need to identify suitable accountability mechanisms for examining PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme. Hence, through extensive literature review, the study 
investigated different theoretical constructs in accountability theory such as process-based 
accountability, outcome-based, ethics-based and democratic accountability. The review led to 
the identification of sixteen (16) accountability mechanisms/constructs suitable for evaluating 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme (see Table 6.1 below). Going further, the 16 
accountability mechanisms (value for money, risk management, collaborative partnership, 
rule of law etc.) were deeply analysed using the literature to identify measures influencing the 
16 constructs. The review resulted in the unravelling of 85 associated measures influencing 
accountability in PFI/PPP Government guarantee scheme. Based on these discoveries, the 16 
accountability mechanisms and associated measures (85 factors) were put up for further 
confirmation using document analysis and case study (semi-structured) interviews. The semi-
structured interviews involved public and private sector subject matter experts with 
experience in PFI/PPP procurement and infrastructure guarantee scheme in the UK. 
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Table 6.1: Accountability Mechanisms identified for Evaluating Government Guarantee Schemes for PFI/PPPs 
 Outcome-Based mechanisms Literature Sources  Ethics-based Mechanisms Literature Sources 
1.  Risk Management Lowry et al. (1998), Drennan et al. 
(2014). 
1.  Whistle-blower-policy  Brewer& Selden, 
(1998),Bovens et al. (2015) 
2.  Environmental Sustainability Deegan & Rankin (1996) 2.  Anti-corruption Meagher (2005), Rebeiz(2011) 
3.  Collaborative Partnership Forrer et al. (2010)         
4.  Budgetary reporting Hodge & Greve (2007); Grout 
(2005) 
   
5.  Value for Money Hodge & Greve (2007); Nisar 
(2007), Demirag and Khadaroo 
(2010) 
   
      
      
      
      
      
 
 Democratic Mechanisms Literature Sources  Process-related Mechanisms Literature Sources 
1.  Social and Political Impact Forrer et al. (2010), Mahalingam 
(2009) 
1.  Competitive Bidding Kaboolian, (1998), Bing et al. 
(2005), Parker& Hartley(2003) 
2.  Stakeholder Engagement Brandsma & Schillemans (2012) 2.  Benchmarking Goddard (2005) 
3.  Rule of Law Afonso et al. (2005) 3.  Monitoring Nisar (2007), Boussabaine 
(2013) 4.  Parliamentary Scrutiny Luke (2010); Morallos & 
Amekudzi, (2008) 
 
4.  Performance Audits Bovens et al. (2010) 
   5.  Public Sector Comparator Bovens et al. (2015) 
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6.1.2 Multiple Case Study  
Coming from the literature review and in order to confirm the relevance and applicability of 
the identified sixteen (16) accountability mechanisms and associated (85) measures within 
real life context, the study examined three (3) case studies of government guaranteed PFI/PPP 
projects in the UK. The adopted multiple-case study strategy was aimed at expanding sources 
of evidences to generate qualitative findings which could be replicated in similar contexts 
(Blaikie, 2000; Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2014). However, considering the unique nature of the 
study, selecting suitable case studies was of utmost significance. 
6.2 Sampling Technique for Case Studies  
Using “Maximum Variation Sampling” approach, this study selected three (3) UK 
government guaranteed Infrastructure PFI/PPP projects as case studies.  The selected projects 
include (1) A Six-lane Toll bridge in Northwest England, (2) a Power Station Project in South 
West of England and (3) a Rail Line Expansion in the South East and South West of England 
respectively. All the three infrastructure projects currently benefit from the UK Guarantee 
Scheme for Infrastructure (UKGSI) cover and are being delivered through Public Private 
Collaboration with varying percentages (100%, 60% etc) of private sector finance.  
 
The selected projects possess different attributes and characteristics, and therefore justified 
the adopted sampling methodology. According to Gentles et al. (2015) maximum variation 
sampling method allows a study to gain multiple insights into social phenomenon by 
selecting entirely diverse cases from a relatively small sample. In this study, all the 
infrastructure projects currently under the UK guarantee scheme vary entirely from one 
another in terms of type, size, sector and project value. As such, selecting projects of similar 
types or sizes would have been clearly impossible. More importantly, considering that the 
selected projects would have gone through similar government guarantee appraisals, 
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accountability mechanisms were likely to be mostly similar. Also, the issue of accountability 
is considered a generic but important issue that cuts across all government transactions 
irrespective of their variants (Ferris, 1993; Dunleavy et al., 2006). As such, maximum 
variation sampling approach allowed the capture of essential and variable attributes of each 
selected project, while enriching the research due to multiple perspectives and heterogeneity 
(Koerber and McMichael, 2008).  
6.3  Three Case Studies of PPP Government Guaranteed Projects  
This section presents the case study projects investigated in the study. The cases were briefly 
described with focus on important features and nature of the projects. Vital information that 
could easily give out the identity of the project and its sponsors were deliberately omitted 
from the descriptions in line with anonymity agreement with the project parties. Table 6.2 
below presents details of the three case study PPP projects. 
 
Table 6.2: Three (3) Selected Case Studies of Public Private Partnership (PPP) Projects 
Guaranteed by UK Government 
Project Characteristics 
 Case Study A Six-lane Toll bridge 
Project Location Northwest England, United Kingdom 
Project value £600million 
Procurement Public Private Partnerships (DBFO) 
Industry/Sector Transport 
Duration 30 years Concession 
Funding arrangement 70% Private Sector Funded 
Value of Government Guarantee £257million 
Project Details 
This project is a 1.5km long toll bridge that connects two towns and forms the centre of a newly 
improved standard link road of 9.5km long that connects the national motorway network. The project 
which commenced construction in 2014 is billed to be completed in the autumn of 2017. This bridge 
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has a total length of 2.3km and width of 60m, height of 80 to 125m and has load weight limit of up to 
53,000+tonnes. Wider output specification of the project includes developing and connecting other 
public transports, cycles and pedestrians including a 20year regeneration programme. The road which 
was designed to have a speed limit of 60mph with three lanes on both sides of the road, is expected to 
create an estimated 4.640jobs courtesy inward investment, regeneration activities and direct jobs. The 
project is also expected to realise an estimate annual income of £61.9million in gross value added from 
the newly created employments. The toll road project is considered among nationally significant 
projects under the UK’s National Infrastructure Policy of 2011and as such was deemed eligible for 
government support via guarantee.  
 
Case Study B Power Station Project  
Project Location South West England 
Project value £19.6 to £20.3billion 
Procurement Public Private Collaboration (DBFO) 
Industry/Sector Energy 
Duration 60years  
Funding arrangement 100% Private Sector Funding 
Value of Government Guarantee £2billion 
Project Details 
This project involves the delivery of a 1630MWe per unit power station that includes two pressurised energy 
reactors which are enough to power an estimated 6 million UK households. The project which is funded entirely 
through the private sector route is expected to be completed by 2027 considering the developer’s own estimation 
of possible 15months time overrun. The massive power project commenced preliminary construction works in 
2014 and is being cited on a near 69 acres site. About 1800 workers are currently working on the project, a 
number which is expected to rise to 5600 over the course of the 10 construction period. The project is currently 
under a 35year fixed tariff agreement (subsidy) between the energy provider and the UK government and is 
expected to satisfy 6-7% of UK’s energy demands. This project is expected to create more 25,000 jobs over the 
construction period and is expected to provide huge opportunities for local, national and international businesses. 
The power projects makes more efficient use of fuel than previous designs therefore ensuring reduction in spent 
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fuel. Generated steam powers just one large turbine which is directly connected to a generator that is capable of 
generating a total site capacity of around 3260MW of electric power. The electric power is transferred via 
overhead cables to the National Grid Transmission Network. Associated projected developments needed to 
support the delivery of the power project include cooling water tunnels, transmission infrastructures, and interim 
energy waste storage facilities among others. 
 
Case Study C Rail Line Extension 
Project Location South East of England 
Project value £1.2billion 
Procurement Public Private Collaboration (DBF) 
Industry/Sector Transport 
Duration Construction duration is 4years 
Funding arrangement 100% Private funding 
Value of Government Guarantee £750million 
Project Details 
This projects involves a massive rail track expansion from the South East to South West part of 
England. This rail extension include the construction of two underground stations. The project which 
commenced construction in 2015 is expected to be completed by 2020 and involves underground 
tunnelling of about 3.2km in length. The project will require the excavation of about 600,000 of earth 
and development of a 300-meter long conveyor belt to transport spoil. The project is designed to create 
more than 25,000 direct employment and the development of over 20,000 homes within the project 
communities. The project, which was designated as a nationally significant project yet benefits from no 
direct government funding as it’s earmarked as to be financed entirely through private sector funds 
through a Design, Build and Finance (DBF) approach. This project is expected to generate wider 
economic benefits to the tune of £7.9billion and up to £4.5billion is additional tax revenue.  
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6.4 Sampling Approach for Qualitative Data Collection 
After identifying suitable case studies for exploring the real life context of the research 
problem, the study then adopted semi-structured interviews and documentation as qualitative 
data collection methods to elicit findings from the selected cases.  Both semi-structured 
interviews and documentation were designed to help confirm the relevance and applicability 
of theoretically identified accountability mechanisms and their associated measures. Using a 
purposive sampling method, the study identified information-rich participants that were 
relevant towards achieving the research objectives. The selected participants in these cases 
were public and private sector stakeholders that fulfilled two or more predetermined criteria 
set for the study. The criteria for selecting participants for the qualitative phase are listed 
below: 
 
Selection Criteria for Private Sector Participants: 
 The first criterion was to interview participants from among project parties involved 
on projects selected as case studies for this study. This include team members of the 
project companies or Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs).  
 In addition, the relative experience or extent of the participants’ involvement in the 
selected case study project, especially the bidding process for UK guarantee scheme. 
Such involvement in the project and guarantee scheme application could be in diverse 
capacities ranging from: 
a. Senior staff with influence or decision making powers on the project and the firm’s 
bid for infrastructure guarantee cover,  
b. Staff team members familiar with the organisation’s application for UK guarantee 
scheme for project,  
 Interview participant may also include experienced staff member with direct or 
indirect involvement with the project and/or the institution’s guarantee scheme 
application.  
 Relative experience of interview participants with Public-Private projects were also 
essential.  
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 The willingness of staff members to allow access to less-sensitive documentation 
relating to the guarantee scheme applications and the beneficiary infrastructure 
project. 
Selection Criteria for Public Sector employees: 
 Public sector employee with direct involvement or experience in the appraisal or 
decision making stages of infrastructure government guarantee applications for the 
selected case study projects. This involvement could be at various levels ranging from 
director or deputy director, senior executive, or executive level staff with varying 
degree of involvement at certain stages of the guarantee appraisal.  
 Public sector employees with experience in PFI/PPP procurements.  
 Other public sector employees with involvement in PFI/PPP procurements but 
without experience of government guarantee application and vice versa. 
6.5 Qualitative Data Collection methods  
6.5.1 Interviews 
According to Moutaskas (1994), when conducting interviews, a minimum of five and 
maximum of 25 participants may be suitable for investigating a phenomenon. In line with this 
perspective, the study interviewed twenty-three (23) participants who fit the selection criteria 
set out for the study (see Table 6.3 for Characteristics of the Interview Participants). These 
participants ranged from public to private sector interviewees that and fulfilled a minimum of 
three of the selection criteria for each group. 
Table 6.3: Characteristics of Interview Participants 
Govt. Guaranteed Case 
Study Projects 
 
Case Study 
A 
Case Study 
B 
Case Study 
C 
Participants’ Position 
Public Sector Participants 
Director - 2 1 
Senior Executives 2 1 2 
Junior Level Managers 2 1 1 
Private Sector Participants 
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Project Team Member 1 - - 
Project Manager 1 2 1 
SPV Executive 2 1 3 
Number of Interviewees 8 7 8 
 
The average work experience of all the interview participants is 37.9 years, while their 
average experience in the UK government guarantee schemes for infrastructure and PFI/PPP 
projects is 3.7 years and 17.5 years respectively. The interviews were conducted between 
August 2014 and April 2015. Suffice to say that, though the interviews were semi-structured 
and relatively guided with few prepared questions, respondents were still encouraged to 
freely share their views on issues relating to how accountability was ensured during the 
processes of bidding for UK guarantees schemes. This therefore allowed the study to 
accommodate views considered important by the participants in line with Irvine et al., (2013). 
More importantly however, the interview participants were asked to confirm, which of the 16 
identified accountability mechanism were relevant and applicable within the PPP guarantee 
application they have been involved. This was made possible through consistent prompting, 
including following up on specific issues relating to accountability arrangements for the 
projects. Overall, all the 23 interviews lasted a total of 757mins and were tape-recorded using 
a smart voice recorder.  
6.5.2 Documentation 
The second stage of the qualitative data collection involved document analysis. Usually 
considered more difficult than direct interview method, gaining access to relevant documents 
can be a herculean task. As such, the study relied on existing relationships built within the 
case study project organisations to obtain a number of relevant documents relating to the 
guaranteed projects. In the case of public sector employees, the researcher was advised to 
access publicly available documents on the projects, as no staff offered any useful 
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documentation. However, through private sector participants, a number of project-related 
documents were accessed including memos, internal and external correspondence of the 
organisations, minutes of project meetings, some project appraisal documents and pre-
qualification documents etc. These data was offered after obtaining express agreement 
anonymity of projects and participants.  
 
Accordingly, before extracting any data from the obtained documents, the study deemed it 
necessary to evaluate their quality. In this regard, Scott’s (1990, pp.6) four criteria for 
determining document quality was employed for the exercise. These criteria include: (1) 
Authenticity, (2) Credibility, (3) Representativeness, and (4) Meaning. The study concluded 
that, being company documents, all the documents can be considered authentic, credible and 
meaningful. This perspective is in line with suggestions by Bryman (2004) who argued that 
documents emanating from private sources such as companies/institutions are often authentic 
and meaningful. However, it was difficult to conclude whether the documents were 
representative enough, given the typically huge documentation that such infrastructure PPP 
projects are known for. After examining the quality and relevance of the documents, the 
study proceeded to take extensive and important notes from the various documents, as may 
be relevant to the study.  
6.6 Qualitative Data Analysis (Interviews and Documents) 
In order to analyse the qualitative data collated from the semi-structured interviews, the study 
adopted a thematic analytical approach. According to Bryman (2004), thematic analysis 
involves identifying underlying themes or patterns in a qualitative dataset, document or 
materials. Being a content-driven technique, thematic analysis enables exhaustive comparison of all 
segments of qualitative data to identify relationships and structures among recurring themes (Aronson, 
1995; Braun et al. 2014).  Oftentimes, thematic analysis allows a researcher to collate the frequency of 
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specific themes or codes within a data and as well permit analysis of their meaning within specific 
contexts (Clarke and Braun, 2014). With this approach, both manifest content of a qualitative data and 
the latent meaning are used for understanding the underlying themes (Vaismoradi, et al., 2016). Coming 
from the above perspectives, this study employed Nvivo 10 Software (qualitative analysis tool), to 
perform thematic analysis on the data by first transcribing all the interviews to textual data. The 
interview transcripts were then printed out and proofread for errors and possible omissions.  
6.6.1 Coding Scheme and Classification 
After considering all the responses of interview participants on the applicability or otherwise of the 
sixteen (16) accountability mechanisms identified from the literature, the study proceeded to code the 
remaining interview data. With the aid of Nvivo 10 software, initial coding of the data was carried out 
by considering the descriptive terminologies used by interviewees during the interview sessions. This 
helps to improve the dependability of the analysis as suggested by Kerr and Beech (2015). The thematic 
analysis was then carried out using a structured coding scheme to unravel the various issues relating to 
accountability, processes or procedures that were essential toward government guarantee scheme and 
PFI/PPP projects. The coding scheme focuses on three main areas namely, sources, context and theme 
category. While the source identifies the interviewee, who discussed the transcript segment, the context 
summarises the important issues discussed within the quotation segment. Table 6.4 below shows the 
example of the quotation classification based on the developed coding scheme. 
Table 6.4: Sample of classification based on the coding scheme 
No. Quotation Source Theme Context Theme category 
1. “Obviously your risk analysis has to be very 
robust. You have to work with experts on the 
job to develop a comprehensive view of 
possible risks and these have to be well 
quantified and mitigated also. Sure, risk 
analysis is a given, you can’t obtain 
government support without showing you can 
manage risks within your project. We had a 
lot of applications returned to sponsors due to 
their inability to satisfy the selection team that 
most possible risks have been planned for.” 
Interviewee 19 Project risks  Risk Analysis & 
Management 
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2. “If you talk about the guarantee application 
process, I think the procedures they have are 
quite strong. Obviously, many levels of audits 
have to be passed. And mind you its a 
continuous exercise. We had to go through 
the government‘s audits to get to where we 
are now. And on our own, there is constantly 
audit exercises on our project. We obviously 
use a Gated lifecycle approach in managing 
our projects so….. We look at the project 
performance indicators on a constant basis 
and this is very crucial….. ".  
 
Interviewee 12 
 
Audits are essential for 
Governance. 
Audit Processes 
3. “Nothing is achievable when you don’t work 
with all parties across board. This 
organization values team work and is built to 
work in teams not only on this project but on 
so many of our other projects. I assume that 
the Treasury Department also places some 
premium on effective interaction, we had a 
lot of interactions with the department on 
quite a number of issues that needed 
clarification from them. And I believe it’s very 
important if the scheme is to serve everyone’s 
interest.” 
 
Interviewee 11 Collaboration across 
all projects stages. 
Collaboration on 
Project 
4. "I would say it’s one of the most important 
aspect of getting considered under the 
scheme. A lot of justifications are required for 
supporting your project with a government 
guarantee. I believe we did a lot in terms of 
showing how much value the project brings. 
Of course were very transparent with this, 
we went through the Comparator stage. It 
came out well and we demonstrated why we 
needed the guarantee through a lot of 
indicators that I may not be able to touch on 
at the moment. 
 Interviewee 2 Demonstrating project 
value and why the 
scheme should support 
the project. 
Value for Money 
evaluation 
 
6.6.2 Data Triangulation with Documentary Evidences 
Having identified the important themes relating to accountability processes and mechanisms within the 
interview data, it was necessary, as part of the objective of the study to triangulate the underpinning 
knowledge extracted from the data. Creswell and Miller (2000) refers to triangulation as a validation 
procedure that allows a researcher to seek convergence among multiple sources of data by eliminating 
areas of overlap. Through triangulation, new corroborating evidences can be collected from diverse 
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independent sources in order to help determine the consistency of already existing coding scheme 
(Richards, 2014; Taylor et al., 2015). 
 
In the context of this study, evidences from official documents relating to each case study (government 
guaranteed) PPP projects were used as corroborating evidences to confirm the consistency of the themes 
within the interview data. As such, the study developed a new coding scheme for analysing the projects’ 
documents in a similar manner to that used for the interview data. The study thereafter sort through the 
documented data so as to establish areas of convergence (similarity in themes and codes) with findings 
from the interviews.  This analytical process involved extensive period of checking, confirming and 
disconfirming in line with studies such as Creswell and Miller (2000) and Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Consequently, by combining data from the interviews with findings from the document analysis, the 
study was able to establish strong convergence on fourteen (14) institutional processes or procedures 
relating to accountability mechanisms that were earlier extracted from the literature and confirmed 
during interviews.  
 
However, not yet satisfied with the triangulations done on the interview and documentary data, the study 
proceeded to confirm the relevance of the data extracted from the literature. Readily prepared set of 
sketchy questionnaires were given to each interview participant which contained the 16 identified 
accountability mechanisms and their associated factors.   Participants were then asked to indicate which 
of the accountability mechanisms and factors were relevant given their experience of government 
guarantee applications and PFIs.  Based on interviewees’ confirmations, all the 16 mechanisms 
identified from the literature were considered relevant within their government guarantee and PPP 
project experience and therefore retained (See Table 6.6 below). However, out of the eighty-five (85) 
associated accountability measures contributing towards the 16 mechanisms, seven (7) were rejected by 
the interview participants. The rejected 7 factors were subsequently removed from the list of 85 
accountability measures (See Table 6.5 below for lists of associated measures rejected).   
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Table 6.5:  Seven (7) Rejected Accountability Measures from List of 85 Measures 
Label                     Accountability Measures Accountability 
Dimension 
 Whistle-blower Policy 
WB4 Financial incentives for encouraging whistle blowing among 
public employees. 
Ethics-based  
 Environmental Sustainability 
ES9 Security of project host community Outcome-based 
ES10 Contribution towards replenishing non-renewable mineral and 
energy resources 
 Collaborative Partnership 
CP7 Multidisciplinary Team to be responsible for ensuring 
collaboration among project stakeholders. 
Outcome-based 
CP8 Integrating information Systems with all project parties 
 Competition 
C6 Timely dissemination of information to bidders. Process-based 
 Bench-Marking 
BM3 Adequate resource committed to benchmarking exercises Process-based 
 
 
This therefore left the study with a list of 78 remaining accountability measures influencing publicly 
guaranteed PFI/PPPs under 16 different accountability constructs (See Table 6.6 below for the 
Accountability Mechanisms and related measures confirmed from the qualitative study). Upon 
deleting the 7 rejected accountability measures as seen a Table 6.5 above, the remaining 
mechanisms (16 mechanisms) and associated measures (78 measures) were used to develop a 
hypothesized model (See Fig 6.1 below). This hypothesized model was then tested for 
validity using Structural Equation Model in the 2
nd
 phase of the study. In addition to developing 
a hypothesized model, the qualitative data were used to develop questionnaire survey. These were 
targeted towards wider audiences among public and private sector participants in PFI/PPP and 
Guarantee Scheme to confirm the validity or otherwise of formulated hypotheses and associated 
indicators. 
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Table 6.6: Accountability Mechanisms and Factors Confirmed through Qualitative Study 
Label Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Indicators 
Case Study A Case Study B Case Study C 
Outcome-Based Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Indicators 
Interviews Documents Interviews Documents Interviews Documents 
VFM Value for Money 
VFM1 Least procurement cost  √ √ √ √ √ 
VFM2 Service quality/output specification √ √ √ √ √ √ 
VFM3 Equitable risk allocation among project parties √  √ √ √  
VFM4 Minimal whole life costing of project  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
VFM5 Effective management of project over the long term period √  √  √ √ 
VFM6 Competitive bidding process √ √ √ √  √ 
VFM7 Innovative solutions √ √  √ √ √ 
RM  Risk Management 
RM1 Improved public sector risk management competences/capabilities.  √ √ √ √  
RM2 Integrating risk management systems into public sector evaluative frameworks √ √  √ √  
RM3 Regular risk identification and reporting √ √ √ √ √ √ 
RM4 Proactive evaluation of past risk events √  √ √  √ 
RM5 Strong stance on compliance with regulatory frameworks √ √ √ √ √ √ 
CP  Collaborative Partnership 
CP1 Open and honest communication among project parties √ √ √ √ √ √ 
CP2 Consortium senior officials’ commitment towards successful collaboration √  √ √ √ √ 
CP3 Existence of clearly defined relationship and communication sharing strategy  √  √ √ √ 
CP4 Commitment of the project delivery team √ √ √ √  √ 
CP5 Fair risk allocation among public-private parties √ √ √ √ √ √ 
CP6 Early warning signals for detecting and solving conflicts or crisis.  √ √  √ √ 
CP7 Multidisciplinary team to be responsible for handling collaboration with project 
parties. 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
CP8 Integrating information systems with all projects parties √ √  √ √ √ 
BR  Budgetary Reporting 
BR1 Reporting government guarantees and other contingent liabilities in the national 
budget 
√  √ √ √ √ 
BR2 Oversight and control √ √ √  √ √ 
ES  Environmental Sustainability 
ES1 Project’s contribution to social participation and inter-racial cohesion √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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ES2 Project’s contribution to increased utilisation of local materials √ √ √ √ √  
ES3 Adoption of energy efficient solutions √ √ √ √ √ √ 
ES4 Project’s contribution to reduction in material wastage  √ √  √ √ 
ES5 Compliance with regulatory standards on sustainable project delivery √  √ √ √ √ 
ES6 Prevention of massive changes to landscape √ √ √ √  √ 
ES7 Project’s impact of surrounding plant and animals  √ √ √ √ √ 
ES8 Contribution to economic and social prosperity of surrounding communities √  √ √ √ √ 
ES9 Security of project host community √ √ √ √ √  
ES10 Contribution towards replenishing non-renewable mineral and energy resources √  √ √ √ √ 
Ethics- based Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Indicators 
WB Whistle-Blowing 
WB1 
Effective institutional arrangement to inculcate culture of openness among public 
sector staff 
√  √ √ √ √ 
WB2 Adequate protection for whistle blowers against institutional witch-hunt √ √ √ √ √  
WB3 Implementing procedurally correct actions to address reported wrongdoings √ √ √ √ √ √ 
WB4 Financial incentives for encouraging whistle blowing among public employees  √ √ √ √ √ 
AC Anti-Corruption 
AC1 Strong stance against corruption in government guarantee schemes √ √  √ √ √ 
AC2 Clear, adequate and timely information about happenings, processes and rules √ √ √ √ √ √ 
AC3 Effective internal and external oversight and control  √ √ √ √ √ 
AC4 Effective sanctions against corrupt practices √ √  √ √ √ 
AC5 Robust due diligence appraisals through extensive information gathering √ √ √ √ √  
Process-related Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Indicators 
C Competition 
C1 Increasing the number of potential bidders or applicants √ √ √  √ √ 
C2 Availability of in-house commercial skills within the public sector. √ √ √ √ √ √ 
C3 Open and comprehensive bidding parameters and requirements √ √  √ √ √ 
C4 Transparent bidding and tendering process √ √ √ √ √  
C5 Adequate incentives to encourage the supply of innovation from the private sector  √ √ √ √ √ 
C6 Timely dissemination of information to bidders √ √ √ √ √ √ 
BM Bench-Marking 
BM1 Comprehensive articulation of historically good practices and processes √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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BM2 Constant improvements on benchmarking techniques.  √ √ √ √ √ 
BM3 Adequate resource committed to benchmarking exercises √ √ √ √ √  
M Monitoring 
M1 Continuous monitoring of corporate and external dealings of the project 
consortium members during the period of guarantee 
 √ √ √ √  
M2 More qualitative public awareness on fiscal risks arising from contingent 
liabilities 
 √ √ √ √ √ 
M3 External monitoring through audit institutions and other interest groups. √ √  √ √ √ 
M4 Effective use of sanctions against wrong practices √ √ √  √ √ 
PA Performance Auditing 
PA1 Project life cycle cost reduction  √ √ √ √ √ 
PA2 Adequate risk transfer among project parties √ √ √ √ √  
PA3 Acceptable project quality √ √ √ √ √ √ 
PA4 Quality service delivery √ √  √ √ √ 
PA5 On-time project completion,  √ √ √ √ √  
PA6 Economic empowerment of local community  √ √ √ √ √ 
PSC Public Sector Comparator 
 
PSC1 Compulsory PSC evaluation both at project and guarantee scheme levels. √ √ √ √ √ √ 
PSC2 Integrating PSC evaluation into government guarantee-decision making process.  √ √ √ √ √ 
Democratic Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Indicators 
SPI 
Socio-Political Impact 
SPI1 Project’s impact on job creation and unemployment √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SPI2 Project’s impact on travel time and journey quality √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SPI3 Affordable user charges √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SPI4 Access to services  √ √ √  √ 
SPI5 Better stakeholder engagement √ √  √ √ √ 
SPI6 Adequate security  √ √ √ √  
SPI7 Project’s impact on biodiversity √ √   √ √ 
SPI8 Sufficient risk transfer away from public sector √ √ √ √ √  
SPI9 Adequate response to public needs through timely project delivery √ √ √  √ √ 
SPI10 Minimal life cycle cost √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SPI11 Better collaboration between public and private sector  √ √ √ √ √ 
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SE Stakeholder Engagement 
SE1 effective communication and dialogue √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SE2 Clear and effective communication channels  √ √ √ √ √ 
SE3 Staff commitment to laid down stakeholder engagement strategy √ √ √  √ √ 
SE4 Transparent decision-making process √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SE5 Clear understanding of all stakeholders’ area of interests √  √ √ √ √ 
RL Rule of Law 
RL1 Enforceability of contracts and agreements in projects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
RL2 Adequate institutional arrangements for supporting contract enforcement  √ √ √ √ √ 
RL3 Legal scrutiny and evaluation of policy, projects and performance. √ √ √ √ √ √ 
RL4 Clarity in legal/contractual rights and responsibility among project parties. √ √  √ √ √ 
PS Parliamentary Scrutiny 
PS1 
Effective use of committee hearings to evaluate the management of government 
guarantee scheme 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
PS2 
Interactions with external experts and interest groups to examine wider impact of 
government guarantee scheme 
√   √ √ √ 
PS3 Encouragement of policy debates on government guarantee scheme  √ √ √ √ √  
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Figure 6.1: Hypothetised Model for Public Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme
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Chapter Summary  
This chapter focused on exploring the qualitative approach to the study. In order to identify 
accountability mechanisms and associated indicators relevant for examining PPP government 
guaranteed projects, the study used literature review. The suitability of the accountability 
mechanisms and measures for exploring the phenomenon was then confirmed using multiple 
case study (semi-structured) interviews and documentary information from guaranteed 
public-private projects in the UK. A hypothetical Model was eventually developed from 
triangulated data, based on identified accountability mechanisms. The model would go on to 
be used for structural equation modelling in the following chapter.    
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Chapter Seven: Quantitative Study  
 
7.0 Chapter Overview: 
As highlighted in the methodology chapter and some parts of this study, this research 
involves qualitative and quantitative phases. Having presented findings from the qualitative 
phase in the previous chapter, this chapter therefore presents the quantitative data collection 
procedures and the associated findings. Sample population, sampling strategy, questionnaire 
development and piloting, final survey distribution and statistical analysis methods were 
justified and well explained in this chapter. As part of the statistical analysis, wider 
applicability of identified factors influencing public accountability in PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme are examined. In addition, perspectives of public and private sector 
stakeholders on accountability in government guarantee and PFI/PPPs are compared. The 
subjective importance of identified measures are also examined across the four broad 
categories of accountability constructs. Overall, findings from the quantitative phase are 
presented and the chapter ends with a summary. 
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7.1 Population and Sampling Techniques 
In line with the research objectives, it was essential to confirm the wider applicability and 
generalizability of the study’s findings through a large sample survey. The major reason for 
this was to achieve two important goals for the research: (1) to confirm the validity of the 16 
theoretical hypotheses generated from the qualitative study, and (2) to explore experts’ views 
regarding factors (identified from the literature) contributing to accountability in publicly 
guaranteed PFI/PPPs in the UK. Considering the special nature of the research, identifying 
information-rich and suitable participants was evident. In this regard, a purposive sampling 
technique was initially adopted for the research. This allowed the study to identify survey 
respondents based on pre-determined, important, and specific criteria (Creswell, 2013). In 
this case, these criteria included: 
 Selecting public sector employees with experience in PFI/PPP cum construction 
industry projects. 
 Selecting private sector experts with experience in PFI/PPP and construction industry 
projects. 
 Selecting public sector employees with experience and involvement in Infrastructure 
guarantee schemes. 
 Selecting private sector experts with experience and involvement in Infrastructure 
guarantee schemes 
Based on the above criteria, questionnaire survey was therefore targeted at suitable public and 
private sector stakeholders with varying experiences in UK’s PFI/PPPs and infrastructure 
government guarantee scheme. Although the UK public sector workforce is currently 
estimated at 5.354 million as at March, 2016 according to the UK’s office of National 
Statistics (ONS). However, the nature of the study required only employees with direct or 
indirect experience with this procurement domain be sampled. Apparently, there is currently 
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no open database for accessing UK’s public-sector employees. In addition, whilst over 200 
private sector consortiums had participated in the UK infrastructure guarantee scheme 
between July, 2011 and January, 2015 (NAO, 2015); there is also no public database for 
identifying these participant firms. The only useful database at this time is the HM Treasury’s 
PFI projects database which has a total of 305 contracting, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) 
and financial firms involved in PPP. This therefore provided a useful starting point for 
reaching out to private sector participants.  
 
In view of the aforementioned constraints above, the study selected another sampling method 
to further its objective. Hence, a snowball sampling method was finally adopted to execute 
the survey. Firstly, initial contacts were established with some existing contacts within the 
public and private sectors respectively (through already known gate keepers). More 
participants were then later recruited by building on networks of referrals from existing and 
new contacts. According to Atkinson and Flint (2001), snowball sampling is quite useful and 
efficient where research participants are difficult to reach by other sampling techniques. At 
the end of the gradual and painstaking exercise, a pool of 118 public and private sector 
participants with varied experiences in PFI/PPPs and Infrastructure guarantee scheme were 
recruited and surveyed. Examples of studies on accountability and PFI/PPPs that have 
employed purposive or snowball sampling methods include Dicke (2002), Wallenburg et al. 
(2010), Li et al. (2005), Meng and McKevitt (2011), among others.   
 
7.2 Questionnaire Design and Formulation 
This study developed questionnaires from the qualitative data identified through literature 
review, semi-structured interviews and documentary evidences. As stated earlier, the central 
aim of the survey was to facilitate authentic representation of the views of larger stakeholders 
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and ensure generalizability of the qualitative findings. Originally, sixteen accountability 
mechanisms were identified for evaluating government guarantee scheme for PPPs. These 
accountability mechanisms were used to form sixteen hypothetical questions. In addition, 78 
factors regarded as measures contributing to each of the sixteen different accountability 
mechanisms were identified. Through the sixteen hypothetical questions, the study generated 
sixteen dependent constructs to be measured in the questionnaire survey. The 78 factors 
therefore constituted independent variables predicting the dependent variables. These data 
was then integrated into an important section of a self-completion questionnaire. 
 
7.2.1 Section of the Questionnaire 
 
In designing questionnaire for this study, 7 major sections were created. The first section 
introduced the research to the respondents and highlighted the research aim and objectives. 
How the questionnaire survey contributed to the study was also mentioned. The next section 
focused on the demographic data of respondents. This captured information such as industry 
or sector of the respondent, the job role, years of experience on the job, including the years of 
experience in relation to PFI/PPPs and infrastructure guarantee scheme. The next four 
sections were classified under the four broad accountability constructs identified from the 
study. These comprised (1) outcome-based accountability mechanisms, (2) ethics-based 
accountability mechanisms, (3) process-based accountability mechanisms and (4) democratic 
accountability mechanisms. Under each category, the associated accountability mechanisms 
were situated along with their measures. In all, a total of 78 questions (factors) were used to 
unravel participants’ views on factors influencing public accountability in government 
guarantee scheme for PFI/PPPs (see Appendix for the questionnaire developed for this 
study). 
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7.2.2 Scale Measurement 
For this study, a likert measurement scale was adopted. The invention of likert scale has been 
attributed to Rensis Likert (1931), who designed and used the technique for measuring 
attitude. According to Croasmun and Ostrom (2011), Likert scale is a very reliable and useful 
tool for assessing self-efficacy. As a psychometric measurement tool (Wadgave and 
Khairnar, 2016), likert scale allows the indirect measurement of different facets of 
multidimensional and latent values (Johns, 2010). Most likert scale often require individuals 
to respond to series of questions (multiple item questions) on a continuum scale of whether 
they “Strongly agree” or “Strongly disagree” (Croasmun and Ostrom, 2011). As suggested by 
Willits et al. (2016), likert scales offer a balance of both positive and negative responses in 
order to minimise response bias and errors. Although, the rating scales range in category from 
three, to four, six and seven (Fugas et al., 2012), the most common is the 5-point scale (Joshi 
et al., 2015). Hence, in this study, a five-point likert scale was adopted, where 1 = “Strongly 
Disagree”, 2 = “Disagree”, 3 = “Undecided”, 4 = “Agree” and 5 = “Strongly Agree”. 
Respondents were then asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with each 
identified factor and mechanisms influencing accountability in PPP government guarantee 
schemes. This presented a basis for arriving at the average rank of all the participants’ ratings 
across the variables, thereby generating the overall importance of each variable. 
 
7.2.3 Pilot Study and Its Evaluation Technique 
 
Since pre-coding allows easy processing of questionnaire data and helps prevent time loss to 
analysis and filling (Bless et al., 2006; Bryman, 2015), the questionnaire in this study was 
pre-coded.  Similarly, the questionnaire was pilot-tested for variation, meaning, content and 
construct validity (Bernard and Bernard, 2012; Armstrong and Taylor, 2014). According to 
Singleton et al. (1993), pre-testing questionnaire instruments allow researchers to, among 
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other purposes examine how respondents construe and understand questions, and whether 
sufficient alternative responses have been provided. Accordingly, a number of studies have 
suggested various sizes of participants suitable for a pilot study (Van Belle, 2002; Isaac and 
Michael, 1995; Mooney and Duval1, 1993). While Van Belle, (2002) suggested 10 
respondents, Isaac and Michael (1995) recommended the size of between 10 and 30 
respondents. Mooney and Duval1 (1993) in a similar study also argued that a total of 10 
respondents may be suitable for effectively pretesting a research instrument. Based on the 
above perspectives, this study identified 10 respondents for piloting the designed 
questionnaire. The ten (10) respondents were selected using the researchers’ existing 
networks in the UK academics, public and private sector. Thus, the pilot study comprised five 
(5) academics from the departments of accounting and construction management at the 
University of West of England, Bristol. Three (3) public sector employees and two (2) project 
finance experts were all selected to pilot the instrument. All the ten participants have an 
average of 7.3 years of experience in advisory or consulting capacities on various 
infrastructure social projects in the UK, Turkey, Greece and South Africa. The pilot study 
respondents were able to evaluate the clarity of the questions, suitability of the measurement 
scale and logic of the measurement variables in relation to the construct being measured. 
Various valuable feedbacks which included shortening of sentences and rewording of 
questions were given. The feedbacks were immediately implemented and used to develop the 
final questionnaire. After the pilot study, the total number of questions on the questionnaire 
stood at ninety four (94) across the four sections on accountability mechanisms and their 
measures. 
7.3 Data Collection 
Upon improving the research instrument using feedbacks from the pilot study, the 
questionnaire survey was distributed to 118 respondents via face-to-face, postal and email 
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channels. It is important to state here that the snowball sampling method adopted in the study 
necessitated that a number of the respondents be met face-to-face to fill the questionnaire. 
Studies have shown that face-to-face survey is much preferred due to its flexible, 
representative, personal interaction and quick-response opportunities (Fricker et al., 2005; 
Faas and Schoen,  2006; Agnoli et al., 2011; Szolnoki and Hoffmann, 2013). The face-to-face 
distribution allowed respondents to fill and return questionnaires on the spot. Hence, series of 
trips were embarked upon and various government, industry and trade led symposia, 
roundtable talks etc. including one-to-one meetings were attended in order to reach out to 118 
respondents. However, understanding the constraints faced by some respondents filling the 
questionnaire on the spot, a postal method of distribution was also deemed necessary. Some 
respondents were handed return-envelopes, while others had the questionnaire posted directly 
to their correspondent addresses along with paid return envelopes.    
 
In addition, the questionnaire survey was intensified with aggressive online distribution 
through emails to several other referred respondents. The online distribution ensure wider 
audiences were reached and provided a cheaper cost of distribution (Tiene, 2000; Paechter 
and Maier, 2010; Bryman, 2015). The online questionnaire was created using Google forms 
and its internet link was copied and included in a well-worded email to the respondents. Each 
questionnaire was accompanied by a letter of introduction detailing the objective of the study. 
Several reminder emails and few additional follow-up trips were made to some of the 
respondents to stimulate responses. This stage of the study lasted over a period of one year 
three months (15months) starting from June, 2015- September, 2016. At the end of the data 
collection exercise a total of 118 respondents have been reached for the study. 
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7.4 Statistical Analysis Techniques 
The statistical analysis in this study was informed by the need to identify underlying patterns 
across the responses given by respondents and ensure collected data are suitable for structural 
equation modelling (SEM). At this phase, various statistical analysis were performed for data 
cleaning, description and validation using the AMOS IBM SPSS software. Through 
Cronbach’s Alpha test, reliability of both the measurement instrument and the various factors 
were deeply examined. Missing data analysis was conducted to test for multicollinearity 
among factors. In addition, descriptive statistical analysis were also conducted on the data to 
unravel the significance ranking of each observed variable in the questionnaire. Mean ranking 
method was used to descriptively identify the top ranked variables in the questionnaire. 
Going forward, in order to examine whether there is a pattern in the data distribution across 
the two independent groups (public and private sector stakeholders) surveyed in the study, a 
non-parametric test was performed on the data (Man Whitney U test of Significant 
Differences). This test measured the extent to which observations in one independent sample 
differs from the other.  
 
7.5 Response Rate 
Out of the one hundred and eighteen (118) questionnaires distributed, 94 questionnaires were 
returned, amounting to a response rate of 79.60%. Three (3) of the questionnaires were 
incomplete and therefore rejected. This left us with a total of ninety one (91) usable 
responses, which constitutes 77.11% of distributed questionnaires. The percentage of 
returned questionnaire (77.11%) falls within the acceptable threshold of 65% return rate and 
is thus suitable for structural equation modelling (Bowen and Guo, 2011).  Although 
structural equation model (SEM) is a large sample technique and a sample of between 200 
and 250 data were normally recommended (Islam and Faniran, 2005). However, as efforts to 
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recruit more survey respondents proved abortive, the study proceeded in line with previous 
studies on SEM where less than 200 samples have been used (Islam and Faniran, 2005; 
Eriksson and Pesamaa, 2007; Jin et al., 2007; Doloi’s, 2009b). For instance, studies like 
Doloi et al., (2011) once used 97 sample for evaluating the impact of contractor’s 
performance on project success, while Chen et al., (2011) used 124 respondents to explore 
the interrelationship among critical success factors for construction projects using SEM, 
among others similar studies. 
From Table 7.1 below, the survey response rates were, 53.85% and 46.15% respectively 
across public and private sector participants in the study. The public sector participants 
comprised civil servants of different ranks from deputy directors, senior executives, higher 
executives, and executive officers on the one hand; whilst the private sector participants 
included subject matter experts such as project managers, PFI construction contractors, 
financial consultants and project financiers. It is important to state here that, out of the 91 
questionnaire respondents, 17 have no prior experience in infrastructure guarantee schemes 
but boast significant experience in PFI procurements. The remaining 74 respondents have 
experiences in both PFI and the UK’s Infrastructure Guarantee Scheme. 
Table 7.1: Sample Responses from Questionnaire Survey 
Variables 
Attributes of 
Participants 
Frequency 
Total No of Respondents 91 
Job role/Titles 
Public sector Employees 
Deputy Director 4 
Senior Executive Officer 15 
Higher executive Officer 19 
Executive Officer 11 
Private Sector Participants 
Project Manager 7 
Project Financier 16 
PFI Construction 
Contractor 
10 
Financial Consultant 9 
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Length of Experience in PFI/PPPs Procurement 
 1-5 21 
6-10 58 
11 - 15 12 
Length of Experience in Infrastructure Government Guarantee  
 1-5 74 
6-10 0 
11-15 0 
 
7.6 Preliminary Data Analysis and Screening 
In preparing the data for additional statistical analysis, the study conducted some preliminary 
data screening and cleansing. This comprised identification of unengaged respondents and 
outliers, missing value analysis and checking for multi-collinearity. A quick calculation of the 
standard deviation for each respondents revealed no unengaged respondents. Going forward, 
in line with recommendation by Riani et al. (2009), the study checked for the existence of 
outliers in the data using Mahalanobis distance (D) statistic. All output returned with a        
value higher than 0.05, thereby suggesting the absence of any influential outlier in the 
sample. Evidence of multi-collinearity and outliers were also not found in the data. 
 
7.6.1 Missing Value Analysis 
 A common occurrence in questionnaire data analysis is incomplete data. Incomplete data 
often arise due to a respondent failing to answer a questionnaire question, either deliberately 
or by omission (Bryman, 2004). When sample data is incomplete, it often has huge 
implications for accurate statistical computation, and as such, missing value analysis is 
usually needed to address this concern (Little and Rubin, 2014).  This statistical analysis 
conducts three important functions by firstly, identifying and describing patterns of missing 
values, estimating the mean values along with other descriptive values, and substituting 
missing values with estimated values (Husson and Josse, 2013; Singh et al., 2015).  
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There are three common types of missing value scenarios. This comprise missing at Random 
(MAR), missing completely at random (MCAR) and missing not at random (MNAR). 
Missing at Random (MAR) is considered systematic in nature and refers to a situation in 
which the tendency for a data to be missing is connected to the observed variable rather than 
the missing data (Newman, 2014). In this case, the data declared missing is better explained 
by other variables in the data set than the missing values. On the other hand, missing 
completely at random (MCAR) is described as a case in which the probability of having a 
value missing for a specific variable has neither connection with the observed variables nor 
the missing variables in the data set (Little and Rubin, 2014). Under this scenario, the 
missingness on the variable is considered unsystematic in nature and gives a statistical 
advantage since the analysis remains unbiased even where the missing value is replaced with 
the average for the variable. In addition, missing not at random (MNAR) describes a missing 
value on a variable that is related to the value of the same variable despite having held other 
variables constant (Cheema, 2014). In this context, the value is not random and therefore 
could not be predicted by another observed variable in the data. In most cases, MNAR can be 
complicated and it’s often been tackled either by deleting the data along with the missing 
value or by simply modelling (Kaiser, 2014). 
Generally speaking, most researchers will treat missing values by performing some 
improvised measures of substituting the missing values or completely jettison the survey with 
missing variable through listwise approach. However, after performing necessary analysis, 
the study recorded no case of missing value. 
7.6.2 Reliability Analysis 
After performing preliminary analysis and data screening, the study proceeded to conduct reliability test 
on the data set. According to Faravelli (1989) and Field (2009), when analysing a survey data conducted 
183 
 
with Likert-scaled questionnaires, a reliability analysis is essential to ascertain the internal consistency of 
variables being analysed. The essence of reliability test in this study was to confirm whether the 
identified seventy eight (78) factors influencing accountability in government guarantee scheme for 
PPPs truly measures the constructs. The formula for reliability analysis can be mathematically 
represented thus,  
  
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
∑   
  ∑     
 
   
 
   
                         
Reliability analysis also helped discover whether the scales used in measuring the various accountability 
measures can consistently and truly reflect the construct it was intended to measure (Huang et al., 2006). 
As argued by Field (2005), in a reliable data, the rule of thumb in Cronbach’s Alpha (α) coefficient is 
often between 0 and 1. However, George and Mallery (2003) argued that a coefficient value of 7 is 
much acceptable, while a value of between 7 and 8 indicate strong internal consistency of the data set. In 
addition to determining the overall Cronbach’s alpha for different accountability mechanisms such as 
value for Money, Risk management, Whistle Blowing, Rule of Law, Social and Political impact among 
others, this study examined another measure of internal consistency called “Cronbach’s Alpha if Item 
Deleted”. Cronbach's alpha if item deleted were estimated for all the measures been evaluated. 
According to Field (2005), any factor or measure that is not contributing to reliability of the data will 
have a higher reliability coefficient compared to the overall reliability coefficient of the evaluated 
construct. This suggests that such factor with higher value, if deleted, would increase the overall 
reliability of the entire data set (Santos, 1999). Using these rules as yardsticks, results of the Cronbach’s 
alpha for the 16 accountability mechanisms and their associated measures are presented in Tables 7.2 – 
Table 7.5. Similarly, based on the results shown in the tables below, the overall Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients for the 16 accountability constructs were 0.833, 0.758, 0.791, 0.701, 0.781, 0.780, 0.769, 
0.773, 0.740, 0.738, 0.801, 0.711, 0.826, 0.826, 0.743 and 0.720 respectively. 
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7.7 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistical analysis involves description of the basic attributes of the data in a 
research study (Dewberry, 2004; Dowdy et al., 2011). Descriptive statistics allow the use of 
numerical, tabular and graphical techniques for summarising, analysing and presenting data 
(Argyrous, 2011). Meaning can be extracted from data using descriptive measures such as 
standard deviation, means, and frequency distribution among others. According to Holcomb 
(2016), the advantage of descriptive statistics lies in the ability to reduce mass of data into 
few statistical measures, graphs or tables, which give clearer view of the findings. In this 
study, questionnaire data was descriptively analysed to derive the mean values and standard 
deviations for each of the factors influencing accountability in PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme. As such, mean values were used to identify the top ranked factors, given 
its suitability for analysing large sample dataset (Vogt and Barta, 2013).  
 
As opined by Sahoo and Riedel (1998) and Hormann and Floater (2006), mean value is the 
most commonly adopted measure of central tendency. For statisticians, the mean comes to 
mind when examining the relative importance of variables in a dataset. In order to identify 
the important factors influencing accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme, 
the factors were ranked using their mean values. Results of the descriptive analysis are 
presented in Tables 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5, showing the mean, standard deviation, ranking 
within the group and overall ranking of the factors in relation to each accountability 
mechanisms.  
 
7.7.1. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms 
As earlier stated in this study, five accountability mechanisms considered as Outcome-based, 
were operationalized along with their indicators. These mechanisms included value for 
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money, risk management, collaborative partnership, environmental sustainability and 
budgetary reporting. In order to determine the key factors contributing towards each of these 
accountability mechanism, descriptive analysis of the data was conducted.  With the aid of 
IBM SPSS version 22, the study derived the mean and standard deviations for each factor. 
All the twenty eight (28) factors associated with these mechanisms were ranked, based on 
their contribution towards strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee 
scheme). Going by the mean ranking, the overall top five factors influencing outcome-based 
accountability mechanisms are:  
1. Service quality/output specification. 
2. Least procurement cost. 
3. Consortium senior officials’ commitment towards successful collaboration. 
4. Contribution to economic and social prosperity of surrounding communities. 
5. Improved public sector risk management competences/capabilities. 
 
As presented in Table 7.2, the mean values and standard deviation of all factors under the five 
outcome-based accountability mechanisms were itemised in columns three and four. In 
addition, columns five and six of the same table present the group mean ranking for each 
factor, also across the five outcome-based mechanisms of accountability. In order to examine 
the internal consistency of the factors, Cronbach’s alpha reliability test was performed for all 
the factors across the five accountability mechanisms. Results from the analysis showed all 
the factors displayed good internal consistency, as the overall Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
ranged between 0.701 and 0.833. Going further, the study also examined whether all the 
factors across board truly contribute to the constructs/mechanisms that they claim to measure. 
In this regard, another measure “Cronbach’s Alpha If Item Deleted” was used to examine all 
the factors for internal consistency. Based on the recommendation by Field (2005), any factor 
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showing higher Cronbach’s alpha coefficient than the overall Cronbach’s alpha does not 
contribute to the construct and such factor if deleted will improve the internal consistency of 
the remaining data. In line with this suggestion, all the factors were found to contribute to 
their constructs with the exception of three factors. The three factors included RM5= Strong 
stance on compliance with regulatory frameworks, CP5= Fair risk allocation among public-
private parties, and ES6= Prevention of massive changes to landscape. The three factors 
showed higher Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (0.759, 0.798 and 0.788) than the overall 
Cronbach’s alphas within their groups. Based on this findings, the three factors were removed 
from the data. Upon deleting the three factors, the overall Cronbach’s alpha coefficients in 
the three affected groups significantly increased to 0.758, 0.791 and 0.781 respectively. See 
Table 7.2 below for results.  
7.7.2 Descriptive Statistics for Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms 
In order to unravel the key ethics-based factors (Whistle Blowing and Anti-Corruption) 
influencing accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme, descriptive analysis 
was also conducted. In this regard, the study generated mean and standard deviations of the 
eight (8) contributory factors. These factors were ranked across the two ethics-based 
accountability mechanisms and examined how they impact on PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme. Based on mean ranking method, the five top-ranked factors across the two 
accountability mechanisms (Whistle Blowing and Anti-Corruption), are: 
1. Strong stance against corruption in government guarantee schemes. 
2. Effective institutional arrangement to the inculcate culture of openness among staff. 
3. Effective sanctions against corrupt practices. 
4. Adequate protection for whistle blowers against institutional witch-hunt. 
5. Implementing procedurally correct actions to address reported wrongdoings. 
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As shown in Table 7.3, the mean and standard deviation values for the factors under the 
ethics-based mechanisms are presented in columns three and four. Additionally, columns five 
and six presents the in-group ranking and overall ranking of the factors respectively. The 
study proceeded to determine whether all the ethical factors are true measures of the 
constructs (whistle blowing and anti-corruption) they claim to measure. This was determined 
using Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients. All the factors were considered reliable as 
their overall in-group Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranged between 0.780 and 0.769 in line 
with recommended levels. The internal consistency of the contributory factors were also 
confirmed through “Cronbach’s Alpha If Item Deleted”. Since the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients of all the factors were lower than their overall in-group Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients (see Table 7.3 below), all the factors were deemed critical towards measuring 
their associated constructs (whistle blowing and anti-corruption) and were therefore retained. 
7.7.3 Descriptive Statistics for Process-based Accountability Mechanisms 
Processed-based accountability mechanisms such as competition, benchmarking, 
performance auditing etc. were also operationalized and their measures descriptively 
analysed in this study. Descriptive analysis of the key factors produced the mean and 
standard deviation values of all the factors. All the factors were ranked across the five 
process-driven accountability mechanisms, in relation to their contribution towards 
accountability in PFI government guarantee scheme. In line with the mean ranking method, 
the overall top five contributory factors were identified and listed below: 
1. Constant improvements on benchmarking techniques. 
2. External monitoring through audit institutions and other interest groups. 
3. Integrating PSC evaluation into government guarantee-decision making process. 
4. Increasing the number of potential bidders or applicants. 
5. Transparent bidding and tendering process. 
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As reflected in Table 7.4 below, the mean and standard deviation values of all the factors 
across the five process-based mechanisms are itemised in column three and four. In addition, 
while the in-group ranking of each factor’s mean can be seen in column five, the overall 
mean ranking of the entire factors are presented in the sixth column of the table. In order to 
examine the internal consistency of the contributory factors, the study derived the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient for all the factors within each group (remember there are 5 constructs under 
this section and therefore 5 groups). Based on the reliability test, all the factors were 
considered reliable with the overall Cronbach’s alpha coefficients within each group ranging 
between 0.710 and 0.810. “Cronbach’s Alpha if Item Deleted”, which is also a construct 
validity test was used to check if all the 19-factors across the five constructs were true 
measures. Upon conducting the analysis, all the measures had Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
that is lower than the overall Cronbach’s alpha coefficients within each of their group, except 
one factor. The affected factor, M4 (Monitoring)= Effective use of sanctions against wrong 
practices, had higher Cronbach’s alpha of 0.740 compared to the in-group coefficient of 
0.738. This factor was therefore deleted from the data in line with recommendation by field 
(2005) that factors having higher Cronbach’s alpha contribute less to the construct and could 
be deleted. Deleting this factor ultimately boasted the in-group (monitoring) overall 
Cronbach’s alpha from 0.730 to 0.738 accordingly (See Table 7.4 below).     
7.7.4 Descriptive Statistics for Democratic Accountability Mechanisms 
Similar to the analysis performed in the above subsections, descriptive statistical analysis was 
also conducted to unravel the key factors influencing accountability in PFI/PPP infrastructure 
guarantee scheme. The analysis was used to derive the mean and standard deviation values 
for each of the contributory factors. The mean values were then used to rank all the twenty 
three (23) factors across the four democratic accountability mechanisms (Social and Political 
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Impact, Rule of Law, parliamentary scrutiny etc.). Based on the approach, the five top-ranked 
factors under democratic accountability mechanisms are: 
1. Enforceability of contracts and agreements in projects 
2. Effective communication and dialogue 
3. Clear and effective communication channels 
4. Encouragement of policy debates on government guarantee scheme issues 
5. Project’s impact on job creation and unemployment. 
Table 7.5 below shows the mean and standard deviation values for each factor in columns 
three and four. Also, the in-group and overall mean ranking for each factor is presented in 
columns five and six of the same table respectively. To measure the reliability of the factors, 
reliability coefficients were derived using the Cronbach’s alpha reliability test. All the factors 
were considered reliable as in-group overall reliability coefficients showed   0.826, 0.826, 
0.743 and 0.720 respectively (within recommended levels). However, as part of the internal 
consistency measurement for the study, “Cronbach’s Alpha if Item deleted” was also 
considered. With this in mind, it was important to delete any factor within any group that is 
not contributing to each accountability mechanism, and therefore has higher Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient than the overall coefficients for their groups. All the factors were considered 
true measures except two factors namely, SP4= Access to services and SP10= Minimal life 
cycle cost (both relating to “social and political impact” mechanism and showed higher 
reliability coefficient). According to the recommendation by Field (2005), these factors if 
deleted will improve the overall reliability of the data. In line with this perspective, the two 
factors were deleted from the dataset which increased the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient within 
their group from 0.799 to 0.826 accordingly. Overall, from the total of 78 factors influencing 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme, 6 factors were deleted to improve 
190 
 
the reliability of the data set. This ensured that only 72factors made it through to the 
structural equation modelling stage.  
7.8  Mann Whitney U Analysis (Test for differences in the perceptions of 
Stakeholders) 
Having established a statistically reliable list of factors contributing towards accountability in 
PFI/PPP infrastructure guarantee scheme, the study proceeded to carry out Man Whitney U 
test of differences in perception. Mann Whitney U test, which is sometimes referred to as 
Mann Whitney Wilcoxon Test or the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is a non-parametric technique 
that helps examine the hypothesis that two samples may be extracted from the same 
population (Field, 2005). As already established from the survey demographics, the two 
broad groups of respondents to the questionnaire survey are public sector employees and 
private sector participants.  Therefore, in line with the focus of the study, it was important to 
confirm whether all the 72 reliable factors were perceived differently or similarly by 
respondents in these two groups. The principal differentiator considered in this analysis was 
the job sector of the questionnaire respondents (public sector or private sector). Considering 
that normal distribution of questionnaire data is not assumed in this study, Mann Whitney U 
test was therefore appropriate for the analysis.  More so, the data contained only two samples 
of independent observation – Public employees and private sector participants. In this regard, 
the null hypothesis was that no differences exist between the mean ranks of all the 
accountability factors from the perception of both groups of respondents. On the other hand, 
the alternative hypothesis was, there is differences in perceptions among respondents on the 
accountability, at 95% confidence interval. This therefore suggest a significance level of less 
than 0.05.  
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7.8.1 Results of Mann Whitney U Test for Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms 
and Associated Measures    
Mann Whitney U test for significant difference was performed on factors relating to 
outcome-based accountability to determine whether job sector had any influence on 
respondents’ ranking of the factors. In this regard, respondents’ job sector were used as 
grouping variables, while the test variables comprise the outcome-based accountability 
measures.  As reflected in Table 7.2 below, the Mann Whitney U coefficients indicate that, 
out of the 28 outcome-based factors across the five accountability mechanisms, only 1 factors 
were perceived differently by the (public and private sector) participants (See results in Table 
7.2 below). The affected factor had        ranged between P˂0.032 much less than the 
significance level (P˂0.05). The result represented 98.01% respondents’ agreement on the 
entire factors. The remaining twenty seven (27) factors had their         higher than the 
significance level of P˂0.05. The implication of this result is that combining the responses 
from the entire respondents will have no impact on the overall reliability of the research 
findings. Hence, the null hypothesis is therefore retained. Going further, the affected factor 
that showed difference in perception among respondents are ES1=Project’s contribution to 
social participation and inter-racial cohesion (P˂0.032). Additionally, a further probe into 
the factor revealed that, ES1 were rated highly by the public sector whilst private sector rated 
it low. In line with the above results, the tenth column of Table 7.2 indicate that the null 
hypothesis be retained for the entire outcome-based measures. 
7.8.2 Results of Mann Whitney U Test for Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms and 
Associated Measures. 
The second round of Mann Whitney U test was to confirm or disprove the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant difference between public and private sectors’ perceptions on 
ethics-based accountability measures in the study. As such, similar to earlier analysis above, 
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the study checked whether job sector had impact in the way participants ranked the ethics-
based measures of accountability. As represented in Table 7.3 below, the Mann Whitney U 
coefficients suggest all the factors were perceived similarly by respondents across public and 
private sectors at 95% confidence level. In this regard, all the ethic-based accountability 
measures showed greater         at P˃0.05. The result therefore confirmed the null 
hypothesis that there is no significant differences in public and private sector’s perceptions on 
all the ethic-based measures. In line with this result, the tenth column of Table 7.3 indicate 
that the null hypothesis should be retained for the entire ethics-based measures. 
7.8.3 Results of Mann Whitney U Test for Process-based Accountability Mechanisms and 
Associated Measures. 
Mann Whitney U test for difference in perception was also carried out on process-based 
accountability measures to determine whether any similarity or differences in respondents’ 
ratings based on their job sectors (Public and Private sectors) exist. In line with this objective, 
respondents’ job sector were adopted as group variables, whilst process-based accountability 
measures were used as test variables. Results of Mann Whitney U analysis suggest that out of 
all the 19 process-based factors analysed, two (2) factors were perceived differently across 
the two category of respondents (public and private sector participants).  
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Table 7.2: Results of Statistical Analysis on Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Measures 
Label Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Ranking 
Within 
group 
Overall 
Ranking 
Overall 
Cronbach’s 
α 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Mann Whitney 
U 
Z Sig 
VFM  Value  for Money 
VFM1 Least procurement cost 4.5 .648 2 2 
0.833 
.772 -0.513 0.633 
VFM2 Service quality/output specification 4.53 .501 1 1 .720 -0.199 0.851 
VFM3 Equitable risk allocation among project parties 4.46 .585 3 6 .759 -0.662 0.513 
VFM4 Minimal whole life costing of project  3.31 1.031 7 26 .792 -0.733 0.467 
VFM5 Effective management of project over the long term period 3.93 .557 6 24 .731 -0.926 0.353 
VFM6 Competitive bidding process 4.43 .621 4 9 .713 -0.395 0.728 
VFM7 Innovative solutions 4.15 .887 5 19 .708 -1.321 0.102 
RM  Risk Management 
RM1 Improved public sector risk management 
competences/capabilities. 
4.47 .648 1 5 
.758 
.710 
-0.635 0.547 
RM2 Integrating risk management systems into public sector 
evaluative frameworks 
4.45 .585 2 7 .713 
-0.333 0.742 
RM3 Regular risk identification and reporting 4.17 .887 4 17 .729 -0.808 0.415 
RM4 Proactive evaluation of past risk events 4.44 .621 3 8 .704 -0.854 0.397 
RM5 Strong stance on compliance with regulatory frameworks 3.09 .536 5 27 .759* -1.104 0.268 
CP  Collaborative Partnership 
CP1 Open and honest communication among project parties 4.19 .621 2 16 
.791 
.772 -0.511 0.615 
CP2 Consortium senior officials’ commitment towards 
successful collaboration 
4.49 .648 1 3 .712 
-0.312 
0.321 
CP3 Existence of clearly defined relationship and 
communication sharing strategy 
4.12 .887 4 20 .755 
-1.329 
0.184 
CP4 Commitment of the project delivery team 4.16 .585 3 18 .702 -1.133 0.256 
CP5 Fair risk allocation among public-private parties 3.34 .552 6 25 .798* -0.441 0.315 
CP6 Early warning signals for detecting and solving conflicts 
or crisis. 
4.11 .785 5 21 .724 
-1.475 
0.141 
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BR  Budgetary Reporting 
BR1 Reporting government guarantees and other contingent 
liabilities in the national budget 
4.07 .648 1 22 
.701 
.694 
-1.063 0.28 
BR2 Oversight and control 4.01 .621 2 23 .638 -1.284 0.199 
ES Environmental Sustainability 
ES1 Project’s contribution to social participation and inter-
racial cohesion 
4.31 .648 6 14 
.781 
.719 -0.689 0.032 
ES2 Project’s contribution to increased utilisation of local 
materials 
4.42 .621 2 10 .716 -0.591 0.552 
ES3 Adoption of energy efficient solutions 4.4 .887 4 12 .757 -0.764 0.465 
ES4 Project’s contribution to reduction in material wastage 4.41 .622 3 11 .714 -0.12 0.912 
ES5 Compliance with regulatory standards on sustainable 
project delivery 
4.32 .648 5 13 .729 -0.721 0.471 
ES6 Prevention of massive changes to landscape 2.27 .513 8 28 .788* -0.181 0.867 
ES7 Project’s impact of surrounding plant and animals 4.29 .740 7 15 .731 -0.02 0.997 
ES8 Contribution to economic and social prosperity of 
surrounding communities 
4.48 .648 1 4 .729 -0.038 0.998 
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Table 7.3: Results of Statistical Analysis on Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Measures 
Label Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Ranking 
Within 
group 
Overall 
Ranking 
Overall 
Cronbach’s 
α 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Mann Whitney U 
Z Sig 
WB Whistle-Blowing 
WB1 Effective institutional arrangement to the inculcate culture of 
openness among staff 
4.47 .648 1 2 
.780 
.766 
-0.854 0.397 
WB2 Adequate protection for whistle blowers against institutional 
witch-hunt 
4.41 1.031 2 4 .741 
-1.104 0.268 
WB3 Implementing procedurally correct actions to address reported 
wrongdoings 
4.15 .887 3 5 .772 
-0.369 0.729 
AC Anti-Corruption 
AC1 Strong stance against corruption in government guarantee 
schemes 
4.49 .648 1 1 
.769 
.719 
-0.245 0.81 
AC2 Clear, adequate and timely information about happenings, 
processes and rules 
3.29 1.031 5 8 .610 
-1.063 0.28 
AC3 Effective internal and external oversight and control 4.14 .887 3 6 .634 -1.284 0.199 
AC4 Effective sanctions against corrupt practices 4.46 .585 2 3 .766 -0.689 0.493 
AC5 Robust due diligence appraisals through extensive information 
gathering 
3.72 .767 4 7 .757 
-0.591 0.552 
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Table 7.4: Results of Statistical Analysis on Process-based Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Measures 
Label Process-Based Accountability Mechanisms Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Ranking 
Within 
group 
Overall 
Ranking 
Overall 
Cronbach’s 
α 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Mann Whitney U 
Z      
C Competition 
C1 Increasing the number of potential bidders or applicants 4.47 .648 1 4 
.773 
.741 -0.721 0.471 
C2 Availability of in-house commercial skills within the public 
sector. 
3.81 .831 4 18 .741 -0.181 0.867 
C3 Open and comprehensive bidding parameters and requirements 4.15 .887 3 12 .716 -0.02 0.997 
C4 Transparent bidding and tendering process 4.46 .585 2 5 .766 -0.038 0.998 
C5 Adequate incentives to encourage the supply of innovation from 
the private sector 
3.72 .767 5 19 .767 -0.873 0.021 
BM Bench-Marking 
BM1 Comprehensive articulation of historically good practices and 
processes 
3.93 .557 2 15 
.740 
.717 -1.063 0.437 
BM2 Constant improvements on benchmarking techniques. 4.53 .501 1 1 .728 -1.284 0.143 
M Monitoring 
M1 Continuous monitoring of corporate and external dealings of 
the project consortium members during the period of guarantee 
4.34 
.534 2 8 
.738 
.715 -0.662 0.013 
M2 More qualitative public awareness on fiscal risks arising from 
contingent liabilities 
4.16 
.516 3 11 .701 -0.733 0.467 
M3 External monitoring through audit institutions and other interest 
groups. 
4.49 
.309 1 2 .725 -0.926 0.353 
M4 Effective use of sanctions against wrong practices 4.04 .374 4 13 .740* -0.395 0.728 
PA Performance Auditing 
PA1 Project life cycle cost reduction 4.43 .643 2 7 
.801 
.791 -0.651 0.516 
PA2 Adequate risk transfer among project parties 4.44 .688 1 6 .746 -0.511 0.315 
PA3 Acceptable project quality 4.32 .732 3 9 .782 -0.312 0.752 
PA4 Quality service delivery 4.27 .627 4 10 .798 -1.329 0.184 
PA5 On-time project completion,  3.94 .793 5 14 .730 -1.133 0.256 
PA6 Economic empowerment of local community 3.91 .693 6 16 .789 -0.441 0.665 
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PSC Public Sector Comparator 
PSC1 Compulsory PSC evaluation both at project and guarantee 
scheme levels. 
3.83 
.583 2 17 
 
.701 -0.662 0.508 
PSC2 Integrating PSC evaluation into government guarantee-decision 
making process. 
4.48 
.644 1 3 .698 -0.733 0.463 
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Table 7.5: Results of Statistical Analysis on Democratic Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Measures 
Label Democratic Accountability Mechanisms Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Ranking 
Within 
group 
Overall 
Ranking 
Overall 
Cronbach’s 
α 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Mann Whitney U 
Z      
SPI Socio-Political Impact 
SPI1 Project’s impact on job creation and unemployment 4.38 .652 1 5 
.826 
.820 -0.245 0.806 
SPI2 Project’s impact on travel time and journey quality 4.16 .630 4 12 .821 -1.063 0.288 
SPI3 Affordable user charges 3.09 .836 10 22 .811 -1.284 0.419 
SPI4 Access to services 3.04 .540 11 23 .827* -0.689 0.491 
SPI5 Better stakeholder engagement 4.24 .528 3 10 .818 -0.591 0.555 
SPI6 Adequate security 3.97 .744 6 15 .810 -0.764 0.327 
SPI7 Project’s impact on biodiversity 3.9 .733 7 16 .819 -0.12 0.904 
SPI8 Sufficient risk transfer away from public sector 4.02 .789 5 13 .822 -0.721 0.471 
SPI9 Adequate response to public needs through timely project 
delivery 
3.82 .811 8 18 .825 -0.181 0.856 
SPI10 Minimal life cycle cost 3.34 .532 9 21 .835* -0.02 0.984 
SPI11 Better collaboration between public and private sector 4.28 .618 2 8 .813 -0.038 0.97 
SE Stakeholder Engagement 
SE1 Effective communication and dialogue 4.44 .806 1 2 
.826 
.807 -1.133 0.256 
SE2 Clear and effective communication channels 4.43 .657 2 3 .812 -0.441 0.665 
SE3 Staff commitment to laid down stakeholder engagement strategy 4.37 .622 3 6 .804 -1.475 0.141 
SE4 Transparent decision-making process 4.32 .648 4 7 .816 -1.215 0.221 
SE5 Clear understanding of all stakeholders’ area of interests 4.27 .713 5 9 .819 -1.601 0.12 
RL Rule of Law 
RL1 Enforceability of contracts and agreements in projects 4.93 .957 1 1 
.743 
.716 -0.689 0.491 
RL2 Adequate institutional arrangements for supporting contract 
enforcement 
3.99 .610 2 14 .730 -0.591 0.555 
RL3 Legal scrutiny and evaluation of policy, projects and 
performance. 
3.83 .904 3 17 .713 -0.764 0.445 
RL4 Clarity in legal/contractual rights and responsibility among 
project parties. 
3.81 .602 4 19 .712 -0.12 0.904 
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PS Parliamentary Scrutiny 
PS1 Effective use of committee hearings to evaluate the management 
of government guarantee scheme 
4.17 .744 2 11 
.720 
.711 -0.662 0.108 
PS2 Interactions with external experts and interest groups to 
examine wider impact of government guarantee scheme 
3.35 .733 3 20 .647 -0.733 0.463 
PS3 Encouragement of policy debates on government guarantee 
scheme  
4.39 .806 1 4 .716 -0.926 0.354 
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This is because the two factors had their        far lower than the significance level of 0.05 
as hypothesized in the study. The         of the two factors showed significance at P˂0.021, 
and P˂0.013 respectively. This confirm differences in opinion among respondents on the 
three factors. However, the result also confirm 97.2% of the respondents are in agreement 
with all the process-based factors in confirmation with the null hypothesis. The two factors 
which higher significance level than hypothesized are: C5= Adequate incentives to encourage 
the supply of innovation from the private sector (P˂0.021) and, M1=Continuous monitoring 
of corporate and external dealings of the project consortium members during the period of 
guarantee (P˂0.013). Other remaining factors showed higher        than hypothesized 
(P˂0.05). The implication of this result is that if all the responses are combined, it will have 
no impact on the overall reliability of the findings. Going further, subsequent analysis into the 
group mean of both public and private sector respondents showed that, while factors C5 was 
rated highly by the private sector, the public sector rated it as less important. On the other 
hand, the private sector rated M1 as a less important factor, but the public sector considered 
the factor to be important. In line with this result, the tenth column of Table 7.4 indicate that 
the null hypothesis should be retained for the entire process-based accountability measures. 
7.8.4 Results of Man Whitney U Test for Democratic Accountability Mechanisms and 
Associated Measures. 
Finally, Man Whitney U test of significance differences in perception was also conducted for 
democratic accountability measures. As earlier done for other constructs, it was essential to 
find out whether any differences in perception between public and private sector respondents 
exist as may affect their ranking of each democratic accountability measures. The 
differentiator here remains the job sector of the respondents, which are public and private 
sectors respectively. The sector was therefore used as the grouping variables, while the 
democratic accountability measures were introduced as the test variables. Based on the 
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analysis, all the twenty three (23) democratic accountability measures were perceived as 
important between the private and public sector participants. All the factors had their P Value 
higher than the hypothesized P˂0.05. In line with this result, the tenth column of Table 7.5 
indicate that the null hypothesis be retained for the entire measures. In summary, the result 
from the statistical analysis suggest that the survey respondents were largely in agreement 
based on their perceptions of all the accountability factors regardless of their demographics. 
7.9 Validity and Reliability 
Validating research findings and ensuring reliability, credibility and generalizability are 
conducted differently, based on whether quantitative or qualitative approach is employed 
(Creswell, 2013). Whilst the term ‘trustworthiness’ may be considered in qualitative research 
(Marshall and Rossman, 2014), the quantitative version may be put as ‘credibility’ (Sousa, 
2014). Studies such as Creswell (2007) and (2013), Guba and Lincoln (2015) have, over time 
come up with their own qualitative yardsticks for measuring internal and external rigour in 
research. As such, the evolution of several terminologies such transferability, confirmability, 
dependability, reliability and validity have been brought into emergence. However, despite 
the array of terms, the critical essence of validity is the introduction of rigour that minimises 
bias in research. Research validity examines the veracity of claims, reduction in error, and the 
logic behind process (Morgan, 2007; Cohen et al., 2013; Jussim et al., 2015). According to 
Greene (2014), research credibility also involves ensuring validity of methodology and 
interpretation. Whilst methodological validity looks at the suitability of the research design 
and procedures adopted in a study, interpretive validity examines the plausibility of 
interpretations generated via an adopted methodology (Greene, 2014; Noble and Smith, 
2015). However, a possible way to address these complexities lies on careful selection of 
research design, methodology and methods (Maxwell, 1992 and Kothari, 2004). 
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In quantitative research, validity focuses on precision and accuracy of the research instrument 
including the research process (Norris, 1997). In this study, validity and reliability have been 
addressed with the adoption of series of procedures for implementing the research. The use of 
pilot study helped strengthen the face and content validity of the questionnaire. The study 
engaged 10 participants to evaluate the research instrument before implementing the final 
survey. The pilot study thus helped ensure consistency in participants’ responses to closely 
connected questions in the questionnaire. This ultimately mitigated threats of validity and 
operationalization. The internal consistency of the measurement scales used in the 
questionnaires also contributed to validity. The study selected 5-point likert rating scales to 
measure every construct examined in the research and ensured the selected scales were 
suitable to operationalize the constructs.  Through piloting, the study was also able to ensure 
each independent variables identified were true measures of their constructs. 
 
In addition, once the data collection stage was over, the study adopted series of statistical 
analysis for data cleansing, screening and reliability. Analysis such as reliability, missing 
value analysis, multicollinearity screening etc. were used to identify unreliable factors, 
missing and incomplete responses from the questionnaire data. By deleting unreliable factors 
and incomplete responses, improvement in the overall reliability of the data set was hugely 
enhanced. 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter explored the quantitative phase of the study by focusing on confirming the wider 
relevance of findings identified at the qualitative stage. Through the literature, semi-
structured interviews and document analysis, findings were identified and then used to 
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develop questionnaire survey. The questionnaire was pilot-tested and later distributed for data 
collection. Although, respondents were principally recruited through Snowball sampling 
approach by relying on existing network of contacts of the researchers in the UK’s public and 
private sectors, other supplementary source included the HM Treasury’s PFI projects 
database containing a list of 305 contracting, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and financial 
firms. The questionnaire respondents were UK public sector employees and private sector 
participants (PFI/Construction Sector) with experience in UK PFI and infrastructure 
guarantee. A total of 118 respondents were sampled with a return rate of 79.60% and 77.11% 
usable questionnaire responses (91 responses) were got. Statistical analysis adopted included 
Missing value analysis, reliability analysis, mean ranking, standard deviation and Man 
Whitney U test of significant differences in perception among respondents. The study 
identified the top-ranked factors contributing towards accountability in PFI/PPP 
infrastructure guarantee scheme across the 16 measured constructs/dependent variables. 
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Chapter Eight: Structural Equation Modelling of Public Accountability 
in UK’s PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme 
 
8.0 Chapter Overview: 
 
This chapter builds on findings from the qualitative study and initial statistical analysis to 
establish the structural path for examining accountability in publicly guaranteed PPPs. On 
this basis, AMOS IBM SPSS version 22 is used to build a Structural Equation Model. The 
chapter also evaluates the important and intertwined relationship among the sixteen 
accountability constructs (latent variables) identified in previous qualitative chapters. In 
developing the structural model, the important issue of model fit evaluation is looked upon. 
Thus, the study examines different indices for determining the fitness of a model. The 
theoretically recommended thresholds are also established.  The study also examines whether 
the measures contributing towards each latent variable were true measures of the particular 
constructs they claim to measure. In this regard, construct validity – convergent, discriminant 
and face validity statistics are examined such as Average Variance Extracted (AVE), 
Maximum Shared Squared Variance (MSV). Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is also 
used to understand the factor structure of the latent variables in the model and establish the 
key measures. Maximum Likelihood technique is considered in this regard. Given the 
multidimensional nature of the construct, second-order CFA is also considered in the study. 
Series of model re-specification and refinement analysis are carried out and thus establish the 
overall structural model which is later used to create a conceptual framework for evaluating 
accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme.  
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8.1 Essence of Structural Equation Model 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) as a statistical tool was largely developed by 
sociologists and Psychologists (Yang and Ou, 2008). SEM as a multivariate method can also 
be viewed as an extension of regression modelling (Hair et al., 2006), which measures series 
of interdependent relationships among variables (Hoyle, 1995). SEM provides a way of 
modelling constructs by clearly integrating errors of measurement caused by substitute 
variables, therefore providing useful insights into measures contributing towards the 
construct (Molenaar et al., 2000). The main logic behind SEM is based on the general notion 
that some variables of major interest are not observable, - latent variables (Kline, 2015). SEM 
thus estimates the interrelationship between the latent variables and the observed 
(independent variables), by creating a structural path towards understanding the construct. By 
providing a visual representation of the interconnected relationships among variables, SEM 
enables users’ in-depth understanding of the causal relationship and performance algorithm 
(Kim et al., 2009; Hair et al., 2016).  Due to its popularity and varying benefits, SEM has 
been widely implemented in many project management studies.  Studies like Doloi et al. 
(2011) once used SEM for evaluating impact of contractor’s performance on project success. 
Chen et al. (2011) also adopted SEM for examining interrelationships among critical success 
factors for construction projects. In another recent study, Xiong et al. (2015) also conducted a 
critical review of the application of SEM in construction project management research, 
among many other related studies. 
 
Under SEM, the observed variables are used to measure the latent variable. This 
measurement technique consist of two major components namely, (1) measurement model 
and (2) the structural model.  Whilst the measurement model integrates confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) by focusing on how well the observed variables measures the latent/construct 
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variable (Kim et al., 2009). The structural model comprise multiple regression analysis, path 
analysis and models the relationship among the construct variables (Chen et al., 2011). In 
terms of evaluating the reliability of observed variables, the measurement model comes in 
handy, as its fits the observed variables to the model and confirm their validity or otherwise 
(Kline, 2015). 
In order to unravel the critical measures contributing towards accountability in UK’s PFI/PPP 
infrastructure guarantee scheme, this study adopted structural equation modelling. An 
important advantage of using SEM in this research is that through CFA, the structural path of 
the measured construct is revealed and the relationship between observed and latent variables 
are established. Where more than one latent variables are measured as components of a 
bigger construct, SEM helps unravel the magnitude and importance of each latent variable 
(Melchers and Beck, 2017). 
8.2 Model Fitness 
An important issue when using Structural Equation Model (SEM) is to evaluate the fit 
statistic of the model (Iacobucci, 2010). Model fit examines the degree to which a 
hypothesized model reflects the theory structure underlying the dataset (Ryu, 2014). 
According to Khalili‐Damghani, K., & Tavana, (2014), a potential SEM model should be 
selected in line with the recommended “Goodness of Fit” (GOF) indices, and where such 
model fulfils GOF and theoretical expectations, it is ultimately selected. Different GOF 
indices have been applied in various studies. However, the most widely reported and applied 
indices can be classified into three broad categories namely, Incremental Fit Indices, 
Absolute Fit Indices and Parsimony Fit Indices (Hooper et al., 2008; Cheung and Rensvold, 
2002). These indices are a product of continuous research and refinement of the SEM tool by 
different researchers over the years (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; Bentler, 1990; Hu and Bentler, 
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1999). As suggested by Henseler and Sarstedt (2013), using different indices across the three 
indices categories enhance the richness of analysis, since each indices reflects distinctive 
aspect of the model. Whilst O'Rourke and Hatcher (2013) recommended indices like Model 
Chi Square (  ), Adjusted Goodness-of-fit statistic (AGFI), Comparative Fit Indices (CFI) 
and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA).  Henseler et al. (2015), suggested 
the use of Standardized Root mean Square Residual (SRMR), Chi-Square (  ), and Global 
Fit Index (GFI), among others.  The three broad categories of GOF indices are broadly 
explained below.  
8.2.1 Incremental Fit Indices 
 
Also referred to as comparative or relative fit indices (Bentler, 1990), incremental fit indices 
are a collection of indices that require no use of Chi Square in its original form but still 
compares the hypothesized model with the chi-square value (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
Incremental fit indices were established to estimate the increment of fit of a hypothetic model 
in relation to a baseline model (Ding et al., 1995). The central hypothesis behind incremental 
fit indices is that all variables in the data set are uncorrelated (Schreiber et al., 2006). The two 
major indices under incremental fit are normed-fit index (NFI) and Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI). Normed-fit index evaluates the model by relating the    value of the model to the    
of the independence model. Since the values of NFI statistic often range between 0 and 1, 
Bentler and Bonnet (1980) suggested a greater value between 0.90 and 1 will represent a 
good fit. However, despite the effectiveness of the NFI, a major shortcoming is its sensitivity 
to sample size, as the index tends to underperform with smaller sample size of less than 200. 
As such, studies like Kline (2005) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) have suggested the NFI 
should not be exclusively relied on to determine model fit. Other indices such as Tucker-
Lewis Index (NNFI) have been proposed to cope with smaller samples for model fit 
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evaluation. However, with Tucker-Lewis Index, its value can go beyond 1.0 and may 
sometimes be difficult to interpret. Hence, studies have recommended cut-off threshold of 
either 0.80 or ≥0.95. Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is a refined form of the Normed-Fit Index 
(NFI) and looks at sample size that shows good performance even under small sample 
scenario. By comparing the samples’ covariance matrix with the independent model, CFI 
hypothesizes all latent variables as uncorrelated (Gerbing and Anderson, 1993). CFI is 
currently one of the most reported fit indices in SEM and with the statistic value ranging 
between 0.0 and 1, where the closest value to 1 indicates good fit. Recommended cut-off 
values have been put at ≥0.95 (Hu and Bentler, 1999). This study thus examined incremental 
fit of the model using CFI, NFI and NNFI. 
8.2.2 Absolute Fit Indices 
Absolute Fit Index (AFI) looks at the extent to which a hypothesized model reflects the 
sample data (Chen et al., 2011) and examines which potential model provides the best fit. By 
comparing the goodness of fit (GOF) to a value that is analogous to a total sum of square, the 
AFI statistic is comparable to   (Hu and Bentler, 1998). Absolute Fit statistic performs better 
where there is a good fit between the hypothetic model and the observed data (Sugawara and 
MacCallum, 1993). A high covariance matrix value suggest higher predicting power of the 
model, such that, a covariance of 0.80 indicate 80% of covariance is explained by the model. 
Examples of absolute fit indices include Model Chi square test, RMSEA, Goodness-of-fit 
Index (GFI), Adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), the Root mean square residual (RMR), 
and Standardised root mean square residual (SRMR). 
 
Model Chi Square (  ) examines the degree of error between the data sample and the 
model’s covariance matrices (Stephens, 1974). The question of “how close are the observed 
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values to those which would be expected under the fitted model” is usually answered using 
the chi square test (Nicholls, 1989, pp. 53). This test statistic confirms if the sample data 
emerged from a particular distribution by evaluating the model against the data to assess for 
discrepancies (Snedecor and Cochran 1989). Normally, a good model fit would give a less-
significant result at 95% confidence interval, hence the chi square is often described as a 
“badness of fit’ statistic (Kline, 2005). However, whilst chi square remains a celebrated 
goodness-of-fit statistic, one of its shortcomings is the assumption of multivariate normality, 
which may result in models being rejected under extreme abnormalities (Satorra and Bentler, 
2001). In addition, its sensitivity to sample size also indicates chi square almost continuously 
rejects models under large sample data (Broffitt and Randles, 1977), while its predictive 
power also diminishes when using small data and thus unable to judge between good models 
(Vigneron and Johnson, 2017). To address these limitations, an alternative indices that 
reduces the impact of size of sample data on model fit such as normed chi-square (   df) 
may be used (Toma et al., 2016). The recommended cut-off value of normed chi-square 
ranges from 2.0 to 5.0 (Toma et al., 2016). 
 
Another essential fit indices is the RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation).  
RMSEA examines the extent to which the model, with certain well-chosen parameter 
estimates, fits the covariance matrix of the sample populations (Hu and Bentler, 1998; Chen 
et al., 2011). Under RMSEA, the objective is to obtain an approximate or very close fit, but 
not a precise fit, between the population and the model. The recommended cut-off value for 
RMSEA is currently between 0.05 and 0.10, and 0.08 is considered a more acceptable upper 
level cut-off point (Stenling and Tafvelin, 2014). Goodness-of-fit Index (GFI) is also another 
strong indices for examining model fit and estimates the percentage of variance in the 
hypothesized model that is explained by the predicted population variance (MacCallum and 
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Hong, 1996). GFI explains the extent to which the model reflects the observed covariance 
matrix (Miles and Shevlin, 1998). The value of GFI statistic ranges between 0 and 1, with 
larger sample data improving its value (MacCallum and Hong, 1996). The recommended cut-
off point for GFI is ≥0.95 (Fan et al., 1999). Another useful model fit indices is the Adjusted 
Goodness-of-fit Index (AGFI). AGFI is an extension of the GFI (as the name indicates), and 
adjusts the goodness of fit index in-line with the degree of freedom (Gerbing and Anderson, 
1993). Additionally, the value of the AGFI statistic increases as sample size increases 
(Snedecor and Cochran 1989) and its values ranges between 0 and 1, with an upper cut-off 
value of 0.09 indicating better fit of the model (Kenny and McCoach, 2003). In view of the 
above explanation, this study therefore examined normed-chi square, RMSEA, GFI and 
AGFI as indices for determining absolute fit in its structural analysis. 
8.2.3 Parsimony Fit Indices 
Parsimony of fit indices are adjustments on earlier mentioned fit indices (Hu and Bentler, 
1999). The focus of the adjustment is to select simpler models over complex models, and 
apparently penalise less- parsimonious models (Stenling and Tafvelin, 2014). With 
parsimony indices, the more complex the estimation process, the lower the fit index (Marsh 
and Hau, 1996). Mulaik et al. (1989) developed two major parsimony indices comprising 
Parsimony Goodness-of-fit Index (PGFI) and Parsimonious Normed Fit Index (PNFI). Whilst 
the PGFI makes adjustment for degrees of freedom and is based on the GFI (Mulaik et al., 
1989), the PNFI estimation is based on the NFI but also considers adjustment for degrees of 
freedom (Williams and Holahan, 1994).  Higher cut-off value for parsimony indices is 
recommended at 0.90 and above (Hu and Bentler, 1999), with Mulaik et al. (1989) preferring 
the combination of parsimony with other goodness-of-fit indices. In line with the above 
analysis, the study’s hypothesized model was examined for PGFI and PNFI indices. The 
summary of all fit indices employed in this study is presented in Table 8.1 below.  
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Table 8.1: Cut-Off thresholds for Structural Model Fit Indices 
Goodness of fit measures Recommended level of GOF Measures
a
 
X
2
 ∕degree of freedom <5 (preferably 1 to 2) 
RMSEA <0.10 (preferably <0.08) 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 
Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 
Parsimonious Normed of Fit Index (PNFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 
a: Cut-offs adapted from Hu and Bentler (1998); Chen et al. (2011); and Mulaik et al. (1989) 
 
8.3 Construct Validity and Reliability 
In order to examine the significant relationship in the hypothesized model (Byrne, 2001), 
construct validity and reliability tests were considered. Construct validity includes different 
sub-dimensions such as convergent validity, discriminant validity and content validity of the 
observed measures associated with the constructs (Garver and Mentzer, 1999; Hulland, 
1999).  These measures are essential validity tests that must be satisfied to ensure all the 
variables truly measure their associated latent variables. Convergent validity is often tested 
from a statistical standpoint. It examines the extent of correlation between two or more 
measures of the same latent construct (Garver and Mentzer, 1999). Convergent validity looks 
at whether measures of a particular latent variable statistically converge (Garver and Mentzer, 
1999). During analysis, the convergent principle suggests that all related measures of a 
construct will correlate very strongly to one another, based on their correlation matrix (Öncel, 
2014). Additionally, convergent validity measures comprise the Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE). AVE measures the amount of variance captured by a latent variable from its 
measures that is shared among other variables (Khosrow-Pour, 2008).  It also estimates the 
variance captured by the latent variable, against the variance occasioned due to measurement 
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error. The recommended upper cut off threshold for AVE is 0.7 and above, indicating that 
70% of the variance in the measures can be explained by the latent variables.  In addition, a 
value of ≥0.5 is considered acceptable and therefore deemed a good value (Khosrow-Pour, 
2008). The mathematical equation for Average Variance Extracted (AVE), based on the work 
of Fornell and Larker (1981) is calculated as: 
         Σ[λi
2
]Var(X) 
AVE =  ────────────  ,………………………..(1 
Σ[λi
2]Var(X)+Σ[Var(i)] 
 
Where λi is the loading of xi on X, Var signifies variance, i denotes measurement error of xi, 
and Σ represents a sum. As a construct validity statistic, the AVE is considered to show more 
reliability when compared to other index such as Composite Reliability (Padilla and Divers, 
2016). 
 
Discriminant validity, as the name implies, describes the extent to which observed variables 
of different latent constructs diverge or are not correlated with one another (Lucas et al., 
1996). In discriminant validity, the correlation coefficients for discriminated measures should 
be very low and closer to zero when observed in a correlation matrix (Cable and DeRue, 
2002). Discriminant validity is often measured using Maximum Shared Squared Variance 
(MSV) (Schumm et al., 1986). MSV examines the extent to which other factors external to a 
specific latent construct are able to explain the variance in the construct (Enders and 
Bandalos, 2001). In ascertaining the reliability of a model, the MSV coefficient must be 
lower to the AVE (Farrell, 2010), since it is expected that measures predicting a specific 
latent construct should correlate with the construct than other external measures (Netemeyer 
et al., 1996). In addition to other construct reliability tests earlier explained, face validity of 
the model was also considered. In this case, the all the indicators meant to measure the 
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constructs actually match the conceptual definition of the constructs (Chau, 1996). Face 
validity, also known as content validity relies on researcher judgement and insights (Qudrat-
Ullah and Seong, 2010). In this study, the combination of literature review, semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis and questionnaire pilot study had helped to ensure face 
validity of the model variables. Overall, this study combines AVE and MSV construct 
validity tests (see in a Table 8.6) with Cronbach’s alpha reliability test earlier performed for 
all the measures in the previous chapter (See Tables 7.2 to 7.5) to improve the model’s 
validity.  
8.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
In order to confirm the key measures underlying the sixteen accountability mechanisms, a 
confirmatory factor analysis was carried. The sample size for the analysis is N=91 and is in 
line with existing studies on structural equation model who have used minimal samples sizes 
such as Eriksson and Pesamaa, (2007); Jin et al. (2007); Doloi’s (2009b), Doloi et al. (2011), 
and Chen et al. (2011). This, therefore emphasized the fitness of the dataset for structural 
equation modelling. The structural models were constructed using IBM AMOS 22 SPSS. 
Preliminary nodes were developed using the measures earlier identified and represented in 
Tables 8.1 above. At this stage of the analysis, only factors statistically considered reliable 
are retained for further analysis. As endorsed by various scholars on structural equation 
modelling (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Mulaik et al., 1989; Garver and Mentzer, 1999; Kline, 
2005), ‘Maximum Likelihood method’ was adopted in this research. Essentially, Maximum 
Likelihood method is useful as it produces the maximum parameter estimate of normally 
distributed dataset (Qudrat-Ullah and Seong, 2010). Covariance results of the hypothesized 
model are then evaluated to examine the model’s suitability, by means of the earlier 
mentioned fit indices (See section 8.2 above). 
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On account of the evaluation of the hypothesized model, further refinement were needed to 
ensure sufficient reliability, validity and model fitness with the sample data. To implement 
the necessary improvements to the model, two model classification methods were employed. 
Based on the recommendation of Kline (2010), IBM AMOS 22 SPSS modification metrics 
were used to input covariance and causal relationships between observed variables and error 
terms respectively. These methods have been severally used for improving model fitness (Hu 
and Bentler, 1999).This refinement ensured all adjustments to the model are theoretically in 
tune and correctly explain the intertwined relationship among the accountability factors. 
Additionally, the path diagram was vetted to reveal measures showing little correlation with 
the latent construct and also important measures that are showing low correlation coefficient. 
In each case, series of refinements were performed on the model until the desired fit, 
reliability and validity levels were achieved. 
 
Considering the multidimensional nature of the constructs in this study, it was necessary to 
consider Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Hence, second order factor 
analysis was carried out for each of the sixteen (16) latent constructs (i.e. Value for money, 
risk management, Parliamentary scrutiny etc.) influencing accountability in PPP government 
guarantee scheme. According to Garver and Mentzer (1999), second order construct is a 
latent variable that is explained by three/four or five other latent variables.  Beyond ensuring 
the preservation of the multifaceted constructs as envisaged in the research, second order 
factor analysis helps minimise multicollinearity, whilst also explaining how the first-order 
constructs loads on the hypothesized second-order construct (Qudrat-Ullah and Seong, 2010). 
On this basis, the second order construct in the study is “Accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme”. As expected, the sixteen (16) accountability mechanisms 
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became the first-order factors/construct which are directly measured by the observed 
variables. 
8.4.1 Second Order CFA of Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms  
To confirm the factor structure of the first and second-order constructs, CFA was performed 
on the five (5) outcome-based accountability constructs influencing PPP government 
guarantee scheme. The five mechanisms under this section are Value for money, 
Environmental Sustainability, Risk Management, Budgetary Reporting, and Collaborative 
Partnership. Under this section, the five constructs were modelled as the first-order factors 
(latent factors), with each construct having predictors ranging from seven (7), seven (7), four 
(4), two (2) and five (5) respectively. Asides confirming the reliability of the predictors 
influencing these five constructs, there was also need to establish the extent to which the five 
latent constructs contribute towards accountability in PPP infrastructure guarantee scheme. 
That is, to examine how well each of the five constructs loads on the second-order construct. 
In view of this, the suggestion of Caplan (2010) was followed by adopting a two-step 
approach. This approach combines the two common models in SEM namely, measurement 
model and structural model. Whilst the measurement model evaluates how well the various 
predictors measures the first-order constructs (in this case the five accountability 
mechanisms), the structural model examines the interrelationship between the first-order and 
the second-order construct. In order to explore the influences of the five (5) outcome-based 
accountability variables (mechanisms) on PPP government guarantee scheme, the 
hypothetical relationship was modelled. As such, a hypothesized model was developed by 
integrating the five accountability latent variables with their associated indicators into an 
initial model based on theoretical expectations and earlier qualitative findings. Below is Fig 
8.1 which presents the specification for the hypothesized model of relationship between the 
first-order, second-order constructs and their associated measures. 
216 
 
 
An initial evaluation of the model suggested the need for improvements, thereby 
necessitating several iterative processes. In view of this, measures with low standardized 
factor loadings and the ones with less-significant loadings were removed from the model in 
line with recommendations by Singhapakdi et al. (1996). This rule automatically affected two 
indicators. The indicators are ES1 and ES7= (under latent variable – ‘Environmental 
Sustainability’) respectively. Upon deleting the measures, the fit indices of the model 
significantly improved to desirable levels. This result revealed the convergence of four 
constructs, out of the five latent variables under outcome-based accountability as they 
contribute more towards accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee. The AVE 
coefficient of the four latent variables ranged between 0.55 and 0.71. The result is also above 
the cut-off threshold of 0.5 recommended by Khosrow-Pour, (2008), thereby confirming the 
four latent constructs passed the convergence test. The contribution of the four constructs 
towards accountability in PPP government guarantee scheme is considered significant in 
addition to very significant Goodness-of-fit (GOF) indices. Budgetary reporting which had 
two indicators was taken off the model given its poor contribution to the overall reliability of 
the model. Overall, the results confirmed the validity of four out of the five hypotheses 
generated, in line with theoretical expectation. The confirmed hypotheses are H1, H2, H3, & 
H5. The final model is presented in Fig 8.2, whilst Table 8.1 presented the variance extracted 
and construct reliability of all the latent variables 
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Figure 8.1: Hypothesized Model of Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms for PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme 
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Figure 8.2: Final Model of Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms for PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme 
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Table 8.2: Maximum Likelihood Estimate and Value Fit Indices for Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms & Indicators 
First-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Relationship Estimate AVE CR Relationship Estimate AVE CR 
VFM1 <--- Value for money 0.88 
0.65 0.73 
Value for Money<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee Scheme 0.79 
0.74 0.87 VFM3 <--- Value for money 0.83 Risk management<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee Scheme 0.71 
VFM6 <--- Value for money 0.77 Environmental Sustainability<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee 
Scheme 
0.65 
VFM2<--- Value for money 0.72 Collaborative Partnership<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee 
Scheme 
0.64 
VFM4<--- Value for money 0.65  
VFM7 <--- Value for money 0.59 MODEL FIT INDICES 
VFM5<--- Value for money 0.55 
RM2 <--- Risk Management 0.87 
0.71 0.81 
Indices Hypothetic Model Final Model 
RM1<--- Risk Management 0.79 X2 ∕degree of freedom 2.004 1.021 
RM4<--- Risk Management 0.74 RMSEA 0.088 0.088 
RM3 <--- Risk Management 0.68 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.721 0.954 
ES5<--- Environmental Sustainability 0.87 
0.55 0.65 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) 0.819 0.935 
ES4<--- Environmental Sustainability 0.82 Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.541 0.818 
ES8<--- Environmental Sustainability 0.75 Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.573 0.789 
ES3<--- Environmental Sustainability 0.67 Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.720 0.821 
ES2<--- Environmental Sustainability 0.61 Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) 1.791 0.917 
CP1<--- Collaborative Partnership  0.77 
0.69 0.69 
Parsimonious Normed of Fit Index (PNFI) 0.611 0.711 
CP2<--- Collaborative Partnership 0.73 Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability  0.812 
CP6<--- Collaborative Partnership 0.67  
CP3<--- Collaborative Partnership 0.61 
CP4<--- Collaborative Partnership 0.57 
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8.4.2  Second Order CFA of Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms  
The two ethics-based accountability mechanisms in the study were also subjected to second-
order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to confirm their factor structure (See Table 7.3 for 
Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms and associated Measures). The ethical mechanisms 
being examined are Anti-corruption and Whistle Blower Policy. Each of the two constructs 
were modelled as first-Order latent variables, whilst the second-order construct remains 
‘accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme’. Figure 8.3 presents the 
hypothesized model of ethics-based accountability constructs and their hypothesized impact 
on PPP government guarantee scheme. 
 
Figure 8.3: Hypothesized Model of Ethics-Based Accountability Mechanisms for PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme 
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The hypothesized model was assessed for construct reliability, validity and model fit in order 
to examine the fitness of the model with the sample data. An initial evaluation of the model 
using the fit and reliability statistic indicated no need for further model refinement to improve 
the model. This is because, all the eight (8) indicators across the two ethics-based constructs 
showed high factor loading above the recommended levels (≥0.5). As such, all the measures 
were confirmed as true predictors of their associated latent constructs (Anti-Corruption and 
Whistle Blower Policy). Whilst the indicators were considered reliable, the two first-order 
constructs load significantly onto the associated second-order construct, with none of the 
coefficient less than 0.66. Convergence reliability and validity test was also passed by the two 
latent constructs, based on their strong Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite 
Reliability (CR) values. In addition, the result confirmed hypotheses H6 & H7, in line with 
theoretical postulation. Fig 8.4:  presents the final model, whilst Table 8.3 presents the 
standardized factor estimate, construct validity and reality indices and model fit indices.  
 
Figure 8.4: Final Model of Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms for PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme.. 
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Table 8.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimate and Value Fit Indices for Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms & Indicators 
First-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Relationship Estimate AVE CR Relationship Estimate AVE CR 
AC1 <--- Anti Corruption 0.81 
0.69 0.81 
Anti-Corruption<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee Scheme 0.79 
0.61 0.57 AC5<--- Anti Corruption 0.77 Whistle Blowing<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee Scheme 0.66 
AC4<--- Anti Corruption 0.71  
AC3<--- Anti Corruption 0.65 
AC2<--- Anti Corruption 0.59  
 MODEL FIT INDICES 
WB2<---Whistle Blowing 0.74 
0.56 0.61 
Indices Hypothetic Model Final Model 
WB3<---Whistle Blowing 0.68 X2 ∕degree of freedom 3.004 1.021 
WB1<---Whistle Blowing 0.61 RMSEA 0.088 0.078 
 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.821 0.854 
 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) 0.719 0.735 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.641 0.918 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.573 0.789 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.620 0.621 
Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) 2.791 0.717 
Parsimonious Normed of Fit Index (PNFI) 0.511 0.811 
Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability  0.713 
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8.4.3 Second Order CFA of Process-based Accountability Mechanisms  
Similar to the analysis performed for earlier constructs, second-order Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) was also carried out for latent variables identified under process-based 
accountability along with their associated indicators. The CFA analysis was intended to 
confirm the factor structure of the five latent variables under this section regarding their 
contribution towards improving accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
The five process-related accountability mechanisms identified in this study includes 
Competition, Benchmarking, Monitoring, Performance Auditing and Public Sector 
Comparator (See Table 7.4 for Process-based Accountability Mechanisms).  
 
Figure 8.5: Hypothesized Model of Process-Based Accountability Mechanisms for 
PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme. 
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Based on the CFA, the five latent variables mentioned above are considered the first-order 
factors which will predict the second order factor, “Accountability in PFI/PPP Government 
Guarantee Scheme”. These first-Order factors are directly measured by a number of 
indicators that ranged from five, two, three, six and two respectively. In order to establish the 
hypothesized interrelationship among the first-order and second-order constructs, Fig 8.5 
above presents the initial model. 
 
However, in order to improve the fitness of the model, the model was examined for reliability 
and convergent validity by performing series of iterative processes. In view of this, indicators 
with low factor loadings as well as less significant relationship with the latent constructs were 
deleted from the model. One of the first-order constructs, ‘Benchmarking’ did not pass 
convergence validity and construct reliability tests. This construct also recorded a less 
significant factor loading on the second order construct less than 0.5 as recommended by 
Kline’s (2010). In addition, the two indicators measuring the latent construct ‘Benchmarking’ 
also showed less than significant loadings. This is in addition to the poor significance result 
of another indicator under the first-order factor ‘Performance Auditing’. Overall, the three 
indicators showing no significant contribution to their first-order factors include BM1= 
Comprehensive articulation of historically good practices and processes, BM2=Constant 
improvements on benchmarking techniques and PA6=Economic empowerment of local 
community. Due to the foregoing, the first order factor ‘Benchmarking was deleted from the 
model along with the less significant indicators. Upon re-specifying the hypothesized model, 
the final model recorded significant factor loading at P˃0.05 for the first and second-order 
constructs (See Fig 8.6 below for the final model of process-based accountability 
mechanisms). In terms of fitness, the model also performed strongly and represented in Table 
8.4 below. Hence, the result confirm four out of the five theoretical hypothesis developed in 
Chapter 4 (confirmed hypotheses 8, 10, 11, &12).  
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Figure 8.6: Final Model of Process-based Accountability Mechanisms for PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme  
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Table 8.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimate and Value Fit Indices for Process-based Accountability Mechanisms & Indicators 
First-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Relationship Estimate AVE CR Relationship Estimate AVE CR 
C4 <--- Competition 0.85 
0.76 0.61 
Competition<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee Scheme 0.87 
0.81 0.77 C1 <--- Competition 0.79 Public Sector Comparator<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee 
sch 
0.83 
C2<--- Competition 0.73 Monitoring<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee Scheme 0.78 
C3<--- Competition 0.68 Performance Auditing<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee 
Schem 
0.69 
C5<--- Competition 0.60  
 MODEL FIT INDICES 
M1<--- Monitoring 0.72 
0.65 0.76 
Indices Hypothetic Model Final Model 
M2<--- Monitoring 0.67 X2 ∕degree of freedom 2.004 1.021 
M3<--- Monitoring 0.64 RMSEA 0.088 0.098 
 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.821 0.854 
PA1<--- Performance Auditing 0.71 
0.69 0.73 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) 0.919 0.935 
PA2<--- Performance Auditing 0.65 Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.641 0.718 
PA5<--- Performance Auditing 0.62 Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.573 0.989 
PA3<--- Performance Auditing 0.61 Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.520 0.921 
PA4<--- Performance Auditing 0.59 Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) 2.091 0.917 
 Parsimonious Normed of Fit Index (PNFI) 0.511 0.801 
0.91 0.68 
Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability 0.801 
PSC1<--- Public Sector Comparator 0.88  
PSC2<--- Public Sector Comparator 0.79 
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8.4.4 Second Order CFA of Democratic Accountability Mechanisms  
The last second-order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) performed in this study involved 
four latent variables under democratic accountability as identified in the study (See Table 
7.5). Similar to earlier analysis, the factor structure of the four latent constructs under this 
section was examined, in terms of their contribution towards strengthening accountability in 
PPP government guarantee scheme. The four latent constructs include Social and Political 
Impact, Stakeholder Engagement, Rule of Law and Parliamentary Scrutiny. These constructs 
were modelled as first-order factors during the CFA, along with establishing their 
relationship with the second-order construct. Second-order factor in the study remains 
“Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme”. In line with theoretical 
expectations, the hypothesized model was produced and presented in Fig 8.7 below. 
 
Figure 8.7: Hypothesized Model of Democratic Accountability Mechanisms for PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme  
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Upon subjecting the hypothesized model to initial modification and re-specification tests, 
evidences of further improvement of the model was clearly shown. In view of this, the model 
was re-specified and refined in order to improve its fitness. Iterative analysis were conducted 
to examine the model for convergent validity and construct reliability, leading to the removal 
of less significant indicators. These indicators with low factor loading were believed to have 
no significant contribution towards the reliability of the model. On this basis, one latent 
variable whose indicators were affected is “Social and Political Impact (SPI)”. With two of 
its indicators reflecting very low and insignificant factor loadings, the two indicators were 
deleted from the model. These indicator comprise SPI5= Better stakeholder engagement and 
SPI6= Access to Services. After deleting the indicators, the model improved significantly and 
all the all the four first-order factors loaded significantly to the second order construct, with 
their Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite reliability coefficients showing 0.73 
and 0.81 respectively above the recommended level (Kline, 20110). This therefore confirms 
the validity of hypothesis 13, 14, 15 and 16 in line with theoretical expectation. This result 
also indicates the models conveniently passed convergent and construct reliability tests as 
evidenced by statistical significance of their Goodness-of-fit (GOF) indices. All the 
remaining indicators contribute well to their various first-order constructs, as reflected in 
their estimates. Fig 8.8 below present Final model of democratic accountability constructs 
influencing accountability in PFI/PPP government Guarantee Scheme. Additionally, Table 
8.9 presents the fit performance statistics of the model.  
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Figure 8.8: Final Model of Democratic Accountability Mechanisms for PFI/PPP 
Government   
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Table 8.5: Maximum Likelihood Estimate and Value Fit Indices for Democratic Accountability Mechanisms & Indicators 
First-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Relationship Estimate AVE CR Relationship Estimate AVE CR 
SPI1 <--- Socio-Political Impact  
0.66 0.69 
Parliamentary Scrutiny<---PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee 
Scheme 
0.85 
0.73 0.81 SPI8<--- Socio-Political Impact  Socio-Political Impact<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee 
Schem 
0.78 
SPI11<--- Socio-Political Impact  Rule of Law<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee Scheme 0.75 
SPI9<--- Socio-Political Impact  Stakeholder’s Engagement<--- PFI/PPP Govt. Guarantee 
Scheme 
0.61 
SPI3<--- Socio-Political Impact   
SPI2<--- Socio-Political Impact  MODEL FIT INDICES 
  
SE5<--- Stakeholder’s Engagement  
0.84 0.89 
Indices Hypothetic Model Final Model 
SE1<--- Stakeholder’s Engagement  X2 ∕degree of freedom 1.004 1.011 
SE2<--- Stakeholder’s Engagement  RMSEA 0.088 0.078 
SE4<--- Stakeholder’s Engagement  Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.921 0.954 
SE3<--- Stakeholder’s Engagement  Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) 0.519 0.912 
RL2<--- Rule of Law  
0.57 0.63 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.641 0.918 
RL1<--- Rule of Law  Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.713 0.889 
RL3<--- Rule of Law  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.511 0.621 
RL4<--- Rule of Law  Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) 3.791 0.981 
 Parsimonious Normed of Fit Index (PNFI) 0.611 0.821 
PS3<--- Parliamentary Scrutiny  
0.68 0.79 
Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability 0.794 
PS2<--- Parliamentary Scrutiny   
PS1<--- Parliamentary Scrutiny  
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8.5  Modelling the Structural Relationship of Outcome-Based, Process-
Based, Ethics-Based and Democratic Accountability Constructs. 
Having established the fit indices of the model and the validity of the latent variables across 
the four accountability dimensions (outcome-based, process, ethics and democratic), a final 
structural model was developed by incorporating the models. The integration allowed 
confirmation of the model structure vis-a-vis the intertwined relationship among all the first-
order constructs (accountability mechanisms). In addition, the integration of the model helped 
estimate the impact of each first-order construct on the second-order variable (accountability 
in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme). So as to develop the final model as a second-
order structural model, data imputation using AMOS SPSS was employed to produce values 
for all the first-order variables across the four accountability dimensions in the study. This 
approach ensured the study avoided criticisms of lack of validity that is often associated with 
adopting third-order reflective or composite factors (Wetzels et al., 2009). 
 
The final structural model was assessed by looking at the value of the model fits indices, 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Maximum Shared Square variance. In line with 
representations in Table 8.6 and 8.7, the final model reflected strong reliability, validity and 
model fit statistics that are higher than the recommended cut-off thresholds by Kline, 
(2005&2010) and Hu and Bentler (1998) among other scholars. As an example, all the 
constructs recorded AVE value that is above the recommended threshold of ≥0.50 (Walter et 
al., 2001; Hu and Bentler, 1998; Kline, 2010). In addition, with the model recording lower 
MSV value compared to the AVE, the result also suggested that all the indicators of each 
examined latent variables correlate more with their associated constructs than measures of 
other constructs (see Table 8.6 below). From a holistic point of view, the final structural 
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model suggested majority of the indicators contribute significantly (based on factor loadings) 
to their associated latent variables at P≤0.01. Consequently, this result reflects huge impact of 
all the measures on the overall second-order construct, which is, ‘Accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme’. The final Structural Model is represented in Fig 8.9 below. 
Table 8.6: Standardised Coefficient Estimate and validity of the Comprehensive Model 
Accountability 
Dimensions.  
 
 
Accountability Mechanisms 
 Influencing PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee 
Scheme. 
 
 
Estimate Overall 
Ranking 
of 
Estimates 
        AVE MSV 
Outcome-
Based 
Accountability 
Value for Money 0.71 
1 
≤0.000 
0.74 0.65 Risk Management 0.68 
4 ≤0.000 
Collaborative Partnership 0.50 
13 ≤0.001 
Environmental Sustainability 0.57 
10 ≤0.011 
Ethics-Based 
Accountability 
Anti-Corruption 0.57 
9 ≤0.001 0.61 0.57 
Whistle Blower Policy 0.51 
13 ≤0.01 
Process-based 
Accountability 
Competition 0.70 
2 ≤0.001 
0.81 0.77 Monitoring 0.54 
11 ≤0.001 
Performance Auditing 0.58 
8 ≤0.001 
Public Sector Comparator 0.58 
7 ≤0.001 
Democratic 
Accountability  
Socio-Political Impact 0.69 
3 ≤0.001 
0.73 0.69 Stakeholder Engagement 0.60 
6 ≤0.011 
Rule of Law 0.50 
14 ≤0.001 
Parliamentary Scrutiny 0.61 
5 ≤0.000 
 
 
233 
 
Table 8.7: Final Results of Goodness of Fit (GOF) measures 
Goodness-of-fit measures (GOF) Recommended Cut-offs of GOF 
Measures
a
 
Final 
Model Fit 
X
2
 ∕degree of freedom <5 (preferably 1 to 2) 1.021 
RMSEA <0.10 (preferably <0.08) 0.088 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 0.954 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 0.935 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 0.818 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 0.789 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 0.821 
Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 0.917 
Parsimonious Normed of Fit Index (PNFI) 0(no fit) – 1 (perfect fit) 0.711 
 
The squared multiple correlations (  ) which is estimated as the percentage of variance in 
each latent variable in the final structural model was also examined (See column three of 
Table 8.6 above). Going by the results, among the fourteen (14) individual constructs 
measuring accountability in Publicly Guaranteed PFI/PPPs, Value for Money (VFM), 
Competition (C), Social and Political Impact (SPI), Risk Management (RM), and 
Parliamentary Scrutiny (PS) explained 71%, 70%, 69%, 68% and 61% of variation in the 
model. Other latent variables contributing towards the second-order construct such as 
Stakeholder Engagement (SE), Public Sector Comparator (PSC), Performance Auditing (PA), 
Anti-Corruption (AC) and Monitoring (M) also explained 60%, 58%, 58%, 57% and 54% of 
the variance in the model respectively.    Overall, the model reflected   of 0.67, which 
suggested all the latent variables explained 67% of variance in the model. Based on the final 
model results above in Tables 8.6 & 8.7, the overall structural model for the study is 
presented in Fig 8.9 below. This final structural model was then later used to present a 
“Conceptual Framework for Evaluating Accountability PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Scheme” as shown in 8.10 below.
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Figure 8.9: Overall Structural Model for Accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme 
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Figure 8.10: Conceptual Framework for Evaluating Accountability PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme 
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Chapter Summary 
This Chapter explored the structural path towards understanding factors influencing 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee Scheme. Whilst the ultimate goal of the 
chapter was to develop a framework for accountability in PPP Infrastructure guarantee 
scheme, the chapter commenced by examining the essence of Structural Equation Model 
(SEM) in the study. The adopted tool for SEM simulation in this case is the AMOS IBM 
SPSS software version 22. For the development of the structural model, the initial phase of 
the study involved confirmation of the factor structure of the 16 latent variables identified at 
the qualitative phase. The latent variables comprise value for money, risk management, 
monitoring, and rule of law among others. However, the second phase of the analysis 
examined the impact of the latent variables on accountability in PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme. Using the qualitative and earlier quantitative analysis, the model was 
estimated through Maximum likelihood method in order to evaluate the 16 latent variables. 
Each latent construct also had different indicators ranging between 2 and 10 with the 
reliability of the measures also established via Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability 
analysis.  
 
In order to ensure all the indicators of each construct truly measured what they were meant to 
measure, various indices for determining fitness of the model with sample data were 
examined. This analysis helped examine the reliability and validity of the model. Fitness of 
the structural models was evaluated using various other sub-elements statistics such as 
Average variance extracted (AVE) Composite Reliability (CR) and Maximum Shared 
Squared Variance (MSV). In addition, series of re-specification and refinement of the model 
was carried out which led to deleting two latent constructs and some indicators that exhibited 
low factor loadings and therefore had less significant contribution to the model. The two 
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accountability constructs deleted were “benchmarking and budgetary reporting”. Upon 
deleting the constructs and indicators the fitness of the model improved significantly. For 
each category of accountability mechanisms (outcome-based, ethics, process and democratic 
mechanisms), initial models and final models were produced through SEM analysis. 
However, a final structural model was produced which explored the % variance in the model 
based on the contribution from different latent variables. Squared multiple correlation (  )   
was employed in this regard to examine the % contribution of variance by each latent 
construct to the overall model. Based on the    analysis, the study established that the % 
variance across the fourteen accountability constructs (mechanisms) was explained by the 
model and the model is therefore valid. The final structural model, was used to present a 
Conceptual framework for accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme, as the 
final output of the study.   
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Chapter Nine: Findings and Discussions of Results 
 
9.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses findings from earlier chapters in detail. The chapter is categorised 
under five headings. The first chapter discusses the differences in perception of participants 
based on job sector, regarding accountability measures for PFI/PPP government Guarantee 
Scheme. Under this section, valuable insights are provided regarding the contested world 
views of the public and private stakeholders about the right accountability that best protect 
public and private interests. The remaining four sections explore findings from structural 
equation modelling on key accountability mechanisms and indicators for evaluating PPP 
Government Guarantee scheme. The discussion was carried out under the four broad 
accountability dimensions (outcome-based, ethics, process, and democratic accountability) 
examined in the study. Table 10.1 presents the summary of all the findings that are explored 
in this chapter.  
9.1 Divergences in Perceptions based on Job Sector 
Based on results of the Man Whitney U (Non-parametric) test carried out, the null hypothesis 
was validated and proved that no significant differences exist between the public and private 
sector’s perception on all the accountability measures examined. However, out of the 78 
accountability measures in the analysis, there were three affected factors which showed 
difference across the two samples within the population. These factors are listed below: 
 C5= Adequate incentives to encourage the supply of innovation from the private 
sector, 
 ES1=Project’s contribution to social participation and inter-racial cohesion. 
 M1=Continuous monitoring of corporate and external dealings of the project 
consortium members during the period of guarantee.  
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A thorough check on the mean values of these three factors across the public and private 
sector respondents suggest an exciting perspective on innovation, public and social 
accountability cum responsibility within the UK’s public and private sectors respectively. For 
instance, whilst the private sector respondents in this study sees C5=“incentives to encourage 
supply of private sector innovation” as important for encouraging market competition, which 
in turn strengthens accountability in public procurement. The public sector respondents 
considered this factor as less important for public accountability. This rejection was based on 
the argument that the delivery of innovative solutions is already a key component of value for 
money (VFM) in PFI/PPP. By implication, the need to incentivise contractors to innovate 
does not arise. From public managers’ perspective, given the existence of level playing and 
competitive procurement process, private sector’s financial and technical innovation is a 
default value added in PFI/PPP.  As such, what is witnessed in many instances, is that 
government uses her bargaining power as the biggest purchaser of projects (contributing 
financially towards 40% of the constructed facilities in the UK), to extract maximum public 
value and leverage on competitive bidding in the PPP process. 
 
This result seemed to mirror the age long theoretical argument about facilitating innovation 
within the public and private sectors. Early scholars on innovation such as Schumpeter 
(1950), Rosenberg (1976) have debated the role of the private sector in innovation and 
invention. In a popular thesis, Schumpeter (1950) hypothesized that the main driver of 
innovation is market competition and argued that since the government does not engage in 
competitive markets, it is less innovative and therefore have to incentivise private innovation. 
However, opposing studies such as Albury (2005), Moore and Hartley (2008) and Bloch and 
Bugge (2013), have challenged this assumption as erroneous. According to Bloch and Bugge 
(2013), the public sector operates different mechanisms for driving innovation and 
competition. Hence, it views innovation as a cardinal aspect of public policy and has been at 
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the fore front of driving innovation even in the private sector using multifarious catalysts for 
the last two decades (Moore and Hartley, 2008). Such catalysts involves harnessing the 
creative skills and ideas of public sector workforce, politicians and other necessity-created 
solutions that changes the course of government’s thinking and methodologies (Ansell and 
Torfing, 2014; Van Grembergen and De Haes, 2017). 
 
These divergent views, typifies the current reality within public policy environments, with the 
public sector working to curtail rising public expenditures whilst trying to achieve value for 
money (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; Bing et al., 2005). Government is also faced with the 
need to encourage private sector driven infrastructure developments on another front (De 
Marco et al., 2016). However, for smooth delivery of private sector led infrastructure 
developments, emphasis on mutually beneficial and collaborative workings have been 
popular especially in the context of PPPs (Sørensen and Torfing, 2016; Torfing, 2016). 
According to Winch and Courtney (2007) and Torfing (2016), innovation in PPP involves 
risks and as such, requires a win-win incentive structures that help both parties achieve their 
objectives. Such collaborative approach not only encourages those taking the risks to deliver 
innovations but also offers enormous social and economic benefits to public sector. These 
benefits may be reflected in terms of cost savings to government, rise in economic growth 
and productivity, including affordable and accessible services and facilities to greater number 
of the people (Zhang et al., 2016). 
 
Another accountability measure which respondents disagreed on is ES1=“Project’s 
contribution to social participation and inter-racial cohesion”. Going by results of the non-
parametric test, the overall average mean value of the factor suggested high ranking of the 
factor by public sector respondents. From public perspective, this factor is seen as an 
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important accountability measure and relevant for government guarantee-backed PPP 
projects. On the other hand, the private sector rated the factor as less important. Hence, this 
result raises arguments regarding social accountability and responsibility in public 
procurements. From government’s perspective, project delivery is a means of fulfilling 
government’s social contract with the people (Smyth and Edkins, 2007; Zou et al., 2014). 
This means government pursues social and developmental goals that creates equitable 
opportunities and engenders social participation across the rank and files (Biesenthal and 
Wilden, 2014). Little wonder public infrastructure procurements appraisals in the last decade 
have focused much on projects’ wider impact and greater benefit to citizens (Rwelamila et 
al., 2014). Often being the one to contend with rising social inequalities in the society, amidst 
unprecedented global migration, governments have had to intensify her capacity to fulfil 
socio-economic responsibilities using public spending. With greater citizen education and 
engagement in public policy discourse (Strongman, 2015), the need to address social 
demands with public projects cannot be overemphasized. 
 
Nevertheless, the private sectors’ perspective on “Project’s contribution to social 
participation and inter-racial cohesion” has nothing to do with callous disregard for projects’ 
social impact. However, from the private sectors point of view, the enormous responsibility 
of encouraging interracial cohesion and social participation, lies with policy formulators. 
According to Young and Grant (2015), whilst project delivery incorporates benefits 
realisation and the fulfilment of projects’ desired and expected outcomes, societal demands 
are dynamic and fast changing. Hence, the delivery of innovative and creative projects may 
only serve as palliatives, but addressing social cum interracial cohesion is a more complex 
policy goal whose realisation cannot to be bench-marked against a single public policy point 
or collection of projects (Thompson, 2015).  
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The third accountability measure disputed across the two broad spectrums of respondents in 
the study is “M1=Continuous monitoring of corporate and external dealings of the project 
consortium members during the period of guarantee”. An evaluation of the average mean 
value of the factor revealed the well-known dilemma and intricate nature of public 
accountability in PFI/PPP contracting. Whilst the public-sector respondents considers this 
factor as a requisite measure for strengthening public accountability in publicly guaranteed 
PPPs, the private sector regards this factor as less significant. Instructively, the private sector 
is usually wary of any attempt suggesting government’s meddling in the corporate 
arena/privacy and thus sees such move as unfriendly to business environment.  
 
From public perspective, this result highlights the complexities encountered when interacting 
or intervening in a competitive market environment. Whilst government acts as catalyst that 
enables free market interaction by providing enabling environment, relationships like PPP 
contracting and public sector guarantee often blur the lines of public accountability (Willems, 
2014). Although, government grants guarantees to spur private sector investment, the danger 
that its bureaucratic nature makes it ill-equipped at carrying out robust information gathering 
of guarantee beneficiaries may jeopardize public interest (Agusman et al., 2014). The 
intertwined nature of public-private partnerships also mean that government has political 
interest in projects being guaranteed, which may therefore affect the rigour in accountability 
scrutiny (Strongman, 2015). As such, a good way of strengthening public accountability 
when granting government guarantee to PPP projects is to ensure close monitoring of the   
project and corporate related dealings  of consortium members. This helps to identify morally 
hazardous behaviour which may jeopardise public interest on the projects being delivered. 
Result of the hypotheses examined on accountability mechanisms for assessing PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme is shown in Table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1: Result of the Hypotheses Examined on Accountability Mechanisms for Assessing PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme 
Accountability 
Dimensions 
Accountability 
Mechanisms 
Theoretical Hypotheses 
Examined 
Hypotheses 
Validity 
Result 
Outcome-
Based 
Accountability 
Dimension 
Value for Money H1: Determining the Value for money in guaranteed projects will contribute positively towards public accountability 
in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme. 
Supported 
Risk Management H2: Effective public sector risk management will strengthen public accountability in PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme 
Supported 
Collaborative Partnership H3: Better collaboration between government and private sector parties on publicly guaranteed projects will 
strengthen accountability in government guarantee scheme to PFI/PPPs. 
Supported 
Budgetary Reporting H4: Reporting government’s contingent liabilities in publicly guaranteed PFI/PPPs on national budgets will 
improve public accountability in government guarantee scheme for PPPs. 
Rejected 
Environmental Sustainability H5: Ensuring sustainable project delivery will strengthen public accountability in Government Guarantee Scheme 
for PFI/PPP projects 
Supported 
Ethics-based  
Accountability 
Dimension 
Whistle Blowing H6: Encouraging whistle blowing among employees involved in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme will have 
positive impact on public accountability. 
Supported 
Anti-Corruption H7: Prevention of corrupt practices and dishonest behaviours in the handling of PFI/PPP government guarantee 
scheme will have a positive impact on public accountability 
Supported 
Process-based 
Accountability 
Dimension 
Competition H8: Competitive project selection process under government guarantee scheme for PFI/PPPs will have positive 
impact on public accountability 
Supported 
Benchmarking H9: Benchmarking potential guaranteed PPP projects against historically good standards and processes under the 
government guarantee scheme will have positive impact on public accountability. 
Rejected 
Monitoring H10: Effective monitoring of government guarantee scheme, actors and beneficiary PFI/PPP projects will have 
positive impact on public accountability 
Supported 
Performance Auditing H11: Greater effective performance auditing of projects benefitting from government guarantee scheme will have 
positive impact on public accountability. 
Supported 
Public Sector Comparator H12: Adopting public sector comparator for deciding guarantee-deserving infrastructure projects will have positive 
implication for public accountability under PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
Supported 
Democratic 
Accountability 
Dimension 
Socio-Political Impact H13: Robust social and political impact evaluation of PPP projects at the government guaranteed scheme level will 
have positive effect on public accountability. 
Supported 
Stakeholder Engagement H14: Effective management of all stakeholders involved in government guaranteed PFI/PPPs will have positive 
impact on public accountability 
Supported 
Rule of Law H15: Upholding the rule of law in the management of PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme will have positive 
impact on public accountability 
Supported 
Parliamentary Scrutiny H16: Parliamentary scrutiny of public managers’ decisions and actions as they affect effective management of 
government’s fiscal liabilities on guarantee schemes to PPPs will strengthen public accountability 
Supported 
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9.2 Outcome-based Accountability Mechanisms and Its Impact on 
PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme. 
 
As explored in the theoretical review chapter, fulfilment of public policy goals have been 
favoured in some quarters ahead of the usual adherences to ground norms and processes of 
formal accountability in public sector management. This section therefore discusses results of 
outcome-based accountability mechanisms as regards the evaluation of prospective publicly 
guaranteed PPPs.  Based on results of the structural equation model conducted in this study, 
four out of the five accountability mechanisms examined were rated highly by respondents. 
The accountability mechanisms were considered very critical towards strengthening public 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. The accountability mechanisms 
include the following in their ranking order: 
 Value for Money (VFM) 
 Risk Management (RM) 
 Environmental Sustainability (ES) and  
 Collaborative Partnership (CP) 
9.2.1 Value for Money (VFM) and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme 
 
With a standardised regression weight of (       ) of 0.79 at 99% significance level (as 
shown in Fig 8.2), Value for money (VFM) emerged as the topmost accountability 
mechanism essential for evaluating potential projects under the infrastructure guarantee 
scheme. VFM also showed group reliability Cronbach’s α of 0.73 suggesting the 
accountability mechanism’s huge impact on the overall model. The value of 0.71 percentage 
(%) variance, based on Fig 8.9 also suggested the predictive influence of the factor on the 
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model. This results confirms the unanimous agreement of both public and private sector 
stakeholders on the core essence of value addition in public sector transactions. This value 
measurement approach is focused on ensuring publicly funded facilities are delivered 
economically, efficiently and effectively (Raisbeck et al., 2010).  As argued by Bracci et al. 
(2015), albeit reducing cost of public procurements remains a key issue under austerity, 
significant value is attached to project delivery to time, quality and within budget (Oyedele, 
2013). In line with the perspective of Ismail (2013), the use of government guarantee 
schemes needs to be justified in terms of the public value it brings to taxpayers. Zeleti et al. 
(2016) also suggested that, unless government obtains value that is equal or greater to the 
incentives derived by private investors, public guarantee schemes may become a mere 
generous reward for doing nothing. From the perspective of Adrian and Ashcraft (2016), 
under the current austerity, government’s drive towards balancing the budgets makes VFM 
extremely essential when considering government possible liabilities. In such instance, 
deriving maximum value from fiscal transactions becomes more crucial than the cost incurred 
in the procurement (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016). Public sector guarantees must therefore offer 
value to public sector in terms of the general socio-economic and cost savings benefits from 
the project delivery. According to HM Treasury (2014), VFM evaluation in government 
guarantee also involves estimating the impact of guaranteed projects on economic growth.  
As argued by Shan et al. (2010) where competing projects are involved in soliciting 
government guarantee, it is in the public interest to examine the economic benefits accruable 
to the society from each project. Going further, based on the results as shown in Fig 8.2, the 
top-five drivers of value for money (VFM) for PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme are, 
VFM 1=Least procurement cost- (standardised estimate of .088), VFM3=Equitable risk 
allocation among project parties (standardised estimate of .083), VFM6=Competitive 
bidding process (standardised estimate of .077), VFM2=Service quality/output specification 
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(standardised estimate of .072), VFM4=Minimal whole life costing of project (standardised 
estimate of .065). Studies such as Atmo and Duffield (2014) and Eadie et al. (2013), have 
suggested one of the cardinal ingredients of VFM is economy. Project affordability allows 
PPP projects to justify their selection against traditional procurements and provide value in 
terms of cost savings (Oyedele, 2013).   HM Treasury (2014) describes risk allocation in 
PFI/PPP as the equitable transfer of risk to the party that best manages and controls the risk. 
Effectively allocating project risks has enormous benefits to both public and private sector as 
it ensures parties can focus on their responsibilities with less distraction. Risk Management 
also helps project parties have a clearer and longer-term view of mitigating strategies (Chou 
and Pramudawardhani, 2015). Better understanding of project risks makes future projects a 
bit easier to manage and while also encourage better synergy among stakeholders (Atmo and 
Duffield, 2014). According to Liu et al. (2014), whilst output specifications may be used to 
ensure quality in public procurement, optimum combination of whole life cost and service 
quality to users is essential for value assessment in PFI/PPP. According to Arthur Andersen 
and Enterprise LSE report (commissioned by Treasury Taskforce 2000), PFI/PPP project 
performance is a measure of how well projects meet pre-agreed technical and operational 
standards specified by the concession. Outputs specification also relate to service quality in 
which the project contractor is expected to deliver innovative solutions that meets or 
surpassed client’s expectations (Rintamaki et al., 2007; Coulson, 2008). Due to high risk 
profile of PPPs (Ball et al., 2003), projects risks must be equitably distributed to parties best 
capable of managing such risks (Wojewnik-Filipkowska and Trojanowski, 2012). Different 
studies have also suggested that VFM may be justified if a competitive bidding process that 
allows creative and value added options are provided (Eadie et al., 2013; Ismail, 2013; Atmo 
and Duffield, 2014). 
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9.2.2  Risk Management (RM) and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. 
 
Risk management (RM) was rated as the second most important outcome-based 
accountability mechanism in terms of its impact on PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
This mechanism recorded standardised regression weight (       ) of 0.71 at 99% 
significance level (as shown in Fig 8.2). RM also reflected group reliability Cronbach’s α of 
0.81, indicating the accountability mechanism’s influence on the overall model. The value of 
0.68 percentage (%) variance, based on Fig 8.9 also indicated the predictive influence of the 
factor on the model. This result succinctly highlights studies such as Irwin (2007), Wibowo 
and Kochendoerfer (2010), and Atmo and Duffield (2014), who argued that, guarantees to 
PPPs are associated with a number of potential risks, which must be carefully evaluated. Due 
to the nature of PPPs, risks such as default risk by the guarantee beneficiary, construction 
related risks; risks associated with insufficient demand/usage of the project are all possible 
incidences, which may create challenges leading to a call on government guarantees. Albeit, 
public guarantees pose risks with huge fiscal consequences for government especially during 
uncertain economic conditions (Setiawan and Surachman, 2016), most policy formulators 
appear passive about these risks and have continued to guarantee many PFI/PPPs (Owolabi et 
al., 2015). As shown in Fig 8.2, evidences from the study indicate four (4) most significant 
measures of risk management influencing accountability in government guarantees for 
PFI/PPPs. These indicators are listed below in their order of ranking (based on their 
regression weights): RM2=Integrating risk management systems into public sector evaluative 
frameworks (with a regression weight=0.87 and reliability coefficient of 0.713); 
RM1=Improved public sector risk management competences/capabilities (with a regression 
weight=0.79 and reliability coefficient of 0.710); RM4=Proactive evaluation of past risk 
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events (with a regression weight=0.74 and reliability coefficient of 0.704); RM3=Regular 
risk identification and reporting (with a regression weight=0.68 and reliability coefficient of 
0.729). Findings from this results mirror recent discussions on the management of public 
sector contingent liabilities (Carbonara et al., 2015; Hwang et al., 2013; Chan et al., 2014). 
As suggested by Carbonara et al. (2015), government’s efforts towards developing their own 
robust risk management systems have been very little. As such, an integrated risk framework 
is needed to cope with the risks involved in underwriting very risky infrastructure projects for 
which guarantees are often applied (Carbonara, 2015). In a related study, Kumar et al. (2017) 
suggested, the better the in-house competency of the public sector in terms of market-driven 
risk pricing and evaluation of project applications, the better the risk decision on guarantee. 
Chan (2014) also argued that risk assessment of guarantee applications (projects) should be 
holistic as to cover the potential impact of the project’s contribution towards fiscal risks. 
Such evaluation should be comprehensive by looking into past, present risk and possible 
future events which may impact on the project and thereby affect the guarantee (Chen et al., 
2017). Effective reporting of such risks towards creating an in-house knowledge-based could 
be useful for sensitivity or scenario analysis. This will ultimately help government better 
prepare for risks on guarantee (Liu et al., 2014). 
9.2.3 Environmental Sustainability (ES) and its implication for accountability in 
PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme. 
The third most important outcome-based accountability mechanism for evaluating PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme is environmental sustainability. Going by its standardised 
regression weight of (βValue) of 0.65, the factor is significant at 95% confidence interval. 
The composite reliability for this factor also show reliability of the factor at 0.65 whilst 
accounting for 0.57 percent of variance of in model. This result confirms the collective 
concern for sustainable environment across public and private sector respectively. Hirsh 
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(2014), described sustainability as the adaptation of individual behaviours and organisational 
policies to the long-term survival of human society. Whilst sustainability have diverse 
perspectives across different fields (Hueskes et al., 2017), the environmental management 
perspective of sustainability in particular focuses on resource efficiency (Carrillo-Hermosilla 
et al., 2010; Frondel et al., 2008; Potts, 2010). This standpoint emphasises the utilisation of 
natural resources in a manner that generates lasting benefits to the population of a country, 
while protecting the environment (Bell and Morse, 2013; Chambers et al., 2014). In the UK, 
sustainability is a critical policy and regulatory issue, with most aspects of public sector and 
corporate dealings needing to comply and promote sustainability practices (Radnor and 
Johnston, 2013; Ball et al., 2014). Difference policy efforts to encourage sustainability 
comprise energy efficiency in constructed facilities (Potts, 2010), construction and food 
waste minimisation (Ajayi et al., 2015), Landfill Tax and Climate Change Levy (Akadiri and 
Fadiya, 2013), Sustainable Business and Sustainable Procurements among others (Walker 
and Brammer, 2009/2011; Lawrence et al., 2013). Under the UK’s sustainable procurement 
agenda, all public sector procurements are legally required to conform with various 
sustainability laws and standards of the government (Brammer and Walker, 2011; Meehan 
and Bryde, 2011). With government procuring nearly 40% of the nation’s construction 
activities (NAO, 2001; Eadie et al., 2011), it therefore suffice to say that projects delivered 
through public-private arrangements or even guaranteed by government requires greater 
demand for outcomes in terms of sustainability. Going by findings as reflected in Fig 8.2, the 
top-four drivers of environmental sustainability in this study are ES5=Compliance with 
regulatory standards on sustainable project delivery (with a regression weight=0.87 and 
reliability coefficient of 0.729); ES4=Project’s contribution to reduction in material wastage 
(with a regression weight=0.82 and reliability coefficient of 0.714); ES8=Contribution to 
economic and social prosperity of surrounding communities (with a regression weight=0.75 
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and reliability coefficient of 0.726); ES3=Adoption of energy efficient solutions (with a 
regression weight=0.67 and reliability coefficient of 0.757). According to Zou et al. (2015), 
government often play a vital role in promoting sustainable development by enacting laws 
and ensuring compliance to sustainability laws. These laws in most instances comprise 
policies targeting reduction in carbon emission, reduction in food and other material wastage 
and sustainable procurements (Bing et al., 2005). As part of government’s wider 
sustainability plans, projects’ contribution towards economic prosperity and social benefits of 
host community is also considered a key factor in sustainability (Hoffman, 2009). This has to 
do with improving the quality of life and environment in communities (Khadaroo et al., 
2008). 
9.2.4 Collaborative Partnership and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. 
 
Collaborative Partnership (CP) is the least ranked outcome-based accountability mechanism 
regarding its impact on PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. This mechanism showed a 
regression weight (βValue) of 0.64 at 95% significance level (as shown in Fig 8.2). CP also 
reflected group reliability Cronbach’s α of 0.781 indicating the accountability mechanism’s 
contribution to the overall model. The value of 0.50 percentage (%) variance, based on Fig 
8.9 also indicated the predictive influence of the factor on the model. According to Zou et al. 
(2014), evidences have shown that most successful PPP arrangements are the ones in which 
greater collaboration exist between the government and private parties. When PPPs enjoy 
government guarantee backing, collaboration among project parties becomes even more 
essential considering the intertwined objectives of government and huge stake on such 
projects (Nugroho, 2014). As suggested by Smyth and Edkins (2007), developing non-
adversarial relationship among parties in PFI/PPPs is seen by the government as an effective 
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way to improve project effectiveness. The complex nature of PFI/PPP projects and the long 
time frame between conception and project completion also suggest robust management of 
relationships among parties is crucial (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; Smyth and Edkins, 
2007). As shown in Fig 8.2, evidences from the study indicate four (4) most significant 
measures of collaborative partnership influencing accountability in government guarantees 
for PFI/PPPs. These indicators are listed below in their order of ranking (based on their 
regression weights): CP1= Open and honest communication among project parties (with a 
regression weight=0.77 and reliability coefficient of 0.772); CP2= Consortium senior 
officials’ commitment towards successful collaboration (with a regression weight=0.73 and 
reliability coefficient of 0.712); CP6= Early warning signals for detecting and solving 
conflicts or crisis (with a regression weight=0.67 and reliability coefficient of 0.724); CP3= 
Existence of clearly defined relationship and communication sharing strategy(with a 
regression weight=0.61 and reliability coefficient of 0.755). This result highlight earlier 
studies such as Yang et al. (2011), Stapel and Schneider (2014), and Roumboutsos and 
Pantelias (2015) on the critical role of collaborative partnership in PFI/PPP cum government 
guarantee scheme. El-Gohary et al. (2006), Yang et al. (2011) and Stapel and Schneider 
(2014), suggested open and honest communication among project parties as a means of 
building trust and ensuring better cooperation. Such transparent and honest dialogue is crucial 
for avoiding the usual incidence of information asymmetries and moral hazards associated 
with government guarantee schemes (Zou et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2016). In line with this 
perspective, Jelodar et al. (2016) and Pal et al (2017) suggested that commitment and 
participation of senior officials of project consortiums is needed to drive the required vision 
for successful partnership. As such top management efforts will ensure that the relationship 
being built is not superficial (Pal et al., 2017). Hwang (2013) also suggested other factors 
encouraging collaboration in PPPs such as existence of clearly defined relationship and 
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communication sharing strategy among project parties, commitment of the project delivery 
team (Torchia et al., 2015;); fair risk allocation among public-private parties (Du et al., 
2016), multidisciplinary team to be responsible for handling collaboration with project parties 
(Noble and Jones, 2006), integrating information systems with all projects parties (Weihe, 
2008), and early warning signals for detecting and solving conflicts or crisis (Meng, 2015). 
9.3 Ethics-based Accountability Mechanisms and Its Impact on PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. 
 
Results of the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) and reliability analysis also suggested 
the important influence of accountability mechanisms evaluating actors’ moral conscience 
and ethical behaviours in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. Thus, this section 
deliberates results of ethics-based accountability mechanisms, in terms of their significance in 
evaluating publicly guaranteed projects. Going by findings from the SEM, the two 
accountability mechanisms examined in the study contribute positively towards strengthening 
accountability in PFI/PPP Government guarantee scheme. These accountability mechanisms 
comprise: 
 AC=Anti-corruption 
 WB=Whistle Blowing 
These ethics-based mechanisms are extensively discussed below as they impact on PPP 
infrastructure guarantee scheme. 
9.3.1 Anti-Corruption and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP Government 
Guarantee Scheme. 
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With a standardised regression weight of ( βValue) of 0.79 at 99% significance level (as 
shown in Fig 8.4), Anti-Corruption (AC) emerged as the topmost ethics-based accountability 
mechanism in the study, based on its significance in evaluating potential projects under the 
infrastructure guarantee scheme. The composite reliability and group Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability coefficients for this factors indicated 0.81 and 0.769 respectively. This indicated 
the enormous reliability of the factor and its contribution towards the overall model. In 
addition, Anti-corruption as an accountability contributes 0.57 of percentage (%) variance in 
the overall model. This result confirms the agreement of all the respondents on the need to 
strengthen accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme through addressing the 
issue of policy abuse and corruption. Theorists described ethical accountability as a concept 
that focuses on the actors’ moral conscience and the feeling of being responsible or 
accountable (Finlay, 1996; Zadek, 1998; Shearer, 2002; Banks, 2004; Frederickson and 
Ghere, 2013). In public administration, ethical mechanisms of accountability emphasizes 
institutional systems for curtailing indiscretions among public actors and holding them 
accountable to certain moral standards (Mulgan, 2000). One of the biggest concerns in 
government guarantee scheme is the problem of corruption arising from moral hazards and 
other vulnerabilities (Rose-Ackerman, 2013). Corruption is described as a fraudulent and 
unethical conduct by a person or persons seeking to obtain underserved personal advantage in 
a transaction (Rose-Ackerman, 2013). According to Allen et al. (2015), corruption can have 
debilitating impacts on policy goals under government guarantee schemes and by creating 
rooms for resource leakages and abuse of institutions (Philip and Peter, 2013). From the 
perspective of Moser et al. (2008) and Bringselius (2014), the challenge for government with 
guarantee schemes is not only about fulfilling targeted objectives but avoiding vulnerabilities 
that could encourage opportunistic behaviours from beneficiaries and applicants alike.  As 
such, effective management of state guarantees is often a tricky one given government’s 
254 
 
limited in-house expertise in complex financial structuring (Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013). 
According to Bringselius (2014), guarantee schemes are often replete with reports of different 
corrupt behaviours like false or incomplete information declaration (Huang and Wang, 2012), 
conflict of interest in decision-making, undue political influence, fraud in evaluations 
(OECD, 2016), dubious documentation (Bringselius, 2014), and sometimes weak due 
diligence and scrutiny by public officials (Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Rowell and Connelly, 
2012). Going by the results, the top-four measures contributing towards anti-corruption as an 
accountability mechanisms are identified below: AC1=Strong stance against corruption in 
government guarantee schemes (with a regression weight=0.81 and reliability coefficient of 
0.719); AC5= Robust due diligence appraisals through extensive information gathering (with 
a regression weight=0.77 and reliability coefficient of 0.757); AC4= Effective sanctions 
against corrupt practices (with a regression weight=0.71 and reliability coefficient of 0.766); 
AC3= Effective internal and external oversight and control (with a regression weight=0.65 
and reliability coefficient of 0.635).These results confirms studies such as Moser et al. 
(2008), Agusman et al. (2014), Bringselius (2014), and OECD (2016) who have suggested 
strong stance against corruption in guarantee schemes while also highlighting different 
strategies for combatting such menace. According to OECD (2016), clear, adequate and 
timely information about happenings, processes and rules creates level playing field for 
businesses and ensure transparency. Investors often require adequate information in order to 
make business decisions in terms of how government-support-schemes benefits businesses. 
Also, Turner (2011) suggested effective internal and external oversight and control as a key 
mechanism for preventing risk-induced behaviour among public officials and the private 
sector in state aid arrangements. In another study, Campbell et al. (2009) and Niehaus and 
Sukhtankar (2013), also identified effective sanctions against corrupt practices as an 
important panacea for curbing corruption in public procurements. According to Campbell et 
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al. (2009), sanctions against corruption and similar tendencies helps create deterrence and 
stimulate compliance among officials and stakeholders. In addition, Agusman et al. (2014), 
suggested more robust due diligence appraisals through extensive information gathering, will 
ensure better reaction to fraud by public officials. 
9.3.2 Whistle Blowing and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP Government 
Guarantee Scheme 
 
Whistle Blowing (WB) was ranked the second important ethics-based accountability 
mechanism in terms of significant influence on accountability in PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme. This mechanism showed a regression weight (βValue) of 0.66 at 95% 
significance level (as shown in Fig 8.4). WB also showed group reliability Cronbach’s alpha 
of 0.780 indicating the accountability mechanism’s significant contribution towards the 
overall model. The value of 0.50 percentage (%) variance, based on Fig 8.9 also indicated the 
predictive influence of the factor on the model. This result very much highlights existing 
studies on accountability and whistle blowing as it affects government guarantee scheme 
(Lambert and Lapsley, 2006; Whitfield, 2007; Spence and Dinan, 2011; Kew and Stredwick, 
2016). From the perspectives of Maroun and Atkins (2014), Alleyne et al. (2013) and Henik 
(2015), whistle blowing has become an important governance mechanism amidst rising cases 
of corporate scandals in many multinational institutions. Within the UK public sector, reports 
have shown that more employees are passing on information against perceived violations and 
wrongdoings especially in the Health, social services and banking sectors (Vandekerckhove 
and Lewis, 2012; Moberly, 2012; Jones and Kelly, 2014). The UK Government’s whistle 
blowing law (Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998) has also recently widened offences 
covered under the Employment Rights Act 1996, to include disclosures relating to personal 
grievances such as work place bullying, discrimination and harassment (NAO, 2014; 
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Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2015). However, whilst voluntary disclosure 
culture has gained acceptance in some sectors (Outterson, 2012; Reader and Gillespie, 2013), 
much has not been seen in public procurements. The UK public procurements especially in 
PFI/PPPs have remained tainted by criticisms of commercial confidentiality of financing 
terms including secrecy regarding true fiscal cost of government guarantees (Koenig‐
Archibugi and Macdonald, 2013; Jones and Kelly, 2014). Hence, employee-voluntary 
disclosures have long been canvassed as a necessary mechanism for strengthening 
accountability in such hybrid contracts (Lambert and Lapsley, 2006; Whitfield, 2007; Spence 
and Dinan, 2011; Kew and Stredwick, 2016). Going by findings as reflected in Fig 8.4, the 
three important factors contributing towards whistle blowing as an important ethics-based 
accountability mechanism comprise: WB2= Adequate protection for whistle blowers against 
institutional witch-hunt (with a regression weight=0.74 and reliability coefficient of 0.741); 
WB3= Implementing procedurally correct actions to address reported wrongdoings (with a 
regression weight=0.68 and reliability coefficient of 0.772); and WB1= Effective institutional 
arrangement to the inculcate culture of openness among staff (with a regression weight=0.61 
and reliability coefficient of 0.766). In line with Brown (2013), Miceli and Near (2013), 
Jones, Bashir et al. (2011) and Ash (2016) adequate protection for whistle blowers against 
institutional witch hunt or ostracism is an essential measure for encouraging accountability in 
public sector transactions. Protections such as confidentiality of whistle-blower identity and 
protection of whistle blowers’ personal and employment rights will help facilitate 
transparency and accountability (Kelly, 2014; Ash, 2016). In addition, implementing 
procedurally correct actions to address reported wrongdoings is suggested to help strengthen 
openness and compliance (Brown, 2013; Miceli and Near, 2013).  Jones and Kelly (2014) 
have also argued in favour of effective institutional arrangement to inculcate culture of 
openness among staff through open meetings. This, according to Jones and Kelly (2014) 
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helps staff especially new employees to freely express their concerns while also aligning 
them with organisational culture of openness from inception. 
9.4 Process-based Accountability Mechanisms and Its Impact on 
PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme. 
As reflected in the literature, the traditional mechanisms of formal accountability are often 
reflected in systems, procedures and processes especially in fields such as accounting and 
public management. This results thus confirm the validity of these process-based 
accountability mechanisms as they contribute towards strengthening accountability in 
PFI/PPP Government guarantee scheme. As a result, this section elaborates the results of 
process-based accountability mechanisms.  Going by results of the structural equation model 
(SEM) in the study, four out of the five accountability mechanisms evaluated were highly 
ranked by respondents as essential for strengthening public accountability in PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme. These accountability mechanisms comprise the following in 
their ranking order: 
 Competition (C) 
 Public Sector Comparator (PSC) 
 Monitoring (M) 
 Performance Auditing (PA). 
These highly ranked process-related mechanisms and their associated impact on 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme are explained in details below. 
9.4.1 Competition and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP Government 
Guarantee Scheme 
 
258 
 
Given a standardised factor coefficient of 0.87 at 95% significance level (as shown in Fig 
8.4), Competition (C) emerged as the topmost process-based accountability mechanism in the 
study. This is based on its significance in evaluating potential projects under the 
infrastructure guarantee scheme. The composite reliability and group Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability coefficients for this factor recorded 0.61 and 0.773 respectively. This indicated the 
huge reliability of the factor and its contribution towards the overall model. In addition, 
competition as an accountability contributes 0.70 of percentage (%) variance in the overall 
model. This result confirms the agreement of all the respondents on the need to strengthen 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme via creating a competitive market 
environment. This result confirms Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015), who described market 
competition as an essential ingredient of free-market innovations like the PFI/PPPs. 
According to Kappelman et al. (2006), competition is described as an instrument of choice 
that allows the elimination of market inefficiencies by facilitating rivalry among suppliers 
within an economic system. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) suggested that when firms 
compete to achieve goals such as maximising profits, increasing market share or bigger 
turnover, innovation and value is brought to the market thereby resulting in efficient 
allocation of resources. In PFI/PPP procurement, the role of market competition has also 
become pivotal to cost efficiency and value for money considerations (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 
2015). Through competitive bidding and tendering processes, public authorities are able to 
award PFI/PPP concessions to contractors based on different value indicators like least 
procurement cost, innovation, performance, quality, and equitable risk transfer among project 
parties (Smyth and Edkins, 2006; Galford and Drapeau, 2004; Robinson and Scott, 2009). 
However, when PFI/PPP concessions are provided government support via guarantee 
schemes, accountability gaps become noticeable, especially because competitive bidding is 
not known with government guarantee approval processes (NAO, 2015). Such flaw, 
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according to the NAO (2015), may result in underserving projects benefiting from 
government support, irrespective of their unsuitability. As such, studies have suggested the 
need for a competitive process in choosing guarantee-deserving public projects (NAO, 2015; 
Whyte, 2015; Owolabi et al., 2015). Such competitive arrangement is believed could help 
free up UK’s infrastructure finance market space for potential investors, and thus enhance 
efficiency in the guarantee scheme (Georghiou et al., 2014; NAO, 2015). As reflected in Fig 
8.6, the top-four accountability measures impacting on market competition as an 
accountability mechanism are highlighted below: C4= Transparent bidding and tendering 
process (with a regression weight=0.85 and reliability coefficient of 0.766); C1= Increasing 
the number of potential bidders or applicants (with a regression weight=0.79 and reliability 
coefficient of 0.741); C2= Availability of in-house commercial skills within the public sector 
(with a regression weight=0.73 and reliability coefficient of 0.741); C3= Open and 
comprehensive bidding parameters and requirements (with a regression weight=0.65 and 
reliability coefficient of 0.716). These findings align with earlier studies such as Raisbeck et 
al. (2010), Gangwar and Raghuram (2015), and Georghiou et al. (2014), who suggested 
transparent bidding and tendering process as a key measure of competition in public sector. A 
transparent tendering arrangement involves open and comprehensive bidding parameters for 
creating an unbiased competitive procurement (Uyarra, 2013; Gong and Zhou, 2015). 
According to Loader (2013), transparent tendering and comprehensive parameters allows all 
bidders have access to similar information which helps eliminate unfair advantage.  In line 
with Georghiou et al. (2014), increasing the number of potential bidders or applicants is also 
suggested to stimulate competition in public sector bidding processes. Such atmosphere of 
competition requires level playing field among participants to prevent skewing the process in 
favour of select few (Gangwar and Raghuram, 2015). These will therefore encourage 
investors to compete through innovative and quality solutions that bring better value to the 
260 
 
public sector (OECD, 2011). In another study, Botswana (2013) argued that the amount of in-
house commercial skills available to the public sector will influence government’s ability to 
create and drive competitive procurement. According to Botswana, government requires 
sufficient in-house expertise to understand targeted markets, including its various attributes 
and trends that may jeopardise the desired competition. In addition, Lember et al. (2014) 
proposed adequate incentives to encourage the supply of innovation from the private sector.  
According to Lember, such incentives could catalyse bidder competition since most 
participants will seek to take advantage of such incentives to drive down their cost. 
9.4.2 Public Sector Comparator and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. 
 
Public Sector Comparator (PSC) was ranked the second most important process-based 
accountability mechanism in terms of its impact on PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
This accountability mechanism showed standardised regression weight (       ) of 0.83 at 
99% significance level (as shown in Fig 8.6). PSC also recorded group reliability Cronbach’s 
α of 0.764 indicating the accountability mechanism’s influence on the overall model. The 
value of 0.58 percentage (%) variance, based on Fig 8.9 also indicated the predictive 
influence of the factor on the model. PSC is commonly used in public procurement decision-
making as a yardstick against which private investment proposals are compared (Khadaroo, 
2008). If, when converted into present values, the private costs are lower than the PSC, then 
the proposal is deemed to be more efficient than conventional procurement (English, 2007). 
Thus, PSCs are central in the decision-making process about where, when and how to use 
privately-financed infrastructure solutions—such as those encouraged under PFI/PPP (HM 
Treasury 2003). 
 
261 
 
The UK HM Treasury claims the use of the PSC is designed in a way that ensures no 
preference for any particular model of infrastructure financing (HM Treasury, 2007). 
However, various criticisms of the PSC abound in the PFI/PPP literature ranging from the 
apparent bias of ministers and other political actors for PSC (Coulson, 2008), arbitrary choice 
of parameters to suite PFI as against traditional procurement (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002), 
contentious arguments about possible cost savings from PFI and bias of public evaluators for 
PFI among others (Hodge and Greve, 2007). In a scathing remark against the PSC, Ball et al. 
(2001), described the tool as lacking in objectivity, clarity and necessary information 
regarding methodological approach. However, despite these disapprovals, PSC remains the 
important tool for deciding PFI procurements and important considerations like value for 
money, risk transfer, and projects’ impact assessments among others still form the core of it 
(Cruz and Marques, 2013). In the context of publicly guaranteed PFI/PPPs, the possible use 
of the PSC will attract serious accountability questions. One of the big questions is the 
supposed relevance of the PSC in government guarantee program, and whether the 
comparison of overall benefit derived from guaranteeing private infrastructure finance vis-a-
vis the immediate and contingent cost to government may be necessary. Going further, based 
on the results of the SEM analysis, the two factors contributing towards the PSC as a 
construct are PSC1= Compulsory PSC evaluation both at project and guarantee scheme 
levels (with a regression weight=0.88 and reliability coefficient of 0.701); PSC2= Integrating 
PSC evaluation into government guarantee-decision making process (with a regression 
weight=0.79 and reliability coefficient of 0.698). These results highlight existing studies on 
the essence of public sector comparator as an essential tool for examining accountability in 
infrastructure PPP (NAO, 2015, pp7; Whyte, 2015; Bain, 2010; Cruz and Marques, 2013). 
According to Zwalf et al. (2017), the PSC addresses value for money (VFM) by focusing on 
output specification with effective simulation of risk allocation that helps select a risk 
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strategy with the best value. In addition, the PSC allows the public sector to gain insightful 
knowledge into the project/business determinants and thus seem an effective tool for projects 
under public guarantees (Hu et al., 2014). 
9.4.3 Monitoring and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP Government 
Guarantee Scheme 
 
The third most significant process-based accountability mechanism for appraising PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme is “Monitoring”. Going by its standardised regression weight 
of (βValue) of 0.78, the factor is significant at 99% confidence level. The composite 
reliability for this factor also show reliability of the factor at 0.76 whilst accounting for 0.54 
percent of variance of in model. This result highlights some existing studies as monitoring 
plays critical role is successful delivery of PFI/PPP projects (Gropp et al., 2013; Allen et al., 
2015; Beck et al., 2010; Mladenovic et al., 2013). Stelling (2014) highlighted the existence of 
effective monitoring mechanism, as a critical strategy for ensuring better service delivery 
through vigilant observation of actors’ behaviours (Asenova, 2013; Stelling, 2014). 
According to Liu et al. (2016), monitoring helps avoid poor decision-making that may result 
in undesired consequences for projects. Evidences have shown that, where monitoring is lax, 
abuse and inefficiency hinders the achievement of public policy goals for PPPs (Hodge and 
Greve, 2007; Campagnac, 2011; Shaw, 2011). As suggested by Robinson and Scott (2009), 
fulfilling the theoretical value for money (VFM) claims in PFI will also largely depend on the 
effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms in place for ensuring practical value in service 
delivery. McDowall (2000) adds that since PFI projects involve the public sector paying for 
services delivered over 25-30years of concession, effective project performance monitoring is 
necessary for achieving service level agreements. As shown in Fig 8.6, the three essential 
factors under monitoring that is contributing towards accountability in PFI/PPP government 
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guarantee scheme are listed below. M1=Continuous monitoring of corporate and external 
dealings of the project consortium members during the period of guarantee (with a 
regression weight=0.72 and reliability coefficient of 0.715), M2=More qualitative public 
awareness on fiscal risks arising from contingent liabilities (with a regression weight=0.67 
and reliability coefficient of 0.701) and M3=External monitoring through audit institutions 
and other interest groups (with a regression weight=0.64 and reliability coefficient of 0.725). 
Studies such as Beck et al. (2010), Mladenovic et al., (2013), and Javed et al. (2013) have 
argued that continuous monitoring of corporate and external dealings of the project 
consortium during the period of guarantee may be needed to prevent practices that could later 
jeopardize the project. In addition, Priemus et al. (2007); Robinson et al, (2009); and 
Boussabaine, (2013) have called for more qualitative public awareness on fiscal risks arising 
from contingent liabilities and external monitoring through audit institutions. Carbo-Valverde 
et al. (2013) and Gozzi and Schmukler, (2015) also suggested the use of sanctions against 
wrong practices to serve as incentive for actors to ensure effective monitoring of projects 
under guarantee scheme. 
9.4.4 Performance Auditing and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. 
 
Performance Auditing (PA) is the least ranked process-based accountability mechanism in 
terms of its impact on PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. This mechanism showed a 
regression weight (βValue) of 0.69 at 95% confidence interval (as shown in Fig 8.6). PA also 
revealed group reliability Cronbach’s α of 0.801 suggesting the accountability mechanism’s 
contribution towards the overall model. The value of 0.58 percentage (%) variance, based on 
Fig 8.9 also indicated the predictive power of the factor on the model. Confirming the 
significant contribution of performance auditing, Pollitt et al. (1999, pp.128) described 
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auditing of effectiveness and good management ‘demands an investigation of outcomes. 
Outcome investigation by definition takes place in the world beyond the organisation or 
program’, and requires the use of independent evaluation criteria. Performance audits focuses 
on measuring improvements in outputs (efficiency) and outcomes (effectiveness) of public 
sector products or services against pre-articulated standards (Ameyaw et al., 2015). Under 
PFI/PPP procurement, auditing project performance is seen as a critical aspect of 
accountability especially given PFI’s political and financial significance (Edwards et al., 
2004; Pollock and Price, 2004). A major reason for this is due to various theoretical and 
empirical arguments regarding the validity, cost and value of privately procured public 
infrastructure (Owolabi et al., 2015).  As suggested by Yaun et al. (2009), conducting 
effective performance audit relies on a clearly identified overall objective for such evaluation. 
In the case of PFI/PPPs, the ultimate objective for the public sector client is the achievement 
of best value in projects and service delivery (Christensen and Lægreid, 2015). Best value, 
which Oyedele (2013) described as the maximum obtainable outcome from any infrastructure 
development, emphasizes value elements such as quality, effectiveness, efficiency, value for 
money and performance (Yaun et al., 2009). The significance of these best value elements is 
often reliant on the integration of stakeholder requirements, project characteristics and the 
achievability of the value elements vis-a-vis available resources (Bawole and Ibrahim, 2016). 
Going by findings from Fig 8.6, the four performance auditing factors contributing towards 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme are listed below in their order of 
ranking. PA1=Project life cycle cost reduction (with a regression weight=0.71 and reliability 
coefficient of 0.791), PA2= Adequate risk transfer among project parties (with a regression 
weight=0.65 and reliability coefficient of 0.746), PA5= On-time project completion, (with a 
regression weight=0.62 and reliability coefficient of 0.730) and PA3= Acceptable project 
quality (with a regression weight=0.61 and reliability coefficient of 0.782). These results 
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highlight studies such as Diefenbach (2009), Yaun et al. (2009), Hodge and Greve (2013), 
and Fombad (2014) who all agreed that performance audit is a critical ingredient of neo-
liberal market philosophy of New Public Management (NPM). Bourn (2007) suggested 
project life cycle cost reduction as an indicator of performance which originally has huge 
impact on the overall rationale for adopting a private procurement route. Adequate risk 
transfer among project parties (Akbıyıklı, 2013), acceptable project quality (Diefenbach, 
2009), and quality service delivery (Christensen and Lægreid, 2015) were also identified as 
measures determining the performance of PFI infrastructure. In another related study, Hodge 
and Greve (2013) and Fombad (2014) also suggested on-time project completion, and 
economic empowerment of local community as essential factors reflecting the performance 
of PPP projects. 
9.5 Democratic Accountability Mechanisms and Its Impact on PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. 
 
As discussed under the theory chapter, an important aspect of accountability is to ensure 
public managers act in the interest of the public through accountability processes that 
strengthens democracy. Thus, this section discusses findings from analysis of democratic 
accountability mechanisms as they impact on accountability in PFI/PPP infrastructure 
guarantee scheme.  Based on results of the structural equation model carried out in this study, 
four out of the five democratic accountability mechanisms examined were highly considered 
by respondents as essential for strengthening public accountability in PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme. These democratic mechanisms include the following in their ranking 
order: 
 PS=Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 SPI=Social and Political Impact 
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 RL=Rule of Law 
 SE=Stakeholders Engagement. 
These democratic accountability mechanisms are extensively discussed below as they impact 
on PFI/PPP infrastructure guarantee scheme.  
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9.5.1 Parliamentary Scrutiny and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. 
 
With a standardised regression weight of (       ) of 0.85 at 99% confidence interval (as 
shown in Fig 8.8), Parliamentary Scrutiny (PS) emerged as the topmost accountability 
mechanism essential for evaluating potential projects under the infrastructure guarantee 
scheme. Parliamentary Scrutiny also showed group reliability Cronbach’s α of 0.720 
suggesting the accountability mechanism’s huge impact on the overall model. The value of 
0.61 percentage (%) variance, based on Fig 8.9 also suggested the predictive impact of the 
factor on the model. This results confirms the unanimous agreement of both public and 
private sector stakeholders on the democratic role public actors in ensuring accountability in 
PPP government guarantee scheme. Parliamentary scrutiny is an institutional activity that 
involves the evaluation of the expenditures, policies and general administration of 
government (Grube, 2014; Thompson, 2014). From a broader perspective, scrutiny is one of 
the three cardinal responsibilities of the parliament, with the remaining two being the 
enactment of legislation and approval of government’s financial budgets (Ward, 2015). There 
is fairly widespread consensus that well-developed institutions are essential constituents of 
democratic accountability, and a lack of effective accountability processes and arrangements 
weakens democracy (Olsen, 2013). Institutions in this context are portrayed as mechanisms 
for oversight, control and compliance. Public actors are presumed to be more likely to act in 
the interest of the public when they are accountable to the governed (Bovens et al., 2015). 
Democratic accountability mechanisms therefore play huge role in holding public managers 
accountable to the people within a democratic system (Bertelli and Sinclair, 2016). Many 
scholars have called for greater parliamentary oversight on EU member nations’ management 
of state aids (Featherstone, 2011; Buiter and Rahbari, 2012; Beck, 2012; Karanikolos et al., 
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2013). As suggested in studies like Reinhart and Rogoff, (2011) and Weil et al. (2013) 
greater control of contingent liabilities allows the parliament better oversight that strengthens 
the fiscal management. As shown in Fig 8.8 above, there are three factors under PS that are 
contributing towards accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. These factors 
include PS3= Encouragement of policy debates on government guarantee scheme (with a 
regression weight=0.89 and reliability coefficient of 0.716), PS2= Interactions with external 
experts and interest groups to examine wider impact of government guarantee scheme (with a 
regression weight=0.78 and reliability coefficient of 0.647) and PS1= Effective use of 
committee hearings to evaluate the management of government guarantee scheme (with a 
regression weight=0.73 and reliability coefficient of 0.711). These results highlight existing 
studies like Featherstone (2011), Buiter and Rahbari (2012), and Beck (2012) on the role of 
public actors in strengthening democratic institutions and processes. In parliamentary 
democracies like UK, Belgium etc., the traditional vertical accountability has often placed 
much emphasis on ministerial responsibilities (Bovens, 2005). Formal accountability is often 
done via ministerial responsibilities to the parliament, while public managers are not 
considered politically accountable (Bovens et al., 2015). However, over the past decades, 
hierarchical accountability approach has given way to diversified accountability relationships, 
with more studies calling for more parliamentary engagement of public managers (Shaoul et 
al., 2010; Laegreid and Christensen, 2013; Bovens et al., 2015). Accountability forums are 
now calling for increased use of parliamentary questioning and policy debates to hold public 
managers to account in the performance of their specific duties (Bovens et al., 2015; Van 
Dooren and Van de Walle, 2016). Such accountability dimension of bringing institutions and 
individual officials under parliamentary scrutiny could help address the weak scrutiny in 
government guarantee schemes. As suggested by Buiter and Rahbari (2012), the non-fiscal 
nature of government guarantee and its popular adoption in PFI/PPPs has allowed many 
269 
 
governments to rack-up huge public debt. These situation becomes dicier especially with the 
current uncertainty in the global economy which is threatening different economies (Gulati 
and Buchheit, 2013). In the event of economic challenges, contingent liabilities may present 
real financial challenge for government when guarantees are called (Weil et al., 2013). 
9.5.2 Socio-Political Impact and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. 
Socio-Political Impact (SPI) was ranked second most significant democratic accountability 
mechanism regarding its impact on PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. This 
accountability mechanism showed a regression weight (       ) of 0.78 at 99% confidence 
level (as shown in Fig 8.8). Socio-political impact also reflected group reliability Cronbach’s 
α of 0.826 indicating the accountability mechanism’s contribution towards the overall model. 
The 0.69 percentage (%) variance and represented on Fig 8.9 also suggested the predictive 
influence of the factor on the model. This result succinctly highlights the argument of 
Marcelino-Sádaba et al. (2015) that maximising the social welfare of the project users and 
host communities, whilst fulfilling government’s political objectives is essential for 
accountability in PPP. According to the HM Treasury Green Book (2003), examining wider 
society’s impact of projects plays important role in value for money (VFM) analysis. 
Example of social factors that may be examined include project’s impact on job creation and 
unemployment (Ugwu and Haupt, 2007), project’s impact on travel time and journey quality 
(Warner, 2013), affordable user charges (Tsamboulas et al., 2013), access to services (Ng et 
al., 2012), better stakeholder engagement (Shen et al., 2011), adequate security (Marcelino-
Sádaba et al., 2015), impact on biodiversity among others (Leigh and Neill, 2011; Zeng et al., 
2015). As represented in Fig. 8.8, there are top four factors under SPI contributing towards 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. These factors include: SPI1= 
Project’s impact on job creation and unemployment (with a regression weight=0.78 and 
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reliability coefficient of 0.820); SPI8= Sufficient risk transfer away from public sector (with a 
regression weight=0.75 and reliability coefficient of 0.822); SPI11= Better collaboration 
between public and private sector (with a regression weight=0.71 and reliability coefficient 
of 0.813); SPI9= Adequate response to public needs through timely project delivery (with a 
regression weight=0.68 and reliability coefficient of 0.825). These results confirm the studies 
of Ruckert and Labonté (2014), and Hu et al. (2014) who suggested that PPPs are often 
designed to satisfy social benefits such as job creation, improving access to services, 
economic growth among others. As argued by Vining and Boardman (2008), social impact 
analysis of projects facilitates more comprehensive cost-benefit evaluation, by ensuring net 
gains to the society outweighs unintended negative impacts (Ruckert and Labonté, 2014). In 
addition, political imperatives of government and pressures of host communities also have 
huge influence on PPP projects (Aldred, 2008). As suggested by Brugha,  and Zwi (1998) 
most PPPs are a product of high level political considerations, therefore often get caught in 
the web of different political manoeuvres and pressures (Ng et al., 2012). As such, different 
political factors are often considered when developing PPP projects such as local 
empowerment and stimulating evenly distributed urban development among others (Warner, 
2013, Ameyaw and Chan, 2015). 
9.5.3 Rule of Law and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP Government 
Guarantee Scheme 
 
The third most important democratic accountability mechanism relevant for appraising 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme is rule of law. Going by its standardised regression 
weight of (βValue) of 0.75, the factor is significant at 95% confidence interval. The 
composite reliability coefficient for this factor also showed a reliability of 0.63 whilst 
accounting for 0.63 percent (%) of variance of in model. This result mirrors the critical 
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influence of compliance with the rule of law and regulatory requirements in PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme. Rule of law refers to the submission of people to the dictates 
of the law regardless of their position in the society (poor or rich, high born or low born) 
(Fallon Jr, 1997; Chesterman, 2008). From a narrower perspective, rule of law implies that 
government’s authority may only be exercised in line with enshrined laws (Skaaning, 2010). 
In this sense, the law is superior to the wishes or dictates of individuals or rulers. Albeit, 
governments’ authority permeates all aspects of public sector transactions with various 
parties (Endicott, 1999; Møller and Skaaning, 2014), such dealings or contracts often happen 
within legal limits (Skaaning, 2010). In public sector transactions such as PFI/PPP 
procurements, government’s interaction with the private sector is also governed by legally 
bonded contractual arrangements which are enforceable under the law (Yehoue et al., 2006). 
This fact is also applicable to transactions like government’s implicit or explicit guarantees, 
with such arrangements having legal implications within relevant public policy frameworks 
(Joshi, 2010). As represented in Fig 8.8, there are four important factors driving rule of law in 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. These factors include RL2=Adequate institutional 
arrangements for supporting contract enforcement (with a regression weight=0.77 and reliability 
coefficient of 0.730), RL1=Enforceability of contracts and agreements in projects (with a 
regression weight=0.68 and reliability coefficient of 0.716), RL3=Legal scrutiny and 
evaluation of policy, projects and performance (with a regression weight=0.61 and reliability 
coefficient of 0.713), RL4=Clarity in legal/contractual rights and responsibility among 
project parties (with a regression weight=0.54 and reliability coefficient of 0.712). These 
results confirm some existing studies who have suggested that effective enforcement of 
contractual agreements (De Jong et al., 2010) and adequate institutional arrangements for 
enforcement (Fombad, 2013; Fombad, 2014), would ensure public accountability in public-
private contracts. Whilst Shen et al. (2006) and Hodge and Greve (2007) also suggested legal 
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scrutiny and evaluation of policy, projects and performance. Additionally, Zhang et al. (2015) 
and Delmon (2017) argued for more clarity in legal/contractual rights and responsibility 
among PPP project parties. 
9.5.4 Stakeholders Engagement and its implication for accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. 
 
Stakeholder Engagement (SE) is the least ranked democratic accountability mechanism 
regarding its impact on PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. This mechanism reflected a 
regression weight (βValue) of 0.61 at 95% significance level (as shown in Fig 8.8). 
Stakeholder engagement also reflected group reliability Cronbach’s α of 0.826 suggesting the 
accountability mechanism’s contribution towards the overall model. The value of 0.60 
percentage (%) variance, based on Fig 8.9 also show the factor‘s percentage contribution 
towards the overall model. These findings evidenced existing studies Li et al. (2005), Smyth 
and Edkins (2007), Cheung et al. (2010) and Sierra‐García et al. (2015) linking stakeholder 
engagement as a critical success factor for PFI/PPP projects. According to Ei-Gohary et al. 
(2006), many PPP projects across the world have failed as a result of poor management of 
stakeholders resulting in public opposition in most cases. Typically, PPP involves multiple 
participants that include but not limited to the project client (governing authority), project 
sponsors, senior lenders, construction and operation contractors, insurers, host communities 
among others (Li et al., 2005; Smyth and Edkins, 2007; Cheung et al., 2010). However, on 
most occasions, the interests of these participants often conflict due to competing motivations 
and objectives (Smyth, 2008). In addition, the complex arrangements in PPP contracts in 
addition to the long term nature of the relationships among project parties sometimes create 
difficulty in aligning all interests at all times (Boussabaine, 2013). As such, engagement 
among project stakeholders is seen as a means of reaching common ground while also 
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achieving individual objectives (De Schepper et al., 2014). That said, under infrastructure 
government guarantee schemes, the nature of relationships among parties become even more 
complex due to increased number of participants and the complexity of such fiscal 
transaction (Owolabi et al., 2015). New parties such as the guarantee administering authority 
(i.e. HM Treasury), Infrastructure and Project Authority (in the UK it’s called Infrastructure 
UK), external stakeholders like pressure and advocacy groups, the media among others all 
contribute towards the protection of different vested interests (NIP, 2011). As shown in Fig 
8.8, there are top four factors contributing towards stakeholder engagement under PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme. These factors comprise SE5=Clear understanding of all 
stakeholders’ area of interests, SE1=Effective communication and dialogue, SE2=Clear and 
effective communication channels and SE4=Transparent decision-making process. These findings 
are in line with several studies on managing stakeholders in PFI/PPP and guarantee scheme (Sierra‐
García et al., 2015; Erkul et al., 2016; Swoszowski et al., 2013).  Due to the increased 
complexity, Swoszowski et al. (2013) suggested effective communication and dialogue as a 
necessary condition for managing every stakeholder in order to achieve successful project 
delivery. According to Wiek et al. (2012), dialogue provides a means for parties to express 
their candid views and thus allow smooth resolution of issues. Two-way free flow of 
communication also ensures all stakeholders are on the same page at all times (Assaf and Al-
Hejji, 2006). Other studies such as Anvuur et al. (2011) and Golob and Podnar, (2014) have 
also suggested effective communication channels and staff commitment to laid down 
stakeholder engagement strategy. In another study, Erkul et al. (2016) and Yang et al. (2009) 
also identified transparent decision-making process and clear understanding of stakeholders’ 
area of interests as critical success factors for managing project stakeholders. 
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed results of descriptive, reliability analysis and structural equation 
modelling as it examined accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. The 
results of Mann Whitney U analysis identified differences in perceptions among public and 
private sector respondents on three key factors influencing accountability in PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme. These factors include (1) adequate incentives to encourage the 
supply of innovation from the private sector, (2) project’s contribution to social participation 
and inter-racial cohesion, and (3) continuous monitoring of corporate and external dealings of 
the project consortium members during the period of guarantee. A further examination of 
these factors showed a reflection of the popular disdain among the private sector towards 
perceived over-accountability from the public sector. These perception difference also raises 
the question of “responsibility”, especially regarding who has responsibility for actualising 
complex social objectives attached to government-backed PFI/PPP projects.  
 
This chapter also elaborated key accountability mechanisms and associated indicators 
influencing PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. The chapter unravelled the intertwined 
relationships among 14 essential accountability mechanisms such as value for money, 
parliamentary scrutiny, rule of law, stakeholder engagement among others. Amos IBM SPSS 
was then used to construct four different structural components of the overall model. Each of 
the components reflected a collection of mechanisms under outcome-based accountability, 
process-based, ethics-based and democratic accountability. Across the four broad 
accountability spectrums, the study identified 6 top-ranked accountability mechanisms 
critical for evaluating accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. These 
mechanisms include Value for money, Risk Management, Collaborative Partnership, 
Environmental Sustainability, Anti-corruption and Whistle Blower Policy. These 
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accountability mechanisms were selected having showed high regression estimates including 
Average Variance Extracted and Composite Reliability coefficients. The top-ranked 
accountability factors contributing towards each of the six top-ranked mechanisms were also 
unravelled and discussed in details vis-a-vis the overall final model produced at the end of the 
statistical analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
276 
 
 
 
Chapter Ten: Conclusion, Recommendations and Future Works 
 
10.0 Chapter Overview 
This chapter concludes the study by providing a summary of the entire study and the findings 
from qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. The following section presents 
comprehensive summary of the study and highlights the research aim, research design, 
techniques of data collection and the analytical approach employed in the study. Immediately 
following this, is the presentation of the key findings from the study, which are discussed in 
line with the objectives of the research, as identified in chapter one of the study. Theoretical 
and policy implication of the research findings, the study’s limitations and areas of future 
research interests are also covered in this concluding chapter. 
   
10.1 Summary of the Study 
 
With the global adoption of PFI/PPPs and the limited public sector resources, the use of 
government guarantee schemes to stimulate private sector investments in infrastructures has 
become a trend among many economies. Although, guarantee is only a contingent financial 
obligation of government, recent events threatening global economic resilience have shown 
that many economies including the UK may witness downturn. In the likely event of such 
happening, government guarantees may become a real and actual financial burden, further 
complicating already stressed public finances (as was the case with economies like Argentina 
and Greece). With this background in mind, a major concern for guarantees remains weak 
public accountability scrutiny despite that guarantees present huge fiscal implications, and 
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also changes the nature of risk allocation between public and private parties in PPPs (Chan 
and Xu, 2013). The popular accounting treatment of accrual method and budgetary reporting 
of guarantees (Marcel, 2014; Kopits, 2014) have been criticised as ineffective and need to be 
used in combination with other governance mechanisms (Laughlin, 2012; Guess and Ma, 
2015).  As a result, this study set out to develop a public accountability framework suitable 
for evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme within UK context. Accordingly, the 
study investigated constructs from accountability theory and identified accountability 
mechanisms relevant for evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. Asides 
identifying the key and underlying measures contributing towards public accountability in 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme, the study proceeded to explore differences in 
perceptions on the accountability measures among the research participants. The participants 
in the study comprise public sector employees and private sector stakeholders with 
experiences in PFI/PPP and Infrastructure government guarantee. 
 
In order to implement this study, multiples data collection methods were employed. In line 
with the epistemological proposition of critical realism, subjective cum objective research 
strategies were adopted. The study therefore combined qualitative with quantitative data 
collection methods under an exploratory sequential mixed method approach. The initial stage 
of the data collection involved a triple-method qualitative strategy. These comprise extensive 
theoretical review of literature at the earlier stage. This review led to the identification of 16 
accountability mechanisms along with 85 associated accountability indicators suitable for 
evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. So as to confirm the relevance of the 
identified mechanisms and associated factors within real life context of Government 
Guarantee-backed PFI/PPP projects in UK, multiple case study strategy was adopted. To this 
end, maximum variation sampling method was used to select three uniquely different but 
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suitable PFI/PPP projects in the UK.  Twenty three (23) semi-structured interviews and 
documentation analysis were used to explore public and private sector participants’ views on 
accountability arrangements within government guarantee and PFI/PPP process. More 
importantly, participants were asked to confirm whether the identified accountability 
measures were relevant to guaranteed PPP projects, based on their experiences. Their 
confirmations were corroborated with findings from project documentations from each case 
study PPPs investigated. After coding the interview and documentation data, a total of 78 
factors were considered relevant to the process within the scheme and PPPs including the 16 
accountability mechanisms. The 16 mechanisms and 78 associated indicators were then 
prepared for the next stage of the study. 
 
To strengthen the generalizability of the qualitative findings, the identified 16 mechanisms 
and 78 associated factors/indicators were used to formulate a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was initially piloted and later distributed to wider audiences. The questionnaire 
respondents comprise UK’s public and private sector stakeholders with prior involvement 
with PFI/PPPs and infrastructure guarantee scheme. Snowball sampling was used to 
gradually build up a pool of questionnaire respondents. Out of the 118 distributed 
questionnaires, 94 were returned and three incomplete questionnaires were identified, leaving 
the study with a total of 91 usable questionnaires for analysis. The analysis conducted 
included Descriptive Mean Rating, Reliability Analysis, and Non-Parametric Test of 
Significant Differences (Mann Whitney U Test). These statistical analysis helped uncover the 
key underlying factors contributing towards accountability in PFI/PPP Government 
Guarantee Scheme. These were identified across the 16 accountability mechanisms and under 
the four broad accountability spectrums.  
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To further understand the structural path and underlying accountability mechanisms vital for 
evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme, structural equation models were 
developed. Reliability and missing value analysis were performed to ensure that only reliable 
factors were considered for the model and no data was missing. Series of analysis including 
model fitness, modification and re-specification of the structural and measurement models 
were used to establish the underlying measures contributing towards public accountability in 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. The key accountability mechanisms suitable for 
evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme were also unravelled, with fourteen out of 
the 16 theoretical hypothesis validated. The results were then used to produce a final 
structural equation model through a conceptual framework for evaluating public 
accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme was presented. 
 
10.2 Main Findings of the Study based on Research Objectives 
Results of the study are elaborated in line with the aim and objectives set out for the study. 
Whilst the first part of this section is based on the first objective of the study which identifies 
suitable accountability mechanisms and associated indicators for evaluating PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme. The second part of the section, in line with objectives two of 
the study, examines differences in perception among UK public and private sector 
stakeholders on identified accountability mechanism and associated indicators.  The third 
section addresses the third objective of the study, which focuses on identifying the key 
underlying accountability mechanisms for evaluating accountability PFI/PPP government 
guarantees.  The fourth section of the study addresses the fourth objective of the study by 
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developing structural equation model for evaluating accountability in PFI/PPP government 
guarantees. 
10.2.1 Identification of Accountability Mechanisms and Associated Indicators for 
Evaluating PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme. 
Accountability mechanisms and associated measures for evaluating PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme were identified through extensive review of literature. In this regard, 
constructs from accountability theory – process-based accountability, outcome-based, ethics-
based and democratic accountability were deeply reviewed. In addition, literature review of 
accountability in PFI/PPPs, public sector management and government guarantee schemes 
were also carried out. This review helped reveal 16 relevant accountability mechanisms 
across the four broad spectrums of accountability dimensions in the study comprising risk 
management, rule of law, parliamentary scrutiny among others. In addition, a total of 85 
associated measures for evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme were revealed. 
The study confirmed the relevance of the identified measures via case study documentation 
and 23 semi-structured interviews with public and private sector experts having PFI/PPP and 
infrastructure guarantee experience. After the subjective confirmation by interview 
participants, a total of 7 out of the 85 accountability measures were rejected and therefore 
dropped. The remaining 78 associated measures were considered useful for evaluating 
accountability in PPP government guarantee, and therefore used to develop a questionnaire 
survey (See Table 6.5). The rejected accountability measures cuts across four accountability 
mechanisms (i.e. Whistle blowing, Environmental Sustainability, Collaborative Partnership 
and Benchmarking) and comprise the following: 
1. WB4=Financial incentives for encouraging whistle blowing among public employees. 
2. ES9=Security of project host community. 
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3. ES10=Contribution towards replenishing non-renewable mineral and energy 
resources. 
4. CP7=A multidisciplinary Team to be responsible for ensuring collaboration among 
project stakeholders. 
5. CP8=Integrating information Systems with all project parties. 
6. C6=Timely dissemination of information to bidders. 
7. BM3=Adequate resource committed to benchmarking exercises. 
 
10.2.2 Differences in perception among UK public and private sector stakeholders on 
accountability mechanism and associated indicators. 
In line with the second objective of the study, it was important to confirm whether all the 
accountability measures identified were perceived differently or similarly based on the job 
sector of the respondents. Hence, having qualitatively confirmed the relevance of each 
accountability mechanisms and indicators, the study checked for existence of significant 
differences in perceptions among public and private sector respondents on each identified 
accountability measures. This was done after the first wave of descriptive and reliability 
analysis performed on the collected questionnaire data. Mann Whitney U test of significant 
differences was therefore conducted for all the measures across the 16 accountability 
mechanisms. These analyses was carried out for measures classified under each of the four 
broad accountability dimensions (i.e. outcome-based, process, ethics and democratic etc.).  
 
The first phase of the Mann Whitney U test was implemented for accountability mechanisms 
classified under outcome-based accountability. These comprised five accountability 
mechanisms including Value for Money, Risk Management, Collaborative Partnership, and 
Environmental Sustainability. All the four mechanisms contained 28 associated measures in 
the order of 7, 5, 6, 2, and 8 measures respectively. The Mann Whitney U result indicate that, 
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out of the 28 outcome-based factors across the five mechanisms, only 1 factors were 
perceived differently by the (public and private sector) participants. The disputed factor is: 
ES1=Project’s contribution to social participation and inter-racial cohesion. However, with 
98.01% of respondents’ in agreement with all the factors, the null hypothesis of no significant 
difference was validated. Whilst, for public sector, the result highlighted government’s desire 
to pursue social and developmental goals with PPP project delivery, while creating equitable 
opportunities and engender social participation across the rank and files. For the private 
sector, the result raises the question of responsibility, with the argument that social inclusion 
and inter-racial participation are wider policy issues needing multifaceted approach than a 
collection of projects. 
 
The second phase of the Mann Whitney U test was performed on ethic-based accountability 
measures. These comprise two different accountability mechanisms, namely whistle blowing 
policy and anti-corruption, both having three and five associated measures respectively. 
Based on the Man Whitney U test, the result suggested all the factors were perceived 
similarly by respondents across public and private sectors at 95% confidence level. The third 
phase of the Mann Whitney U test was conducted on process-based accountability measures. 
These comprise mechanisms such as Competition, Monitoring, benchmarking, Performance 
Auditing, and Public Sector Comparator.  All the five mechanisms comprise 5, 2, 4, 6, and 2 
associated measures respectively. Results of the Man Whitney U test suggest that out of all 
the 19 process-based factors/measures analysed, two (2) factors were perceived differently 
across the two category of respondents (public and private sector participants). In addition, 
the result confirm 97.2% of the respondents are in agreement with all the process-based 
factors in confirmation with the null hypothesis. The two disputed measures include C5= 
Adequate incentives to encourage the supply of innovation from the private sector and, 
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M1=Continuous monitoring of corporate and external dealings of the project consortium 
members during the period of guarantee. The result (C5) highlights public sector’s argument 
that innovative solutions is already a key component of value for money (VFM) in PFI/PPP. 
Hence additional effort at incentivising private investment is less favourably considered a 
driver of accountability by public employees. From private sector perspective, public sector 
has less competence to engage in competitive market and therefore lacks innovative abilities 
which it must incentivise to create market competition. The respondents also differ on 
whether public accountability in PPP government guarantee be extended towards monitoring 
corporate and external dealings of guarantee beneficiaries. From private sector perspective, 
such accountability oversteps the traditional boundary of government in market-based 
arrangement and reflect encroachment that may unsettle business environment. Public 
sector’s point of view differs by considering the greater risk of moral hazard as a key 
motivation for extensive due diligence and monitoring of beneficiaries. 
10.2.3 Key underlying accountability mechanisms for evaluating accountability PFI/PPP 
government guarantees. 
 
In line with the third objective of the study, key underlying mechanisms contributing towards 
public accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. Going by the results of the 
structural equation model, out of the fourteen statistically important accountability 
mechanisms, the five top-ranked accountability mechanisms were identified. These 
mechanisms include are: 
 Value for Money (VFM) 
 Competition (C) 
 Social and Political Impact (SPI) 
 Risk Management (RM) 
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 Parliamentary Scrutiny (PS) 
Value for money (VFM) - Based on the results of the structural equation modelling and 
group reliability Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, VFM was rated the most important underlying 
mechanism for evaluating accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme (See 
Table 8.2). Accordingly, out of the seven (7) measures of value for money (VFM), the top-
five VFM measures as reflected in Fig. 8.2 are (1) VFM1=Least procurement cost, which 
emphasises  affordability of projects delivery, (2) VFM3=Equitable risk allocation among 
project parties, which entails transferring risk to the party that is best able to control and 
manage such risks. In addition, whilst the 3
rd
 important VFM measure is (3) 
VFM6=Competitive bidding process, which involves creating level playing field and 
allowing increased participation of bidders; (4) VFM2=Service quality/output specification 
entails meeting pre-defined service and technical specification in delivered projects. Finally, 
the fifth important VFM measure is (5) VFM4= Minimal whole life costing of project, which 
emphasizes reduction in the cost a project right from the construction and operation life of the 
project till the end of the concession. 
 
Competition (C) – Going by results of the structural equation modelling (See Table 8.2), the 
second most important underlying mechanism for evaluating accountability in PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme is Market Competition. Competition is described as an 
instrument of choice that allows elimination of market inefficiencies through facilitating 
rivalry among suppliers within an economic system (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015). Based on 
result in Fig 8.2, the top-five accountability measures contributing towards Market 
Competition are (1) C4= Transparent bidding and tendering process, involving clarity in 
bidding rules and decision making process. (2) C1= Increasing the number of potential 
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bidders or applicants, which is seen as key parameter for creating competition that engenders 
innovation, (3) C2= Availability of in-house commercial skills within the public sector, 
which emphasizes the public sector competence in dealing with complex commercial deals 
and financial engineering that enables it take better informed judgement on PPP/guarantee 
contracts. In addition, whilst the fourth important measure of competition is (4) C3= Open 
and comprehensive bidding parameters and requirements, which is seen as precursor for 
creating level playing field among investors, (5) C5= Adequate incentives to encourage the 
supply of innovation from the private sector is seen as the least important measure of 
competition that highlights deliberate and conscious efforts of government at encouraging 
private sector investors to develop innovative solutions in project delivery.   
 
Social and Political Impact (SPI) – Based on results of the structural equation modelling, 
the third most important accountability mechanism for evaluating PFI/PPP Government 
Guarantee Scheme is ‘Social and Political Impact’. This results underline arguments that 
maximising social welfare of the project users and host communities, while also fulfilling 
government’s political objectives is critical to PFI/PPP success (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017). 
Based on results shown in Fig 8.8, the top-five important measures of Socio-political impact 
are (1) SPI1= Project’s impact on job creation and unemployment, which emphasizes the 
economic growth and empowerment contribution of the project to the host community, (2) 
SPI8= Sufficient risk transfer away from public sector, reiterating the traditional rationale for 
PPP and the risk aversion of the public sector towards the risks outside its tradition control. 
(3) SPI11= Better collaboration between public and private sector, (4) SPI9= Adequate 
response to public needs through timely project delivery, (5) SPI3= Affordable user charges. 
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Risk Management (RM) – Results of the structural equation model also revealed the fourth 
most important accountability mechanisms for evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee 
scheme is Risk Management. According to the National Audit Office Report on Managing 
Risks to Improve Public Service (2011), the UK government considers effective risk 
management as a vital tool for curtailing failures in service delivery and improving overall 
efficiency. In line with the results of statistical analysis, the top-four accountability indicators 
of risk management are:  (1) RM2= Integrating risk management systems into public sector 
evaluative frameworks, (2) RM1= Improved public sector risk management 
competences/capabilities, (3) RM4=Proactive evaluation of past risk events (4) 
RM3=Regular risk identification and reporting. 
 
Parliamentary Scrutiny (PS) – Going by results of the structural equation modelling, the 
fifth most important accountability mechanism for evaluating PFI/PPP government guarantee 
scheme is Parliamentary Scrutiny. ). Parliamentary scrutiny is an institutional activity that 
involves the evaluation of the expenditures, policies and general administration of 
government (Grube, 2014; Thompson, 2014). From a broader perspective, scrutiny is one of 
the three cardinal responsibilities of the parliament, with the remaining two being the 
enactment of legislation and approval of government’s financial budgets (Ward, 2015). An 
examination of parliamentary scrutiny as shown in Fig. PS3= Encouragement of policy 
debates on government guarantee scheme, PS2= Interactions with external experts and 
interest groups to examine wider impact of government guarantee scheme, PS1= Effective 
use of committee hearings to evaluate the management of government guarantee scheme. 
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10.2.4 Developing a Structural Equation Modelling for Accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme 
The fourth objective identified for the study is to develop a structural equation model useful 
for evaluating accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. In order to achieve, 
this objectives, the questionnaire data was checked for internal consistency of the 
measurement scale. Thus reliability analysis conducted helped arrive at a comprehensive set 
of reliable accountability factors. In addition, to further ensure that the model is built on set of 
statistically reliable factors, Construct validity and reliability of the models were assessed 
(using Average Variance Extracted and Maximum Shared Squared Variance MSV). Having 
established the fit indices of the models and the validity of the latent variables (accountability 
mechanisms) across the four accountability dimensions (outcome-based, process, ethics and 
democratic), a comprehensive structural equation model was developed. This was achieved 
by incorporating the four sub-component structural models in one final model. The 
integration allowed confirmation of the model structure vis-a-vis the intertwined relationship 
among all the fourteen latent (accountability mechanisms). In addition, the integration of the 
model helped estimate the impact of each first-order construct on the second-order variable 
(accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme). So as to develop the final model 
as a second-order structural model, data imputation using AMOS IBM SPSS was employed 
to produce values for all the first-order variables (accountability mechanisms) across the four 
accountability dimensions in the study. This approach ensured the study avoided criticisms of 
lack of validity that is often associated with adopting third-order reflective or composite 
factors (Wetzels et al., 2009). The overall and final model, as shown in Fig 8.9, revealed the 
% variance contributed to the model by the 14remaining accountability mechanisms. 
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10.3 Implication for Practice 
Many nations across the world face the task of managing public sector guarantees which 
often arise from multiple sources, including trade, infrastructure PPPs, foreign exchange etc. 
The last Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007/2008 and the associated huge public debt has 
made countries even more vulnerable to severe fiscal risks in recent times. Although various 
fiscal policy and accountability prescriptions that includes accrual budgeting and reporting 
have been advised by the World Bank and other multinational financial institutions (Kopits, 
2014; Marcel, 2014). Yet, accountability lapses have continued to trail public sector handling 
of government guarantees schemes especially in the case of PPPs (Willems and Van Dooren, 
2016). According to Willems and Van Dooren, (2016), among other shortcomings, the dual 
role of the public sector both in PPP project development and government guarantee 
approvals raises doubts about her ultimate neutrality in decision making. Hence, the big 
question of whether current accountability mechanisms are sufficient to prevent abuse of PPP 
government guarantee scheme remains a critical issue. In this study, a multidimensional 
framework was developed to provide insights into the evaluation of public accountability in 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme.  Evidences suggest that successful management of 
guarantees can be linked directly to sufficient accountabilities that is built into its evaluative 
framework. Therefore, results of this study have a number of important policy implications 
for PPPs under guarantee contracts Firstly, evidences from this research nullifies a one size 
fits all public accountability approach to PPP guarantee scheme evaluation by suggesting a 
multidimensional accountability scrutiny. Instructively, no time is more auspicious that now, 
considering the UK government’s new infrastructure delivery plan which eyes project 
delivery via PF2 and other private sector routes, in order to achieve her £483 billion targeted 
infrastructure investment by 2021 (NIP, 2016). Given the grand nature of this planned future 
infrastructure delivery in the UK vis-à-vis the role of £40 billion infrastructure guarantee 
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scheme, a comprehensive blend of accountabilities that helps deliver public value is essential. 
Such robust accountability framework will therefore require due consideration for ethical, 
democratic and outcome driven processes, so as to ensure successful management of PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme.  
 
In addition, going by findings from this study, the top-five accountability mechanisms 
necessary for evaluating PFI/PPP guarantee scheme includes the following: Value for Money 
(VFM), Competition (C), Socio-Political Impact (SPI), Risk Management (RM) and 
Parliamentary Scrutiny (PS). In the case of value for money (VFM), the results suggest public 
managers are able to ensure that government guaranteed PFI/PPPs justify their superiority 
against traditional procurement. Additionally, existence of competitive guarantee application 
process helps enable selection of the most economically desirable projects, as against project 
selection that is merely based on low cost. In addition, ensuring maximisation of projects’ 
social benefits to users and host communities, as well as fulfilling government’s political 
objectives will ensure policy goals addresses the most cogent concerns of the citizenry. 
Furthermore, government guarantee is often associated with fiscal risks, and as such, a more 
robust risk management strategy is necessary in the case of PPPs. This will help mitigate 
against unexpected fiscal challenges that may result in a call on the guarantee, and therefore 
bring to live, the real financial liability. Additionally, the role of democratic institutions is 
seen as critical to public accountability, as Olsen (2013) suggested that lack of effective 
accountability processes weakens democracy. Hence, parliamentary scrutiny on the 
operations and handling of government guarantee scheme, will help ensure public interest is 
constantly upheld. The policy implication of these results for government is that, future 
government guarantee evaluation for PFI/PPPs can integrate these key accountability 
mechanisms into their due diligence appraisals. This will help ensure that a more 
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comprehensive approach that strengthens public accountability is taken whilst making 
decisions on deserving projects under the infrastructure guarantee scheme. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that although the UK has voted for BREXIT, it currently 
remains in the EU till 2019 or longer and therefore bonded by EU rules until the final exit. In 
the light of this, the current use of government guarantee scheme for infrastructure PPP 
procurements and the reflection of such transactions on public sector balance sheet (under 
accrual accounting principle), has wider implications on a host of issues. Firstly, guarantees 
exert pressures on government’s capacity to comply with EU-prescribed macroeconomic 
indices such as debt/GDP ratio and debt ceiling (Eubanks, 2010; Zandstra, 2011). With 
member states expected to observe 60% public debt/GDP ratio and 3% budget deficit 
(Verdun, 2015), the challenge for public managers is meeting policy objectives under the 
guarantees scheme, while also fulfilling deficit reduction. At the moment, the economic value 
of UK’s contingent liabilities which includes government guarantees, pension’s scheme, etc. 
that is reflected on the public balance sheet and the huge debt in future unitary payments on 
PFI projects, currently stands at £1.387Trillion by the end of 2012.  This will therefore pile 
additional pressure on UK’s gross national debt, with serious complications already created 
by BREXIT, in addition to some existing commitments to certain jointly signed EU 
contingent liabilities prior to BREXIT vote.   
10.4 Theoretical Implication of the study 
This research contributes to existing accountability theories in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
study confirms Boven’s (2010) assertion that both “accountability as a virtue” and 
“accountability as a mechanism” are collectively needed to strengthen public accountability. 
Hence, although this study examined accountability mechanisms for evaluating PPP 
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guarantee scheme, themes such as reporting, transparent bidding and tendering, responsibility 
- all of which are normative concepts that mirrors accountability from a virtuous perspective, 
were reflected in the research findings and also statistically contributed towards study. The 
implication of this is that, for public accountability, especially in transactions with blurry 
lines of accountability between public and private parties, such as PFI/PPP. The combination 
of high moral standards and institutional mechanisms of accountability will therefore be 
important to strengthen public accountability. Similar to the above perspective, whilst 
exploring process accountability, Tetlock and Mellers (2011b), opined that most 
accountability mechanisms are a constantly evolving process-outcome hybrids that lean 
towards either side, depending on the context or task. According to Tetlock and Mellers, the 
desirability of one type of accountability is often based on context within which the 
accountee operate at a given time. This perspective is similar to the description by Sinclair 
(1995, pp. 219) of the chameleon-like nature of accountability which changes with context 
and remains ever evasive. As such, in this study, process, ethics, democratic and outcome-
based accountabilities were used as theoretical constructs to classify a number of 
accountability mechanisms investigated. Based on the results from the study, only two 
accountability mechanisms (benchmarking and budgetary visibility/reporting), each from 
process and outcome-based accountability constructs were rejected by the respondents. There 
was no clear cut evidence of any statistically significant rating differences among respondents 
based on accountability dimension. The implication of this result confirms Tetlock and 
Mellers (2011) including Sinclair (1995) and suggested that accountability forums favour 
certain types of accountability tool at certain times based on whether their need are well 
served by its adoption. In this regard, for many accountability forums, accountability 
mechanisms remain a blend of different but useful accountabilities that interchanges rather 
than a stand-alone tool. Going by the result of this study therefore, a single accountability 
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mechanism will be incapable of addressing the multifaceted nature of transaction in PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme going the complexities of such public transactions. This 
research therefore join earlier literature such as Boven’s (2010), Tetlock and Mellers (2011b), 
Bovens et al. (2015) to lay to rest the theoretical arguments of Luke (2010), Patil et al. (2014) 
and Olsen (2017) among others about a necessary dichotomy among accountabilities based 
process-outcome and virtue /mechanism. 
 
Additionally, this study supports existing assertions in earlier studies such as Robinson and 
Scott (2009) and Sainati et al (2017) that the notion of off-budget financing of PPPs is 
unrealistic. This conclusion was based on findings from the study which highlighted how, 
contingent liabilities incurred in the name of PFI/PPP end up on public sector budget under 
the accrual accounting treatment of fiscal guarantees.  
10.5 Limitations of the Study and Areas of Future Research 
However some limitations of the study include the principal focus on the United Kingdom. A 
major reason for this was due to freedom of access to data sources, especially interview 
participants. In addition, the study also focused on perspectives of UK’s public and private 
sector stakeholders alone especially the one with PFI/PPP and Infrastructure guarantee 
experience. Other economies using government guarantees for PPPs have not been 
considered in this study.  
 
Furthermore, this study also focused mainly on Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) and Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) projects that have been backed with government guarantee. As 
such, other methods of infrastructure procurement including contracting and concession were 
excluded from this study. Another limitation of this study is that only three UK infrastructure 
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PFI/PPP projects were considered for the multiple-case qualitative investigation in this study. 
A major reason for this is because the UK currently has a small but growing portfolio of 
government guarantee-backed PFI/PPP projects.  This research is also limited to 
accountability mechanisms and their significant contribution towards strengthening public 
accountability in PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. Hence, other forms of 
accountability including managerial accountability, personal, legal, democratic or political 
accountabilities were not considered in this study. 
 
This study have only considered infrastructure PFI/PPPs alone, such as roads, bridges, rails, 
among others. Other future studies might find it worthy to explore accountability in 
government guarantees for other type of PPPs (i.e. Forfeiture model, etc.). In addition, 
although this study focused specifically on government guarantee using the UK as a case 
point, further empirical studies can be carried out by looking into accountability framework 
for PPP government guarantee in other global economies. In addition, future empirical 
studies could be carried out to examine the possible impact of diffusion of EU’s 
accountability practices into UK’s framework on public-private procurements in the UK post 
BREXIT. It is also possible to examine the possible impact of accountability overload or 
over–accountability on PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme. As earlier stated, this study 
has been conducted only within the context of the UK PFI/PPPs in relation to the 
infrastructure guarantee scheme. As such, findings from the study should therefore be 
interpreted only within this context. Studies from other countries on PFI/PPP and government 
guarantee could use findings from this study as a means of doing a comparative analysis with 
their own contexts.  
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Appendix: Questionnaire  
Public Accountability: A Case of Government Guarantee Scheme for PFI/PPP 
Projects. 
 
Dear Respondents, 
 
I am a postgraduate doctoral researcher studying PFI/PPP Project Finance and Management, at the Faculty 
of Business and Law, University of the West of England (UWE), Bristol. This questionnaire emerged after 
an extensive qualitative investigation into Accountability in Government Guarantee Scheme; and seeks to 
capture stakeholders’ views concerning accountability mechanisms suitable for evaluating publicly 
guaranteed PFI/PPP projects under the United Kingdom (UK) Infrastructure Guarantee programme.  
 
Responses from the questionnaire are only designed for academic purpose, and as such, all individual 
answers will be treated with utmost confidentiality. This is strictly in line with UWE’s ethical guidelines as 
touching anonymity of academic research. 
 
Additionally, I want to stress that your participation in this survey is voluntary, as you reserve the right not 
to consent or answer any particular question considered offensive or inappropriate. However, be assured that 
all questions only pertains to your experiences with UK’s Infrastructure Guarantee Scheme and PFI/PPP 
projects in general. On estimate, filling this questionnaire will take about 30mins of your time. Finally, in 
case you have questions regarding the questionnaire, kindly feel free to express them. 
 
Thank you in anticipation of your valuable contributions to this study. 
 
Section A – Particulars of Respondents    (Please mark answers with an ‘X’) 
 
1. Type of Organisation you are working for:  
  
Bank ☐   Investment Firm ☐   Hedge Funds ☐ Insurance ☐   Special Purpose Vehicle ☐    
Construction Contractor ☐   FM/Operations Contractor ☐ Public Authority ☐Academics☐   others ☐      
   
2. Job Title of Respondents:  
Director ☐   Senior Manager ☐  Manager ☐ Dep. Director ☐ Senior staff ☐ Junior Staff ☒ others ☐    
PFI/PPP Manager ☐   Project Manager ☐  Contracts Manager ☐ 
 
3. Years of Experience in the industry: 
  
  
4. Number of PFI/PPP Projects you have personally being involved in? 
          
 
5. Year of Experience in UK Infrastructure Government Guarantee Scheme? 
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6. Responses to the questions in this questionnaire need to be based on your experience on UK 
Infrastructure Guarantee Scheme and/or a particular PFI/PPP project. Kindly specify by marking the 
type of PFI/PPP project that you have been involved with. 
 
 
NHS (Hospital Facility) ☐ School Projects ☐ Road Project ☐ Waste Plant ☐ Oil and Gas ☒    
Housing ☐ Defense Facility ☐ Rail Project ☐ Airport ☒ Prison Facility ☐ Energy Project ☐ Others 
☐ 
 
 
Section B –  Outcome-based Accountability factors influencing PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Scheme 
This section considers (5) outcome-based accountability mechanisms (identified from the qualitative study) 
contributing towards accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme and their associated 
indicators. 
      
 
The following accountability factors are considered essential for strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme. Kindly rate your level of agreement with these outcome-based 
accountability factors based on your experience with PFI/PPP projects and government guarantee scheme, 
on the following scale; 
     
5=Strongly Agreed       4=Agreed   3=Undecided   2=Disagree 1=Strongly Disagree 
Value for Money  
ID  
To what extent do you agree that the following Value for money measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
 
Agreement on factor 
5 4 3 2 1 
VFM
1 
Risk associated with the project’s ability to generate sufficient cash flows to meet debt service 
repayments 
     
VFM
2 
Least procurement cost      
VFM
3 
Service quality/output specification      
VFM
4 
Equitable risk allocation among project parties      
VFM
5 
Minimal whole life costing of project      
VFM
6 
Effective management of project over the long term period      
VFM
7 
Competitive bidding process      
VFM
8 
Innovative solutions      
Risk Management Factors 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Risk Management measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
RM1 Improved public sector risk management competences/capabilities.      
RM2 Integrating risk management systems into public sector evaluative frameworks      
RM3 Regular risk identification and reporting      
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RM4 Proactive evaluation of past risk events      
RM5 Strong stance on compliance with regulatory frameworks      
Collaborative Partnership 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Collaborative Partnership measures are essential 
for strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
CP1 Open and honest communication among project parties      
CP2 Consortium senior officials’ commitment towards successful collaboration      
CP3 Existence of clearly defined relationship and communication sharing strategy      
CP4 Commitment of the project delivery team      
CP5 Fair risk allocation among public-private parties      
CP6 Early warning signals for detecting and solving conflicts or crisis.      
Budgetary Reporting 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Budgetary Reporting measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
BR1 Reporting government guarantees and other contingent liabilities in the national budget      
BR2 Oversight and control      
Environmental Sustainability 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Budgetary Reporting measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
ES1 Project’s contribution to social participation and inter-racial cohesion      
ES2 Project’s contribution to increased utilisation of local materials      
ES3 Adoption of energy efficient solutions      
ES4 Project’s contribution to reduction in material wastage      
ES5 Compliance with regulatory standards on sustainable project delivery      
ES6 Prevention of massive changes to landscape      
ES7 Project’s impact of surrounding plant and animals      
ES8 Contribution to economic and social prosperity of surrounding communities      
 
 
Section C –  Ethics-based Accountability factors influencing PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Scheme 
This section considers (2) ethics-based accountability mechanisms (identified from the qualitative study) 
contributing towards accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme and their associated 
indicators. 
 
The following accountability factors are considered essential for strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government guarantee scheme. Kindly rate your level of agreement with these ethics-based accountability 
factors based on your experience with PFI/PPP projects and government guarantee scheme, on the following 
scale 
 
5=Strongly Agreed       4=Agreed   3=Undecided   2=Disagree 1=Strongly Disagree 
Whistle Blowing Policy  
ID  
To what extent do you agree that the following Whistle blowing measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
 
Agreement on factor 
5 4 3 2 1 
WB1 Effective institutional arrangement to the inculcate culture of openness among staff      
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WB2 Adequate protection for whistle blowers against institutional witch-hunt      
WB3 Implementing procedurally correct actions to address reported wrongdoings      
Anti-Corruption 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Anti-Corruption measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
AC1 Strong stance against corruption in government guarantee schemes      
AC2 Clear, adequate and timely information about happenings, processes and rules      
AC3 Effective internal and external oversight and control      
AC4 Effective sanctions against corrupt practices      
AC5 Robust due diligence appraisals through extensive information gathering      
 
 
Section-D     Process-based Accountability factors influencing PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Scheme 
This section considers (5) process-based accountability mechanisms (identified from the qualitative study) 
contributing towards accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme and their associated 
indicators. 
 
The following accountability factors are considered essential for strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government guarantee scheme. Kindly rate your level of agreement with these process-based accountability 
factors based on your experience with PFI/PPP projects and government guarantee scheme, on the following 
scale 
   5=Strongly Agree   4=Agree     3=Neutral      2=Disagree     1=Strongly Disagree 
Competition  
ID  
To what extent do you agree that the following Competition measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
 
Agreement on factor 
5 4 3 2 1 
C1 Increasing the number of potential bidders or applicants      
C2 Availability of in-house commercial skills within the public sector.      
C3 Open and comprehensive bidding parameters and requirements      
C4 Transparent bidding and tendering process      
C5 Adequate incentives to encourage the supply of innovation from the private sector      
Benchmarking 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Benchmarking measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
BM1 Comprehensive articulation of historically good practices and processes      
BM2 Constant improvements on benchmarking techniques.      
Monitoring 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Monitoring measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
M1 Continuous monitoring of corporate and external dealings of the project consortium members 
during the period of guarantee 
     
M2 More qualitative public awareness on fiscal risks arising from contingent liabilities      
M3 External monitoring through audit institutions and other interest groups.      
M4 Effective use of sanctions against wrong practices      
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Performance Auditing 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Performance Audit measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
PA1 Project life cycle cost reduction      
PA2 Adequate risk transfer among project parties      
PA3 Acceptable project quality      
PA4 Quality service delivery      
PA5 On-time project completion,       
PA6 Economic empowerment of local community      
Public Sector Comparator 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Public Sector Comparator measures are essential 
for strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
PSC
1 
Compulsory PSC evaluation both at project and guarantee scheme levels.      
PSC
2 
Integrating PSC evaluation into government guarantee-decision making process.      
 
Section-E     Democratic Accountability factors influencing PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Scheme 
This section considers (4) democratic accountability mechanisms (identified from the qualitative study) 
contributing towards accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme and their associated 
indicators. 
 
The following accountability factors are considered essential for strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government guarantee scheme. Kindly rate your level of agreement with these democratic accountability 
factors based on your experience with PFI/PPP projects and government guarantee scheme, on the following 
scale 
   5=Strongly Agree   4=Agree     3=Neutral      2=Disagree     1=Strongly Disagree 
Social and Political Impact 
ID  
To what extent do you agree that the following indicators of Social and Political Impact (SPI) are 
essential for strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
 
Agreement on factor 
5 4 3 2 1 
SPI1 Project’s impact on job creation and unemployment      
SPI2 Project’s impact on travel time and journey quality      
SPI3 Affordable user charges      
SPI4 Access to services      
SPI5 Better stakeholder engagement      
SPI6 Adequate security      
SPI7 Project’s impact on biodiversity      
SPI8 Sufficient risk transfer away from public sector      
SPI9 Adequate response to public needs through timely project delivery      
SPI1
0 
Minimal life cycle cost      
SPI1
1 
Better collaboration between public and private sector      
Stakeholder Engagement 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Stakeholder Engagement measures are essential 5 4 3 2 1 
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for strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
SE1 Effective communication and dialogue      
SE2 Clear and effective communication channels      
SE3 Staff commitment to laid down stakeholder engagement strategy      
SE4 Transparent decision-making process      
SE5 Clear understanding of all stakeholders’ area of interests      
Rule of Law 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following indicators of Rule of Law are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
RL1 Enforceability of contracts and agreements in projects      
RL2 Adequate institutional arrangements for supporting contract enforcement      
RL3 Legal scrutiny and evaluation of policy, projects and performance.      
RL4 Clarity in legal/contractual rights and responsibility among project parties.      
Parliamentary Scrutiny 
ID To what extent do you agree that the following Parliamentary Scrutiny measures are essential for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? 
5 4 3 2 1 
PS1 Effective use of committee hearings to evaluate the management of government guarantee scheme      
PS2 Interactions with external experts and interest groups to examine wider impact of government 
guarantee scheme 
     
PS3 Encouragement of policy debates on government guarantee scheme       
 
SECTION F – Key Accountability Mechanisms for Evaluating PFI/PPP Government Guarantee 
Scheme 
To what extent do you agree with the following as important accountability mechanisms necessary for 
strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme? Kindly indicate the extent 
of your agreement with the statements on the scale of 1-5, where 
5= Strongly Agree     4= Agree     3= Undecided     2= Disagree      1= Strongly Disagree 
I.D To what extent do you agree that the following accountability mechanisms 
contribute positively towards strengthening accountability in PFI/PPP 
Government Guarantee Scheme? 
Degree of Agreement  
5 4 3 2 1 
F1. Determining the Value for money in guaranteed projects will contribute positively 
towards public accountability in PFI/PPP Government Guarantee Scheme. 
     
F2. Effective public sector risk management will strengthen public accountability in 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme. 
     
F3. Better collaboration between government and private sector parties on publicly 
guaranteed projects will strengthen accountability in government guarantee scheme 
to PFI/PPPs. 
     
F4. Reporting government’s contingent liabilities in publicly guaranteed PFI/PPPs on 
national budgets will improve public accountability in government guarantee 
scheme for PPPs. 
     
F5. Ensuring sustainable project delivery will strengthen public accountability in 
Government Guarantee Scheme for PFI/PPP projects. 
     
F6. Encouraging whistle blowing among employees involved in PFI/PPP government 
guarantee scheme will have positive impact on public accountability. 
     
F7. Prevention of corrupt practices and dishonest behaviours in the handling of 
PFI/PPP government guarantee scheme will have a positive impact on public 
accountability. 
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F8. Competitive project selection process under government guarantee scheme for 
PFI/PPPs will have positive impact on public accountability. 
     
F9. Benchmarking potential guaranteed PPP projects against historically good 
standards and processes under the government guarantee scheme will have positive 
impact on public accountability. 
     
F10. Effective monitoring of government guarantee scheme, actors and beneficiary 
PFI/PPP projects will have positive impact on public accountability. 
     
F11. Greater effective performance auditing of projects benefitting from government 
guarantee scheme will have positive impact on public accountability. 
     
F12. Adopting public sector comparator for deciding guarantee-deserving infrastructure 
projects will have positive implication for public accountability under PFI/PPP 
government guarantee scheme. 
     
F13. Robust social and political impact evaluation of PPP projects at the government 
guaranteed scheme level will have positive effect on public accountability. 
     
F14. Effective management of all stakeholders involved in government guaranteed 
PFI/PPPs will have positive impact on public accountability.   
     
F15. Upholding the rule of law in the management of PFI/PPP government guarantee 
scheme will have positive impact on public accountability. 
     
F16. Parliamentary scrutiny of public managers’ decisions and actions as they affect 
effective management of government’s fiscal liabilities on guarantee schemes to 
PPPs will strengthen public accountability. 
     
 
 
Any additional comments 
Please state any further information that you feel may have particular importance to the outcome of this 
questionnaire. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
